ATLANTA CAMPAIGN
STAFF RIDE
BRIEFING BOOK

CAMP CREEK BUSINESS CENTER
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMMAND (USARC)
ATLANTA CAMPAIGN
STAFF RIDE
BRIEFING BOOK

by
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USARC Staff Ride Briefing Book Series

USARC Staff Ride Briefing Books are produced by the Office of the Command Historian (OCH) to provide a systematic approach to the analysis of significant campaigns and battles in the history of the military art and the profession of arms. These handbooks supplement various essential training activities of unit leader development programs and military history education programs as required by Army regulation. Specifically, the immediate goal of the Staff Ride methodology is to make the professional development experience of military leaders more meaningful, by stimulating the process of historical inquiry, analysis and application. The ultimate goal of this publication is to help develop and sustain a historically minded officer and noncommissioned officer corps in the Army Reserve capable of applying a historical perspective to the resolution of contemporary military problems, and, in turn, to support the command’s mission of readiness for war.
FOREWORD

As it did in the 1920’s and 1930’s -- the lean years for the Army prior to World War II and the Cold War, during a period of scarce training funds the study of military history provides an inexpensive bridge toward a better understanding of the profession of arms. The Staff Ride, in particular, teaches invaluable lessons in the resourcefulness, courage, skill, and initiative of military leaders in actual combat operations.

This volume is the second in a series of Staff Ride handbooks for use by Army reservists in examining and assessing military operations of the past in order to be ready for the military challenges of the future. The study of campaigns such as that for the possession of Atlanta, and the major actions concerned, offer unique insights into the complexities of leadership and men in war, in both the combat and the combat support/service support roles. A careful analysis of military operations on the actual terrain of operations allows today’s citizen soldiers to appreciate the conditions experienced by their predecessors at the time, gaining a better understanding of the timeless lessons and principals of war. Such historical mindedness can go far in shaping the military leadership style necessary on the battlefields of the twenty-first century.

In the Atlanta Campaign Staff Ride Briefing Book the author, Ed Shanahan, provides a concise but detailed account of Major General William T. Sherman’s operational art and tactical prowess in maneuvering his army group, composed of three separate Union armies, from Chattanooga, Tennessee to the Confederate rail hub of Atlanta, Georgia. During his hundred mile advance on Atlanta, Sherman fought a dozen major actions and executed several skillful flanking movements, enabling his force to capture this strategic objective within four months. In this campaign, Sherman provides an excellent example for the proper use of economy of force and maneuver. Capitalizing on his advantage of superior manpower, he employed the largest army to face-down the Confederates in their impregnable defensive positions while the other two armies turned the flanks. I am certain that Army reservists as well as other students of this campaign will find the volume a very useful addition to their professional libraries.

Camp Creek Business Center
Atlanta, Georgia
27 June 1995

LEE S. HARFORD, JR., Ph.D.
Command Historian
U.S. Army Reserve Command
# THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

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STRATEGIC BACKGROUND

The third year of the war, 1863, proved to be a watershed in the course of the war. As the southern force of arms reached its zenith, the seeds of its decline were sown, while the resiliency of the Union was severely tested from repeated set backs on the battlefields of the east to the miserable mud of the Mississippi Delta. By mid year, northern forces, recovered from earlier setbacks and dramatically reversed the direction of the war at Vicksburg, Tullahoma, and Gettysburg. As the year progressed, the ebb and flow of the fortunes of war began to turn in favor of the Union as the North’s vast resource base began to make a difference. In the East a virtual stalemate existed, while in the West the Mississippi was opened to the Gulf. Despite the Federal set back at Chickamauga, once secured, Chattanooga provided an excellent start point for campaigning in 1864.

The year began impressively enough for the Confederacy in the East, with Ambrose E. Burnside and the Army of the Potomac recovering from the debacle at Fredericksburg in December 1862. “Fighting Joe” Hooker, who took command of the Federal forces (January) in the East, executed an impressive turning movement against Lee in Fredericksburg. But, then proceeded to give up his advantage by losing the momentum, initiative and tempo of the operation and was in turn, bested by the grandmaster, Robert E. Lee. General Lee won his most brilliant victory at Chancellorsville (May 1863). For the Confederacy, at least for the moment, momentum and initiative appeared to be theirs.

As a result, Lee undertook a second invasion of the North that summer to relieve pressure on Virginia and exploit these advantages. However, a resolute and determined Federal force, led by the newest commander of the Army of the Potomac, MG George G. Meade, held its ground at Gettysburg turning back the invaders. The Army of Northern Virginia sustained 25,000 casualties that July shattering the myth of Lee’s invincibility. The cost of earlier victories combined with mounting Confederate losses, that accumulated disproportionately, made sustainment of an ever expanding war exceedingly more difficult.

Simultaneously, Federal operations were underway in the western theater. Grant began the year bogged down opposite Vicksburg searching for a way to get at the fortress city. However, after six months of frustration, Grant slipped south of Vicksburg, successfully crossed the Mississippi and masked his movement inland, turning the Confederate defenses at Vicksburg. Establishing central position, Grant defeated Joseph E. Johnston at Jackson, Mississippi, then maneuvered against Vicksburg. Grant brilliantly displayed audacity and versatility in his masterfully executed campaign. On 4 July 1864, Pemberton surrendered the city of Vicksburg and the 30,000 men of the Army of Mississippi.

In the middle Tennessee theater of operation, MG William S. Rosecrans and his Army of the Cumberland held the battlefield after the Battle of Stones River (Murfreesboro). Rosecrans, then masterfully outmaneuvered General Braxton Bragg, twice, forcing him to pull the Army of Tennessee back into northern Georgia. In the process Bragg gave up, without a fight, the "gateway to Atlanta," Chattanooga. Bragg and the hard luck Army of Tennessee, however, were
not routed but laid coiled near LaFayette, Georgia waiting for the pursuing Federals to make a mistake so they could deliver a devastating counterstroke. Then along the Chickamauga, Bragg, reinforced with Longstreet's Corps from the Army of Northern Virginia and good fortune turned the tables on the Army of the Cumberland. Bragg defeated Rosecrans and drove the Army of the Cumberland back into Chattanooga, but failed to aggressively pursue and follow-up his success. Bragg then attempted to starve the Federals into submission. However, to recover the situation, Federal authorities put Grant in command and rushed reinforcements from both east and west to break the siege of Chattanooga. With the Confederate collapse at Missionary Ridge in November, Bragg retreated back into the mountains of northwestern Georgia where he went on the defensive around Dalton.

Despite the success on the battlefield the outcome of the war and the fate of the Union were still in doubt both militarily and politically. Although military successes in the West left Federal forces in that theater poised to strike at the deep south, additional operations to further dissect the deep south and isolate the Virginia theater would be required. Several needs were apparent. The Federals needed to coordinate their efforts on all fronts in order to bring their numerical preponderance in resources to bear and to concentrate those forces in the most important areas. These parameters led Lincoln to rearrange his command system in early 1864. Next, Lincoln asked Congress to restore the rank of Lieutenant General and called MG Ulysses S. Grant east to assume the position of General-in-Chief. In turn, MG Henry W. Halleck became the Chief-of-Staff.

Following his success at Chattanooga, Grant had time to contemplate future operations and how to prosecute the war. By the spring of 1864, Grant's plan matured to encompass each of the theaters of operation and not only the destruction of the Confederacy's main armies but also its war-making capability. Grant envisioned a single coherent, unified campaign to exhaust the Confederacy's will to continue to fight, destroy its military power, and bring the war to a conclusion on Federal terms. Grant's campaign plan addressed the national objectives, his strategic aim, military end-state conditions, operational objectives, identification of his main effort, and the missions of each of his subordinate armies. The plan unified the efforts of all toward common objectives. He would concentrate Federal operations in two major thrusts against the South's two main field armies, the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee. He would support the main effort with three subsidiary ones -- MG George G. Meade in the East supported by MGs Benjamin F. Butler and Franz Sigel; MG William T. Sherman in the West, supported by MG Nathaniel P. Banks with all operations to commence in early May. During the campaign, each subordinate exercised their initiative to take advantage of opportunities unforeseen at the start of the campaign, but never losing sight of the overall national strategic objective.

Jefferson Davis also did some reorganizing before operations began in 1864. He left Virginia in Lee's capable hands. However, in the West he had to correct the unhealthy command situation in the Army of Tennessee. General Braxton Bragg's subordinates had been calling for his removal since the ill-fated Kentucky invasion in 1862, but after the disaster at Chattanooga Davis had to act. He relieved Bragg on 29 November and appointed General Joseph E. Johnston
as Bragg's successor on 16 December 1863, a choice that was not an easy one given their history. Davis called Bragg to Richmond as his military advisor.

**CHRONOLOGY**

**1863**

**OCTOBER**
8  Transfer of XI and XII Corps (Hooker) 25 Sep - 8 Oct completed.
23  Grant arrives Chattanooga.
25-30 Federal forces in Chattanooga reinforced (Hooker with XI and XII Corps from Army of the Potomac).

**NOVEMBER**
4  Bragg detaches Longstreet for operations against Knoxville.
15  Army of the Tennessee (Sherman) arrives Chattanooga.
23  Battle of Orchard Knob.
24  Battle of Lookout Mountain.
25  Battle of Missionary Ridge.
29  Bragg retreats to Dalton, defends Rocky Face Ridge.
29  Bragg relieved; Hardee interim commander.
DECEMBER
16 Davis appoints Joseph E. Johnston to command Army of Tennessee.
27 Johnston arrives at Dalton.
Hood arrives in Dalton, assumes command of a corps. Johnston reorganizes his seven infantry divisions into two corps.

1864

JANUARY
2 Cleburne calls for enlisting slaves to solve Confederacy's manpower shortage.
Johnston proposes defensive-offensive.
8 Johnston issues GO # 5.

FEBRUARY
3 Bragg appointed military advisor to Jeff Davis.
Sherman begins Meridian, Ms. campaign.
12 Grant orders Thomas to conduct recon in force toward Dalton.
17 Davis orders Johnston to send Hardee's Corps (Cheatham, Cleburne, and Walker) to MS to support Polk.
22 Palmer's (XIV Corps) movement toward Dalton.

MARCH
3 Grant ordered to Washington.
9 Grant promoted to LTG.
12 Grant appointed General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States.
14 Grant summons Sherman to Nashville.
18 Sherman assumes command of the Military Division of the Mississippi.
McPherson takes command of the Army of the Tennessee.
25 Sherman begins inspection tour of new army.

APRIL
4 Grant issues strategic guidance and concept of operations for 1864.
6 Sherman issues GO # 6.
7 Davis orders Longstreet to rejoin Lee.
19 Johnston holds "Grand Review" -- 36,000 effectives.
28 Cavalry skirmish at Tunnel Hill.
29 Sherman moves his HQ from Nashville to Chattanooga.

MAY
4-7 Campaign opens, Sherman's preliminary movements.
5 Sherman at Ringgold.
6-7 Actions at Tunnel Hill. Johnston requests reinforcements (Polk) and orders brigade at Rome, Ga. to Resaca.
8-11 Action at Rocky Face Ridge, Buzzard's Roost, Mill Creek Gap, Crow Creek Valley, and Dug Gap.
9 McPherson advances through Snake Creek Gap, emerges opposite Resaca, falls back into gap.
10 Loring's Division (Polk) arrives at Resaca.
11 Sherman moves IV, XX, and XXIII Corps southward through Snake Gap.
12 Polk arrives Resaca. Johnston evacuates Dalton.
May (continued)

13 Sherman deploys opposite Resaca.
16 Cheatham's rearguard action at Calhoun delays Federal pursuit, Howard's IV Corps.
17-18 At Adairsville, Johnston fails to find good defensive terrain; withdraws to Cassville.
18 Federals occupy Adairsville.
19 Davis' Division (XIV) to Rome.
18-19 Cassville Affair.
20 Federals occupy Cassville; Sherman at Kingston-operational pause. Johnston occupies Allatoona Pass.
23 Sherman swings army out to west toward Dallas, Ga. Johnston counters by moving into blocking position along Dallas-New Hope Church-Pickett's Mill line.
25 Battle of New Hope Church.
27 Battle of Pickett's Mill.
28 Battle of Dallas.

June

1 Sherman begins shift back to the railroad.
2 Federal cavalry seize Allatoona Pass.
4 Johnston withdraws, establishes Lost Mountain Line.
6 Sherman at Ackworth across railroad.
10 Federals renew advance, Lost-Pine-Brushy Mountain Line.
14 Pine Mountain, Polk killed.
15 Action at Gilgal Church.
16 Action at Lost Mountain.
17 Johnston established Mud Creek Line.
19 Confederates occupy Kennesaw Mountain.
20 Action at Noonday Creek.
21-22 Johnston shifts Hood from northern end of Kennesaw(right) to Kolb's Farm (left).
22 Battle of Kolb's Farm.
27 Battle of Kennesaw Mountain.

July

2 Confederates withdraw to Smyrna
4 Action at Ruff's Mill and Rottenwood Creek.
5-17 Actions along Chattahoochee River.
8-9 Federals cross Chattahoochee.
10-22 Rousseau's raid from Decatur, Al. to West Point & Montgomery RR.
18 Johnston relieved. Hood takes command, Special Orders No. 168.
20 Battle of Peachtree Creek.
July (continued)

22-24  Garrad's raid to Covington.
27-31  McCook's raid on Macon and Western RR, with actions at Lovejoy and Newnan.
       Garrad's raid to South River, skirmish at Lithonia.
       Stoneman's raid to Macon, action at Macon and Sunshine Church.
       28  Action at Utoy Creek.

AUGUST  10-9 SEP  Wheeler's raid to North Georgia and East Tennessee.
         18-22  Kilpatrick's raid to Lovejoy.
         31-1 SEP  Battle of Jonesboro.

SEPTEMBER  2  Federal troops occupy Atlanta.

NOVEMBER  16  Sherman begins the march to the sea.
ORDER OF BATTLE

Union Forces

Commander -- MG William T. Sherman

Army of the Cumberland

Commander: MG George H. Thomas
IV Corps: MG Oliver O. Howard
Divisions: MG David S. Stanley
BG John Newton
BG Thomas J. Wood
XIV Corps: MG John M. Palmer
Divisions: BG Richard W. Johnson
BG Jefferson C. Davis
BG Abasalom Baird
XX Corps: MG Joseph Hooker
Divisions: BG Alpheus S. Williams
BG John W. Geary
MG Daniel Butterfield
Cavalry Corps: BG Washington L. Elliott
BG Edward M. McCook
BG Kenner Garrard
BG Judson Kilpatrick

Army of the Tennessee

Commander: MG James B. McPherson
XV Corps: MG John A. Logan
Divisions: BG Peter J. Osterhaus
BG Morgan L. Smith
BG John E. Smith
BG William Harrow
XVI Corps: BG Grenville M. Dodge
Divisions: BG Thomas W. Sweeny
BG James C. Veatch
XVII Corps: MG Frank P. Blair
Divisions: BG Mortimer D. Leggett
BG Walter Q. Gresham

Army of the Ohio

Commander: MG John M. Schofield
XXIII Corps: MG John M. Schofield
Divisions: BG Alvin P. Hovey
BG Henry M. Judah
BG Jacob D. Cox
Cavalry: MG George Stoneman

Confederate Forces

Commander -- GEN. Joseph E. Johnston

Army of Tennessee

Commander: GEN. Joseph E. Johnston
Hardee's Corps: LTG William J. Hardee
Divisions: MG Benjamin F. Cheatham
MG Patrick R. Cleburne
MG William H.T. Walker
MG William B. Bate
Hood's Corps: LTG John B. Hood
Divisions: MG Thomas C. Hindman
MG Carter L. Stevenson
MG Alexander P. Stewart
Cavalry Corps: MG Joseph Wheeler
Divisions: MG William T. Martin
BG John H. Kelly
BG William Y.C. Humes

Army of Mississippi

Commander: LTG Leonidas Polk
Polk's Corps: LTG Leonidas Polk
Divisions: MG William W. Loring
MG Samuel G. French
BG James Cantey
Cavalry: BG William H. Jackson

Casualties:

Federal:  
k- 4,423  
w-22,822  
m- 4,422  
tot- 31,687

Confederate:  
k- 3,044  
w-18,952  
m-12,983  
tot-34,979
CAMPAIGN OVERVIEW.

Prelude to the Campaign.

Confederate Situation.

That winter Johnston faced the formidable task of rebuilding the Army of Tennessee physically and spiritually. When they retreated from Chattanooga they had abandoned much equipment and many had deserted. Johnston immediately set about reestablishing discipline, offered amnesty to those soldiers who would return to the ranks voluntarily and scheduled furloughs. He also requisitioned rations, clothing and equipment, then initiated an intense training program to restore pride and confidence. The army also underwent a religious revival.

As spring approached, a revived Army of Tennessee emerged, pronounced combat ready by its new commander at a formal review on 19 April. However, a terrible disconnect existed between the field commander and the authorities in Richmond. Davis and the Confederate high command wanted Johnston to retake Chattanooga and launch a major offensive into Tennessee. Considering his own assessment of his army's capabilities and resources available Johnston felt a major offensive campaign was out of the question. He lacked adequate manpower, supplies, and transportation. Furthermore, the terrain favored a defensive-offensive strategy.

Davis and Johnston constantly disagreed over strategy and resources. Johnston also failed to adequately communicate his intentions to Richmond in a clear and timely manner. Further, Johnston's position was undermined by subordinates who corresponded regularly with Davis, most notably John Bell Hood. Other factors that further exacerbated this tenuous relationship, were having Bragg as Davis' senior military advisor, the long standing animosity that existed between Johnston and Davis (dating back to their days as cadets at West Point), and Johnston's secretive nature. This was not a relationship upon which to build a successful operation as neither trusted nor had confidence in the other. So the bottom line was that there was no coherent Confederate strategy for 1864.

Johnston's reassembled army consisted of two infantry corps - commanded by Lt. Generals William J. Hardee (four divisions) and John B. Hood (three divisions), and a cavalry corps with three divisions commanded by MG Joe Wheeler. All together they numbered approximately 45,000 men, organized into 27 infantry brigades, 8 cavalry brigades, and 34 batteries with 138 guns. Over in Alabama, LTG Leonidas Polk commanded the Army of Mississippi, with 14,000 men, 9 infantry brigades, 3 cavalry brigades, and 12 batteries with 50 guns. MG William W. Loring's Division was at Montevallo, Alabama; MG Samuel G. French was at Tuscaloosa, Alabama; BG James Cantey had one brigade at Rome, Georgia and two at Mobile. BG William H. Jackson's cavalry division was operating in northern Alabama. Johnston found himself in a position of constantly requesting additional forces from Richmond. Initially he picked up Mercer's brigade (to Walker) from Savannah and Cantey's division (3 infantry brigades) and two batteries from Mobile (to Polk). Polk's force would join Johnston's at Resaca after the campaign started.
Federal Situation.

Prior to opening the campaign, Sherman's field forces extended across the entire extent of the Military Division of the Mississippi. They stretched from eastern Tennessee, across northwestern Georgia, northern Alabama, and western Tennessee, to northern Mississippi. The Army of the Ohio, based in East Tennessee, covered an area between Knoxville and the Cumberland Gap. The Army of the Cumberland occupied Chattanooga and the area westward to Bridgeport, Alabama. The Army of the Tennessee stretched out along the Tennessee River west of Bridgeport to Decatur (XV Corps/Logan). The XVI Corps (Dodge) had a division at Memphis, another at Athens, Alabama, one at Corinth, Mississippi, and a forth at Columbus, Kentucky. The XVII Corps (Blair) operated in the Mississippi Valley with its headquarters still at Vicksburg. When McPherson took command he established his headquarters at Huntsville, Alabama.
Likewise, the department spread Union cavalry across its full extent. BG Edward M. McCook's division was at Cleveland, Tennessee. BG Judson Kilpatrick's division was at Ringgold, Georgia. MG George Stoneman's division was in Kentucky and BG Kenner Garrard's division was at Columbus, Tennessee on the Duck River.

Sherman assembled, at Chattanooga, approximately 110,000 men organized into three armies: (1) The Army of the Cumberland (three infantry corps and a cavalry corps) commanded by MG George H. Thomas (73,000); (2) The Army of the Tennessee (two infantry corps) commanded by MG James B. McPherson (24,000); and (3) The Army of the Ohio (one corps and a cavalry division) under MG John M. Schofield (13,000). Sherman's "army group" consisted of seven infantry corps (IV, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XX, XXIII), 19 infantry divisions of 58 infantry brigades, 4 cavalry divisions of 12 cavalry brigades, and 69 batteries with 254 guns. When the campaign started three brigades of cavalry, J.E. Smith's Division of XV Corps and XVII were responsible for rear area and lines-of-communication (LOC) security.

Prior to commencing operations, Grant and Sherman met in Nashville and took the train to Cincinnati. Enroute they discussed strategy for prosecuting the war and bringing it to a successful conclusion. At the conclusion of their discussions, they outlined a strategy for a unified campaign that synchronized the conduct of operations by all the Federal field armies based on common objectives. The relationships between Grant and Lincoln and Grant and Sherman were markedly different from those in the high command of the Southern camp. Grant and Sherman shared a mutual trust, respect and confidence. Additionally, Grant had Lincoln's full support.

For his part, Sherman was "to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources..." Sherman's objectives were the destruction of Johnston's army, prevention of any reinforcement of Lee, and Atlanta. How he accomplished his mission was left up to him, just as Lincoln had directed Grant.

Atlanta was of strategic importance because of its status as a manufacturing, distribution, and transportation center. Four railroads converged on Atlanta. The city was not only Johnston's base but supported Lee's Army of Northern Virginia as well. Sherman's axis of advance, determined generally by the route of the Western and Atlantic Railroad that ran between Chattanooga and Atlanta, further emphasized the importance of railroads in this war.

A critical element in Sherman's campaign planning was logistics and sustainment issues. Sherman set about turning Nashville into a huge supply base, gathering enough locomotives and rolling stock to move his supply requirements and stockpiling enough supplies in Chattanooga to sustain operations for seventy days. (See logistics section.)

The Western and Atlantic Railroad below Ringgold passed through Tunnel Hill then ran southward to Dalton and Resaca. About three miles west of Dalton, Georgia the railroad passed through the only natural water level gap in Chattogata Mountain, Mill Creek Gap. The mountain ran generally north and south with steep slopes and was densely wooded. The ridge,
also known as Rocky Face Ridge, provided Johnston with a naturally strong defensive position from which to oppose any movement southward, especially against an adversary who would depend heavily on the railroad. Rocky Face Ridge could be penetrated only at its three gaps: (1) Mill Creek or Buzzard's Roost Gap a natural passage cut through the mountain by Mill Creek, through which the railroad and the main road ran; (2) Dug Gap, about four miles south, was only a narrow cut across the top of the ridge; and (3) Snake Creek Gap about fifteen miles south which opened out into Sugar Valley west of Resaca. A forth alternative was to go around Rocky Face to the north through Crow Creek Valley.

Sherman had no intention of assaulting into the teeth of Johnston's formidable defenses arrayed on top of Rocky Face Ridge. Instead, he decided to turn Johnston out of his defensive works by executing a turning movement to the West. By putting a strong force astride his opponent's line of communication, Sherman could either cut Johnston's LOCs or threaten to disrupt them, forcing Johnston to give battle at Resaca, caught between two Federal forces, or retreat to the east away from his supply base. Sherman envisioned accomplishing his primary objective with a decisive victory at minimum cost.

Sherman's plan was actually a variation of one originally purposed by George Thomas that had the Army of the Cumberland in the role of the turning force. Thomas discovered Snake Creek Gap while operating around Dalton in February. However, Sherman appeared more comfortable with McPherson and his old army in the role of the maneuver force. So, Sherman originally planned for McPherson with three corps, the XV, XVI, XVII (nine divisions) to execute a bold turning movement sweeping south through northern Alabama then turning eastward toward Rome, Georgia and threatening Johnston's rear, while the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio demonstrated against Johnston at Dalton. However, circumstances forced Sherman to rethink his plans.

Due to the situation in Louisiana, Banks' Mobile column got bogged down in its Red River Campaign drawing off troops from XVI and XVII Corps to the Mississippi Valley. Also, the delay of the return of two divisions of XVII Corps from "veteran furloughs" in the North prevented these critical troops from being available initially to the start of the campaign. They would not rejoin McPherson until early June. Since that left McPherson with only five divisions, about 20,000 men or four understrength divisions and without the Mobile portion as a diversion to distract Polk, Sherman decided not to risk McPherson's column with Polk free to operate against him. Sherman decided to modify McPherson's turning movement into a shallower one by sending him through Snake Creek Gap to Resaca. Thomas and Schofield would still threaten Dalton to divert Johnston's attention from McPherson's maneuver. Howard's IV Corps would demonstrate against the north end of Rocky Face, XIV Corps (Palmer) would operate against Mill Creek Gap and XX Corps (Hooker) would move against Dug Gap. Schofield would push southward through Crow Valley against Dalton.
Figure 3: The Atlanta Campaign, Overview of the Campaign Area.
Opening Moves (29 April - 7 May).

In order for his movements to coincide with Grant's in Virginia, Sherman began his preliminary movements on 29 April when he started McPherson in motion southward behind Thomas. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee's (XV and XVI Corps) route of march from Chattanooga took it through the old Chickamauga battlefield to Lee and Gordon's Mill (5-6 May). Thomas formed the Army of the Cumberland with XX Corps (Hooker) on the right at Leet's Tanyard, XIV Corps (Palmer) in the center at Ringgold and IV Corps (Howard) on the left at Catoosa Springs. Schofield with two divisions (1st and 2d) of XXIII Corps (Army of the Ohio) moved by train from Knoxville to Cleveland, Tennessee. BG Hovey's new 3d Division from Indiana joined them there. On 5 May, Schofield assembled his force at Red Clay subsequent to moving south generally along the axis of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad to Varnell's Station. Sherman, himself, moved to Ringgold. Sherman arrayed his armies from right to left (west to east), McPherson, Thomas and Schofield.

Thomas moved the Army of the Cumberland from Ringgold through Chickamauga Creek Valley across Taylor's Ridge via Nickajack Gap into position in front (west) of Rocky Face Ridge. Schofield moved east of Ringgold and maneuvered into position north of Dalton on Thomas' left. Meanwhile, McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee moved south from Lee and Gordon's Mill, masking his movement west of Taylor's Ridge. They passed through Gordon Springs, then continued south to LaFayette before turning east, with orders to continue the movement via Villanow to Snake Creek Gap.

On Saturday, 7 May Thomas advanced XIV Corps (Palmer) directly on Tunnel Hill. Jefferson C. Davis' 2d Division led with the 52d Ohio. First contact occurred at 1100. The 52d Ohio encountered Johnston's outposts, a detachment of cavalry (Wheeler) supported by artillery. Confederate skirmishers, put up only token resistance, felled trees to block the road and fired from concealed positions in the trees. After only a brief encounter, the skirmishers fell back. Continuing to push forward, Davis next encountered Confederates guarding the railroad tunnel from on top of Chetoogata Ridge. Again the advancing Federals easily dispersed the Southerners and secured the tunnel intack. Sherman established his headquarters for the operation in the Clisby Austin House at the base of Tunnel Hill.

Howard's IV Corps moved on XIV Corps left linking with Schofield in the vicinity of Catoosa Springs. XX Corps (Hooker) with BG Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry covered and extended the right further southward crossed Taylor's Ridge through Gordon's Gap and reached Trickem west of Rocky Face Ridge. Schofield and XXIII Corps with BG Edward M. McCook's cavalry (MG George Stoneman was still in Tennessee) on the left flank for security, skirmished with some of MG Joseph Wheeler's cavalry near Varnell then moved on towards Tunnel Hill. McPherson bivouacked west of Taylor's Ridge, while a brigade from XVI Corps moved forward to seize Ship's Gap.

Johnston wargamed Sherman's most likely courses of action, deciding that the most likely scenarios were for Sherman to try to (1) outflank the Confederate position atop Rocky
Face to the west, (2) drive southward around the northern end of Rocky Face Ridge into Crow Valley or, (3) conduct a direct assault on his position. As much as Johnston would have preferred this last option he felt it was the least likely of Sherman's options. Therefore, Johnston deployed to meet the first two contingencies. Johnston positioned the bulk of Wheeler's cavalry (less than 2500) in an arc north of Dalton, while the remainder picketed Taylor's Ridge and the valley between Taylor's Ridge and Rocky Face Ridge. MG William Martin's cavalry division guarded the Oostanaula River crossings and BG James Cantey's Brigade from the Department of the Gulf was at Resaca protecting the Western and Atlantic Railroad bridge over the Oostanaula.

The Confederate defenders constructed strong entrenchments along the rugged crest of the northern end of Rocky Face Ridge and across Crow Creek Valley north of Dalton anchoring the defenses on the extreme right on Potato Top Hill. As Federal activity increased in the vicinity of Ringgold, Johnston became even more certain that the major Federal threat would be from the north and he deployed accordingly. To meet the expected Federal thrust, Johnston assigned Hood's Corps the mission of defending Mill Creek Gap in Rocky Face Ridge and Crow Valley with Hardee's Corps in reserve. Further, Johnston reinforced Hood with two divisions from Hardee (Cheatham and Bate).

Hood organized his defense across Crow Creek Valley and along the crest of Rocky Face Ridge in the shape of an inverted fishhook (similar to the Federal defensive position at Gettysburg). He blocked Mill Creek Gap with obstacles and dammed the creek to create a lake to further obstruct movement through the gap. MG Thomas C. Hindman's Division positioned on the far right faced generally north and east. He had one brigade (BG Hugh Mercer's Georgians) to the left or southwest of Picket Top (Potato) Hill. With the remainder of his force he refused his right with three brigades (BG William F. Tucker's Mississippians, BG Edward C. Walthal's Mississippians, and BG Arthur M. Manigault's Alabamans and South Carolinians) back southward along the East Tennessee Railroad. On Hindman's left, MG Carter L. Stevenson's Division extended the Confederate defense westward across Crow Valley to Rocky Face Ridge with two brigades (BG Alfred Cummings' Georgians and BG Alexander W. Reynolds' North Carolinians and Virginians). He bent his left back to the south along the northern end of Rocky Face facing west with BG Edmund W. Pettus' Alabama Brigade forming the apex and Brown's Brigade on the left. Next, Hood deployed MG A.P. Stewart's Division across Mill Creek Gap (also known as Buzzard's Roost). Stewart deployed with BG Alpheus Baker's Alabama Brigade in the gap, BG Marcellus A. Stovall's Georgia Brigade and BG Henry D. Clayton's Alabama Brigade to the right and BG Randall L. Gibson's Louisiana Brigade to the left. Colonel John C. Carter's (Wright's) Tennessee Brigade of MG Benjamin F. Cheatham's Division dug in on Clayton's right connecting with Brown of Stevenson's Division. Cheatham positioned his remaining two brigades (BG George E. Maney's Tennessee and BG Otho F. Strahl's Tennessee) behind Carter. MG William B. Bate's Division of three brigades (BG Joseph H. Lewis' Kentucky Orphan Brigade, BG Thomas B. Smith's (Tyler's) Brigade, and BG Jesse J. Finley's Florida Brigade), on Stewart's left, completed the southern end of the Confederate line.

Johnston held Hardee's remaining two divisions, MG William H.T. Walker's and MG Patrick R. Cleburne's, to the rear in reserve along Hamilton Mountain. At Dug Gap, the second passage point through Rocky Face Ridge, Johnston had the 1st and 2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles
(BG Daniel C. Reynold's Brigade) commanded by Colonel James A. Williamson. By 7 May BG James Cantey's Brigade (Polk) arrived at Resaca.

When Wheeler's scouts west of Taylor's Ridge reported McPherson south of Lee and Gordon's approaching LaFayette, Johnston assumed this was the flanking move on Rome, he anticipated. Therefore, he alerted Polk to concentrate at Rome and canceled orders for Cantey to move from Resaca to Dalton. Johnston also ordered a cavalry regiment to Taylor's Ridge and into the valley west of Rocky Face Ridge. He also sent a cavalry division (Martin) south of the Oostanaula to screen between Resaca and Rome.

Dalton (8 - 9 May).

On Sunday, 8 May, BG Charles G. Harker's 3d Brigade, BG John Newton's 2d Division, IV Corps attacked the northern end of Rocky Face Ridge. Spearheading the attack, Colonel Emerson Odycke's 125th Ohio drove back the thin Confederate skirmish line along the crest and grabbed a toe hold. They then pushed southward along the crest toward Buzzard Roost. BG George D. Wagner's 2d Brigade attacked on Harker's left, his advance slowed by difficult terrain. An intervening ravine and stream separated the two forces. Out of touch, Harker advanced alone and unsupported against increasing Confederate resistance. The terrain along the crest channeled and narrowed the frontage of the attackers. Reacting to the Union threat, Pettus' Alabama Brigade, supported by Brown's Tennessee Brigade (Stevenson) used the terrain to their advantage and turned back the charging bluecoats.

The most extensive action occurred at Mill Creek Gap, where Thomas launched several direct assaults to fix Johnston in place. Each of Thomas' corps sent a division toward Mill Creek Gap, driving in the outposts and advancing to within about a half mile of the gap against only slight resistance. However, once in front of the gap they found the route covered by artillery and entrenched infantry concealed on the slopes and obstructed by stone breastworks. Additionally, Stewart's pioneer company (combat engineers) flooded the gap, as well as the approaches into the gap by damming Mill Creek. BG Jefferson C. Davis' 2d Division, still spearheading Palmer's advance, deployed Colonel John G. Mitchell's 2d Brigade on the left and BG James D. Morgan's 1st Brigade to the right along the main road traversing the gap. Thomas made three attempts to eliminate the dam and clear the way for an assault through the gap. They even attempted to bridge the lake formed in the gap. Sherman watched from his vantage point on top of Blue Mountain. At the same time, McCook's cavalry force, screening the left flank of Schofield, advanced to Poplar Springs where they encountered BG William W. Allen's and Colonel George G. Dibrell's Confederate cavalry brigades (Wheeler). After a counterattack by the Confederate horseman, Schofield advanced BG Jacob D. Cox's 3d Division on the left and BG Henry M. Judah's 2d Division on the right to support McCook, but then fell back rather than attacking their entrenchments. On the 9th, Schofield advanced down Crow Creek Valley with two divisions to
Figure 4: Rocky Face Ridge, 7-12 May 1864.
feel out the Confederate position. Reaching Hood’s defensive line extending across the valley, Schofield encountered combined infantry and artillery fire across his entire front and on both his flanks from Confederate defenders concealed on Rocky Face Ridge and Potato Top Hill. Schofield again backed off but continued to maintain contact and keep up his demonstration.

Dug Gap (8 May).

BG John W. Geary’s 2d Division, XX Corps, moved from the vicinity of Truickum Post Office to Dug Gap with only two of his three brigades (Colonel Charles Candy’s and Colonel Adolphus Buschbeck’s), having sent Colonel David Ireland’s 3d Brigade to Snake Creek Gap to cover McPherson’s movement through the gap. His remaining two brigades and Captain James D. McGill’s Pennsylvania Artillery Battery of 3-inch ordnance rifles mission was to keep the Confederate at Dug Gap occupied. Geary made initial contact in Dogwood Valley west of the gap at the Babb House and drove Colonel William C.P. Breckinridge’s 9th Kentucky back across Mill Creek and into the gap. He then positioned McGill at the Babb House to support his attack into the gap and up the mountain. Geary formed into line of battle with Candy’s 1st Brigade on the left and Buschbeck’s 2d Brigade on the right. The Federal attackers faced a difficult task since their approach to Dug Gap was up a steep, almost vertical rock palisade, crowned by boulders, and a narrow pass at the top.

Colonel Williamson’s 1st and 2d Arkansans (250) and Breckinridge’s 9th Kentuckians (800) reinforced by Colonel Warren Grigsby’s Kentucky Cavalry Brigade repulsed Geary’s 4,500. The assaults cost the Federals 357 casualties, in their two attempts to pierce the gap. Later, BG Hiram M. Granbury’s and BG Mark P. Lowrey’s brigades (Cleburne), with Hardee and Cleburne leading, came up and took over defense of the gap.

As Thomas and Schofield demonstrated in front of Dalton, successfully distracting Johnston, McPherson slipped around Johnston’s left flank unnoticed. Wheeler having left Ship’s Gap through Taylor’s Ridge unguarded, allowed McPherson to slip through Ship’s Gap undetected then pass through Villanow and on into Snake Creek Gap. McPherson reached Snake Creek Gap on the evening of the 8th, then pushed on through the narrow four to five-mile long corridor between Mill Creek and Horn Mountain. On the 9th, McPherson’s column emerged from the gap into Sugar Valley astride the LaFayette Road. McPherson sent off a message to Sherman to inform him of his progress. The Army of the Tennessee had come this far without a cavalry force reconning the routes or screening the movement, an oversight that could have proven fatal to this type of mission. However, they had had no contact with Confederate cavalry either. BG Grenville M. Dodge’s XVI Corps, BG Thomas W. Sweeney’s 2d and BG James C. Veatch’s 4th infantry divisions led the way followed by XV Corps (MG John A. Logan).

Grigsby’s Kentucky Cavalry Brigade after being relieved from its reinforcing mission at Dug Gap, proceeded immediately to Snake Creek Gap. Arriving about dawn, a surprised Grigsby ran into McPherson’s advance guard, skirmishers of the 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry and 39th Iowa entering Sugar Valley in advance of XVI Corps (Dodge). Momentarily thrown
off balance by the unexpected presence of Federals to their front and in the army's rear, Grigsby immediately deployed and vigorously attacked. He drove the advancing Federal skirmishers back into the gap.

Sweeney responded by forming his 2d Division (Dodge's XVI) into line of battle and advanced against the confederate position. Grigsby continued to delay as best he could but faced by overwhelming odds he fell back. Using the difficult terrain to his advantage he slowed the Federal advance causing them to advance cautiously not reaching the crossroads two miles west of Resaca until about 1400. With Veatch in overwatch, Sweeney drove Grigsby back to a treeless ridge called "Bald Hill," where he fell-in with entrenched infantry. Dodge continued to advance Sweeney to secure "Bald Hill." Again Sweeney attacked. This time the attackers drove the Confederate defenders back across Camp Creek and into the earthworks in front of Resaca. From their new position the Federals could see the railroad bridge over the Oostanaula and a more formidable line of entrenchments west of the Western and Atlantic Railroad. Grigsby's Brigade, BG James Cantey's and BG Daniel H. Reynolds' infantry brigades along with Captain John J. Ward's and Seldon's Alabama (Lt. Charles W. Lovelace) batteries with eight 12-pounder Napoleoncs, 4-5,000 troops defended the bridge and occupied the earthworks. Also present, a contingent of cadets from the Georgia Military Institute in Marietta.

About 1600, McPherson continued forward, accompanied by Generals Dodge and Logan. He ordered Dodge to advance Veatch's 4th Division on Sweeney's left to intersect the railroad north of Resaca. Logan followed with his three divisions. Veatch pushed forward with BG John W. Fuller's 1st Brigade and BG John W. Sprague's 2d Brigade. Encountering greater resistance than anticipated and formidable Confederate defensive works, thinking he was facing a much larger force than was actually present, and with darkness approaching McPherson became overcautious and called off the attack. He then withdrew back into Snake Creek Gap.

Encouraged by McPherson's initial report and Johnston's apparent commitment to hang tough in his position around Dalton, Sherman, sensed an opportunity to decisively defeat Johnston and contemplated modifying his plan further. Instead of waiting for Johnston to give up the high ground at Dalton, Sherman would turn the Army of Tennessee out of Dalton by sending the Army of the Cumberland to Resaca and cut Johnston off from Atlanta. Later that night, Sherman received McPherson's second dispatch stating that Resaca was too heavily defended to assault.

McPherson, with an overwhelming advantage in forces available (23,000 vs. 5,000), could have easily brushed aside the Confederate troops protecting Resaca but, at the moment, he lacked boldness and audacity, and the willingness to risk his force. Perhaps, being behind enemy lines out of supporting distance from the rest of the main Federal force, McPherson felt isolated and vulnerable. That night McPherson wired Sherman informing him of his decision to fall back to Snake Creek Gap. Sherman, obviously disappointed, sent off dispatches immediately to McPherson and Grant.

To McPherson he wrote: "I regret beyond measure you did not break the railroad, however little, and close to Resaca, but I suppose it was impossible."
Three days later when they met face to face Sherman again expressed his disappointment telling McPherson that he had "missed the opportunity of a lifetime."

In his Memoirs, Sherman wrote that "such a opportunity does not occur twice in a single life; but at the critical moment McPherson seems to have been a little cautious."

Disappointed, Sherman ordered McPherson to hold his position and ordered his other forces southward to reinforce McPherson, all except MG Oliver O. Howard's IV Corps along with McCook's and Stoneman's cavalry, who were left in front of Rocky Face to watch Johnston. The Army of Tennessee sat for three days awaiting the arrival of the rest of the Federal army. Their movement slowed by poor roads and rain, the Federals lost a great opportunity for a quick victory.

**Clear and concise enunciation of the commander’s intent focuses subordinates planning on the desired end-state.**

Johnston spent the day with Hood observing the skirmishing in Crow Valley. After accessing reports from the action at Resaca, Johnston ordered Hood to Resaca with Cleburne, Walker, and Hindman. After McPherson withdrew, Hindman returned to Dalton while Cleburne stayed near Tilton (10 May). In the meantime, advance elements of Loring’s Division of Polk's Corps arrived in Resaca. The remainder arrived on the 11th along with Polk, himself, who took command of the forces at Resaca.

By the 12th, Johnston's scouts reported the number of Federals in front of Rocky Face dwindling and Grigsby reported McPherson entrenching in Snake Creek Gap. Johnston, now convinced Sherman was trying to turn him out of Dalton, ordered a withdrawal to the prepared positions at Resaca and for Polk to join him there. The night of 12th, Johnston's forces conducted a textbook perfect withdrawal southward to the defenses north and west around Resaca. Wheeler provided the rear guard to watch Howard. Also, Johnston sent Walker south of the Oostanaula to Calhoun to scout the rivers crossing sites below Resaca.

**Resaca (13 - 15 May).**

At Rocky Face Ridge, May 13, MG David S. Stanley's 1st Division (IV Corps) probed Mill Creek Gap and found the Confederate positions abandoned. By 0900 Howard telegraphed Thomas that he occupied Dalton and was continuing southward with Stoneman covering the left and McCook the right. Further, the railroad south had not been destroyed by the withdrawing Confederates.

Sherman did not expect Johnston to stand and fight at Resaca, but thought he would retreat south of the Oostanaula. Therefore, he intended to cut the retreating Confederates off at the river. However, the movement and concentration of his forces on Resaca took longer than
anticipated due to the nature of the terrain, the weather, the limited number of roads and the road conditions. Johnston, taking advantage of interior lines and having a shorter, better and more direct route to Resaca beat Sherman into position.

Resaca, named by railroad construction workers who were veterans of the battle of Resaca de la Palma in the Mexican War, consisted of only a few buildings and a freight station on the Western and Atlantic Railroad line. West of the town was the narrow valley of Camp Creek and its tributaries, which emptied into the Oostanaula River southwest of the settlement. North-south oriented ridges and hills border Camp Creek Valley on the west. East of Resaca the Conasauga River flowing southward turns eastward to join the Coosawattee to form the Oostanaula that flows westward along the southern edge of the village.

May 13.

Johnston's penchant for preparing his subsequent fall back positions ahead of time proved advantageous over and over again during the Atlanta campaign. By the morning of the 13th the entrenched Confederates awaited the approach of the Federals. Johnston decided to make at least a temporary stand at Resaca or risk being attacked in the flank and rear. Johnston's new defensive line, anchored on the southern (left) end on the Oostanaula extended northward for approximately three and a half miles along a series of rugged hills west of the town of Resaca overlooking Camp Creek. The line then turned back to the east for about three quarters of a mile before turning south for another three quarters of a mile finally connecting with the Conasauga River. From north to south, Hood, Hardee, and Polk, Johnston's three corps held the Resaca line.

Stewart's Division anchored Hood's right on the Conasauga, while Stevenson's Division occupied the center astride the road from Dalton (US Highway 41) supported by Van Den Corput's Cherokee Georgia Battery of four 12-pounder Napoleons. Hindman's Division held the left. Hotchkiss' artillery battalion (Key's, Goldwaite's, and Swett's batteries) of eight 12-pounder Napoleons and four 12-pounder howitzers sat in the angle formed by the junction of the Confederate line where it turned south. Hardee's Corps extended Johnston's line southward, with Bate's Division on the right, Cleburne's in the center, and Cheatham's on the left. Polk's newly arrived Army of Mississippi formed the Confederate left, with MG William W. Loring on the right and BG James Cantey's Division on the left, anchored on the Oostanaula. Scott's Brigade with a section (two 12-pounder Napoleons) of Bouanchard's Battery were placed in a forward position on the bald hill, abandoned by Sweeney when McPherson ordered the Federal withdrawal west of Camp Creek, watching the LaFayette Road (GA Hwy. 143).

The bulk of Wheeler's cavalry deployed to the north on the eastern side of the Conasauga River. Walker's Division of Hardee's Corps, sent south of the Oostanaula, linked up with Martin's cavalry division at Calhoun.
Sherman's concept of the operation was for McPherson to lead out at 0600 13 May and occupy the hills overlooking Camp Creek, then advance on Resaca. Thomas was to follow McPherson out of Snake Creek Gap, then turn northward to deploy on McPherson's left. Schofield (minus BG Alvin P. Hovey's 1st Division, guarding the trains) was to follow Thomas, but continue northward around Thomas, deploying on Thomas' left. Garrard's cavalry division would provide security to the rear west of Snake Creek Gap. Kilpatrick's cavalry division was to be in reserve.

McPherson deployed with Dodge's XVI Corps on the right and Logan's XV Corps on the left. Dodge deployed Veatch's division forward with his left on the Oostanaula and Sweeny's division in reserve. Logan deployed BG Morgan L. Smith's 2d Division on the left connecting with Veatch; BG Peter J. Osterhaus' 1st Division in the center, astride the LaFayette Road; and BG William Harrow's 3d Division on the left.

McPherson called forward Kilpatrick's cavalry division to clear Confederate pickets from the route of advance. The rugged, wooded terrain was difficult to negotiate. As the Federals advanced, they encountered hills and gullies, dense thickets and harassing fire. In the process of clearing the route of advance and driving Confederate skirmishers back to the vicinity of Bald Hill, Kilpatrick was wounded. Logan, with a strong skirmish line, advanced slowly, taking two hours to move into position in the open area in front of Confederate works. The following units slid northward masked by McPherson's units and the range of hills and ridges overlooking Camp Creek. Osterhaus' 1st Division (Williamson's and Wood's brigades) drove off Colonel Thomas M. Scott's Brigade, defending the bald hill. In a three hour battle, they forced Polk to the east side of Camp Creek back to the main Confederate defensive line. The Federals then occupied Bald Hill with two 3-inch ordnance rifles and four 20-pounder Parrot rifles. They also employed two 20-pounder Parrots on a hill south of the road. From these positions the gunners could place effective direct fire into the Oostanaula railroad bridge area.

Thomas deployed with Hooker on the right, Palmer on the left. Hooker's XX Corps on McPherson's left deployed with Butterfield's 3d Division on the right, Williams' 1st Division on the left and Geary's 2d Division in reserve behind Butterfield. Palmer (XIV Corps) had Johnson's 1st Division on the right, Baird's 2d Division on the left and Davis' 3d Division in reserve. Schofield (XXIII Corps) continued the Federal line northward with Judah's 2d Division on the right and Cox's 3d Division on the left. Howard's IV Corps, after following the Confederates retreating from Dalton, moved into position on Schofield's left with Newton's 2d Division on the right, Wood's 3d Division in the center and Stanley's 1st Division on the left.

May 14.

Skirmishing erupted early on the 14th across the entire front and continued almost unabated for most of the day as the Federals maneuvered, adjusting their lines and improving their positions. Also, Sherman decided to send Garrard's cavalry on a deep strike to Rome and then to turn east and to break up the railroad north of Kingston. He also ordered McPherson to
establish a bridgehead across the Oostanaula at Lay's Ferry. In turn, McPherson sent Sweeney's division of XVI Corps, along with the pontoon train, to establish the bridgehead, cross and threaten Johnston's rear. Sherman ordered Thomas and Schofield to assault the Confederate positions at Resaca. The afternoon of the 14th, Sherman conducted a four-division assault. Using two divisions from Palmer's XIV Corps (Johnson and Baird) and two (Judah and Cox) from XXIII Corps. They assaulted the salient angle in the Confederate line above Camp Creek occupied by Hindman's Division (Hood) and Bate's Division (Hardee). Using the left of MG Daniel Butterfield's 3d Division (the left of Hooker's XX Corps) as a pivot point, BG Richard W. Johnson's 1st Division, on the right having been pinched out the previous evening, swung into line connecting with BG Absalom Baird's 3d Division (Palmer XIV Corps) on his left. BG Richard Johnson deployed his division with BG William P. Carlin's 1st Brigade on the right, BG John H. King's 2d Brigade on the left, and Colonel Benjamin Scribner's 3d Brigade to the rear in reserve. The attackers passed over heavily wooded terrain broken by deep ravines, then descended a steep slope into a broad open valley. The on-rushing attackers crossed the killing field, under constant fire, negotiating their way through stands of thickets and trees, then wading through marshy areas and pools of standing water, before ascending the steep slope in front of their objective—the defensive works south of the angle. From north to south the brigades of Polk, Lowrey, and Granbury of Cleburne's Division, Hardee's Corps occupied these works. Carlin's 1st Brigade managed to cross Camp Creek, but his battle lines were in disarray. Under heavy infantry small arms and artillery fire, the majority advanced only about halfway across the 400 yards wide open field in front of the Confederate works before being driven back.

Carlin lost 277 men in about 30 minutes. King's 2d Brigade having a further distance to advance and after witnessing Carlin's fate stopped before becoming engaged. To cover their withdrawal from in front of the breastworks, back across the open field to the shelter of their own lines, Palmer brought up Dilger's Battery I, 1st Ohio to the bluffs overlooking the creek to place counterbattery fire on the Confederate artillery firing on Carlin.

Baird's 3d Division, Palmer's left, deployed with Van Derveer's 2d Brigade on the right and Turchin's 1st Brigade on the left. As Baird's division advanced, his left, Turchin intermingled with Schofield's right, Hascull's 2d Brigade of Judah's 2d Division. Baird tried to delay the advance in order to realign his force but Judah ordered his troops to advance. Baird seeing his right carried forward by Judah's premature movement also ordered his line forward, but was unable to catch up. Judah's rush not only left Baird's left brigade behind but also Cox's division, which was supposed to attack simultaneously on the left. As a result, the attacks were marked by confusion and lack of coordination. The intermingled portions of the units advanced together, five lines deep, but the advancing formations lacked cohesion and the battle lines were in disarray. The assaulting wave of bluecoats surged forward without control and unsupported across very difficult terrain—over hills, through gullies overgrown with thick underbrush, across an open field, across a waist-deep creek, and then assaulted uphill against the heavily defended Confederate works. The entrenched Confederates, Lewis' Kentuckians of the Orphan Brigade of Bate's Division, Hardee's Corps; Walthall's Mississippian's of Hindman's Division, Hood's Corps; and Hotchkiss' artillery battalion of eight Napoleons and four 12-pounder howitzers repulsed the Federal assault. Some of Baird's division took refuge behind the banks of Camp Creek until dark before negotiating their way back to their lines.
Cox's 3d Division, Schofield's left, advanced with Reilly's 1st Brigade on its left and Manson's 2d Brigade on the right striking directly at the angle. To support his attack, Schofield
concentrated his artillery on the Confederate salient. Cox's attack carried the southerners' forward rifle pits, but, essentially on their own, they could not pierce the Confederate main line of defensive works. Even with the assistance of Harker's 3d Brigade, Newton's 2d Division, Howard's IV Corps. For most of the remainder of the day Thomas and Schofield's artillery continued to pound away at the Confederate angle and Hotchkiss' batteries, Swett, Goldwaite, and Key positions. Schofield's and Palmer's attacks achieved little against Cleburne, Bate and Hindman. Judah suffered approximately 700 casualties, Cox 552 and Baird 135.

In the meantime, Wheeler's cavalry scouting on the Confederate right discovered that the Federal left was in the air and vulnerable to attack. Johnston, seizing the opportunity, ordered Hood to attack around 1600 and to drive the Federal line in upon itself and back to Snake Creek Gap. Hood attacked with two divisions, Stewart's on the right and Stevenson's on the left. Walker had two brigades come up in support of Stewart and one brigade along with a brigade from Loring to support Stevenson. Stewart advanced with Clayton's Brigade on the left and Baker's Brigade on the right supported by Gibson's and Stovall's brigades. Stevenson advanced with Reynolds on the right, Brown's Brigade in the center, and Cummings on the left with Pettus trailing in support.

MG David S. Stanley (1st Division), alerted to the Confederates massing on his flank, sent word to Howard (IV Corps) and ordered his chief of artillery Captain Peter Simonson to cover the extreme left flank of the Army. In response, the 5th Indiana Battery shifted to the rear of Charles Cruft's 1st Brigade. Howard, after receiving word of the buildup on his flank and the impending attack, rushed off to inform Thomas. Thomas, alerted to the impending danger, ordered Hooker to send a division to the extreme left to support IV Corps. Hooker (XX Corps) sent BG Alpheus S. Williams' 1st Division.

About 1700, Hood advanced. The Confederate assault swept over Cruft and Whitaker on his right. However, the double-shotted guns of the 5th Indiana's artillery rudely engaged Stevenson's Division which had paused briefly to reorganize and regroup before continuing the attack. Cruft and Whitaker rallied enough men to support the Hoosiers' flanks. Once again the Confederate assault surged forward and the guns appeared to be in danger of being overrun. However, Hooker, leading Williams' division arrived and along with Robinson's brigade smashed the Confederate attack. Stevenson retired back to the railroad as did Stewart. Stewart's attack carried him further to the right where they met little opposition prior to the Federal counterattack.

Around 1730, out on the other end of the battlefield, on the Federal right, Giles A. Smith's 1st Brigade (Morgan L. Smith's 2d Division) and Charles R. Woods' 1st Brigade, 1st Division, XV Corps charged across Camp Creek. Some crossed via a bridge that XV Corps laid across the creek, others used logs to bridge the creek while others waded through "neck-deep" water. They drove Polk's defenders from a series of low hills just beyond the creek back into the main Confederate line on the outskirts of Resaca threatening Johnston's escape route across the Oostanaula. Polk counterattacked with Cantey and Vaughn but failed to retake the lost ground. Wood's brigade suffered 232 casualties in 30 minutes.
Meanwhile, Thomas W. Sweeny's 2d Division, Dodge's XVI Corps, ordered to establish a crossing site in the vicinity of Lay's Ferry and to cover the laying of the pontoon bridge by Buell's troops, managed to cross the Oostanaula with relatively little difficulty or opposition. However, they recrossed after receiving an inaccurate report that a large Confederate force had crossed upstream. Fearing being cut off, Sweeny recrossed the Oostanaula and withdrew the pontoon bridge. Johnston, reacting to reports that the Federals had crossed the Oostanaula, sent Walker to deal with the situation. By the time Walker's force arrived the reported Federal force was gone and he reported such to Johnston.

Johnston, encouraged by the action on Hood's front, ordered a renewed assault for the 15th, then canceled the attack. After receiving Walker's report, Johnston ordered a resumption of the attack on the Federal left for the afternoon of the 15th. Hood ordered Stewart and Stevenson to attack at 1600. That night Hood asked Polk to baptize him.

During the night, Sherman repositioned the remainder of Hooker's XX Corps and ordered them to conduct the main attack against the Confederate right. Howard's IV Corps would conduct a supporting attack down the Dalton road on the Confederate angle and against the hills north of Resaca. Schofield, ordered back out on the familiar left flank, would secure that flank. Sherman ordered Sweeny to recross the Oostanaula and McPherson to interdict the railroad bridge while guarding against any Confederate counterattack.

May 15.

Skirmishing began early on the 15th, as it had the previous morning. Sherman ordered the general movement of troops to begin at 0800. However, Howard and Hooker took most of the morning to redeploy in preparation for their attack. On the Federal extreme left, Stoneman's cavalry division crossed the Conasauga, after Wheeler withdrew his cavalry south of the Oostanaula, and conducted a raid into the Confederate rear attacking Hindman's Division hospital. Also, during the morning, Sweeny supported by Kilpatrick's cavalry, drove off the Confederate defenders and reestablished the bridgehead in the vicinity of Lay's Ferry by laying one of the bridges and crossing two brigades. Kilpatrick was wounded in the operation.

The Federal push finally came sometime around noon. What was supposed to be a coordinated effort proved to be anything but. Howard arrayed IV Corps with Stanley on the left, Wood in the center, and Newton on the right. The Federals attacked Hindman's entrenched position in the salient, which had been the focus of the previous day's action. However, Howard's assault kicked off before Hooker completed redeployment. Consequently, William B. Hazen's brigade, the left of Wood's division, attacked unsupported. As a result, Hindman's Confederate division easily repelled Hazen. Hazen's unsupported attack cost him 120 casualties in 30 seconds. The fighting on Howard's front settled down to an exchange of fire across Camp Creek.
Hooker attacked Stevenson and Hindman with Alpheus Williams on the left, John Geary in the center, and Daniel Butterfield on the right. Butterfield and Geary conducted the main
attack. Geary deployed in a column of brigades with David Ireland's 3d brigade in the lead, followed by Adolphus Buschbeck's 2d Brigade, and Charles Candy's 1st Brigade. Butterfield deployed with his brigades on line with James Wood's 3d Brigade on the left, William Ward's 1st Brigade on the right and James Coburn's 2d Brigade in reserve. Williams deployed on line with James Robinson on the left, Thomas Ruger's 2d Brigade in the center, and Joseph Knappe's 1st Brigade on the right.

The Federal assault force, almost 12,000 strong, deployed on a narrow front. In theory, a powerful strike force, comparable to Longstreet's Grand Column at Chickamauga or Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, however, the attack was plagued by problems. The assault formations faced maneuvering blindly without benefit of any recon prior to movement, contending with the rugged broken terrain, thick woods, and dense underbrush -- so thick it was "impossible to see ten rods." The resulting confusion led to incidents of friendly fire as brigades wandered across each other's front, intermingled, and struggled to find their way (Butterfield and Geary). One of Butterfield's brigades, John Coburn's 2d Brigade, fired into William Ward's 1st Brigade, then formed up in the wrong location, and advanced into the flank of James Wood's 3d Brigade. The Federals' axes of advance converged on the "commanding hill" that anchored the Confederate line at the point where the refused line bent back southward toward the Conasauga River. When the Federal units came within range of the Confederate positions they attacked piecemeal and unorganized. As a result, they were easily driven back.

The focus of Hooker's attack became an artillery position thrown out some eighty yards forward of John C. Brown's portion of Carter L. Stevenson's line. This was a small earthen lunette occupied by the four-gun battery of Captain Max Van Den Corput's Cherokee Georgia Battery. Ireland's and Ward's brigades overran the battery. Ireland and Ward were both wounded in the assault. One of the regiments involved in the hand to hand fighting that took place in securing the guns was the 70th Indiana, led by Colonel Benjamin Harrison (a future president of the United States). The intense fires from Brown's Tennesseans forced the Federals to back off and abandon their hard won war prizes. It was not until that night that the 5th Ohio from Charles Candy's 3d Brigade and a detail from the 33d New Jersey were able to dig away the front slope of the parapet and drag the pieces into Federal lines. Hooker's assault accomplished little particularly in terms of the price that he paid - 1200 casualties, 156 in the 70th Indiana.

Johnston, after hearing about Hooker's repulse by Stevenson and Hindman and receiving Walker's report that the Federals had not crossed the Oostanaula, ordered Hood to attack the Federal left flank at 1600. The plan of attack called for Stewart to wheel to the left to get on the Federal flank and for Stevenson and Hindman to attack to their front. Johnston also detached a brigade from Hardee (Maney's Brigade, Cheatham's Division) and Polk.

Stewart formed his division in a double line of battle with Stovall on the left, Baker behind him in support, and Clayton on the left with Gibson to follow him in support. Stewart put Maney along with the 11th Tennessee Cavalry out on his right flank as flank security. At 1600, Stewart's units stepped off on the attack. Also, about this time Johnston received a second message from Walker that declared that the Federals had crossed the Oostanaula. Johnston immediately sent word to Hood to cancel the attack, but by the time Hood's message arrived,
Stewart's attack was underway. Stewart didn't strike the Federal flank, but, turning too early, attacked head on into Alpheus Williams's division and part of Geary's division on his right. Hovey's division (XXIII Corps), coming up on Williams' left, when engaged went to ground and left Williams' flank uncovered. Williams, however, was set and awaiting the onslaught of the Confederates. The Confederates popped out of the woods separated so their attacks were delivered piecemeal. Clayton was engaged first and thrown back after suffering heavy casualties. Stovall, following Clayton, encountered an equally devastating reception and chose not to continue to advance in the face of the withering fire but retreated. Baker, passing over the dead and wounded of the units that preceded him managed to fight to within 30 yards of the Federal position before being thrown back. Stewart, who witnessed the slaughter, recalled Gibson and Maney before they become engaged. Stewart lost about 1000 men, with roughly half of those in Clayton's Alabama Brigade. Baker reported 250 casualties. Williams' casualties were 410.

In light of Walker's latest report, that the Federals were in fact across the Oostanaula and threatening to cut his LOCs south of the river, Johnston called his commanders together and ordered a general withdrawal. That night, as expertly as he had done at Dalton, Johnston slipped away practically unnoticed. The trains for the most part had already withdrawn south, those that remained used the pontoon bridge. The infantry units withdrew using the railroad and wagon bridges; skirmishers left in front line trenches covered the army's withdrawal, then followed at appropriate intervals. The engineers and rear guard (Stewart) removed the pontoon bridge and destroyed both the railroad and wagon bridges.

Hardee and Polk marched to Calhoun, while Hood proceeded to Adairsville. At 0330 on 16 May the rear guard torches the railroad and wagon bridges and removed the pontoon bridge as they withdrew. The Confederates withdrew leaving nothing, save the hundreds of dead that littered the battlefield.

Estimates of Union and Confederate losses ranged from as low as 2,600 and 3,500 to Federal losses for the three days of 939 killed, 5,696 wounded, and 170 missing for a total of 6,805 and for the Army of Tennessee 490 killed, 3,047 wounded, and 1,432 missing for a total of 4969. Sherman's chance for a decisive battle at the outset of the campaign had slipped away. Now he took up the pursuit, lengthening his supply lines, as he plunged deeper into Georgia -- exactly what Johnston said he wanted Sherman to do.

Resaca to Cassville (16 - 18 May).

Sherman occupied Resaca the morning of 16 May and immediately went over to the pursuit. Federal troops were able to save the wagon bridge from burning but not the railroad bridge. Sherman hoped to bring Johnston to battle north of the Etowah River. The terrain transitions south of the Oostanaula from heavily forested, rugged mountains into a more rolling landscape dotted with hills, fields, and forests between the two rivers. A terrain more favorable to maneuver and Sherman wanted to catch Johnston before he retreated into the Allatoona Mountains south of the Etowah River.
Johnston's route of march followed the railroad and the main parallel routes directly south to Calhoun. On the 16th at Calhoun, Johnston looked for favorable defensive terrain and conditions for a counter stroke against Sherman's advancing army. Hardee's rear guard executed a classic delay. The delaying elements positioned themselves using the terrain and natural cover effectively. The Confederate rear guard threw out obstacles across the most likely avenues of approach, initiated contact with artillery at maximum range, repeatedly feigned a general engagement, and forced the advancing Federal units to deploy into line of battle -- an operation requiring a considerable amount of time. At the appropriate time, the force in contact would pull back to their next delay position and when the Federal line of battle finally reached the Confederate positions they found them abandoned.

Having failed to find favorable defensive terrain around Calhoun, Johnston continued to fall back to Adairsville on the 17th. At Adairsville, Johnston selected a ridge flanked by a swamp as his next defensive position but reconsidered, deciding the valley was too wide to defend and stretched his front too far. Johnston ordered the withdrawal to continue southward to Cassville. Johnston accompanied Hardee to Kingston, while Polk and Hood took the Cassville Road. French's Division, Polk's Corps joined the army at Kingston. Jackson's cavalry division also arrived. At Cassville Johnston's options were to: (1) hit Sherman's divided force or, (2) continue to retire, drawing Sherman further south lengthening the attacker's supply line.

Sherman continued his pursuit split into four columns on a broad front advance to facilitate rapid movement. McPherson crossed over the two pontoons at Lay's Ferry as did Garrard and Kilpatrick. Garrard then turned west heading to Rome, followed by Davis' division (XIV Corps). Kilpatrick accompanied McPherson to Kingston through Woodland and Hermitage. Thomas as the direct pursuit force erected two bridges at Resaca and took the Calhoun Road southward. Considerable skirmishing occurred between IV Corps and Johnston's rear guard (Cleburne Division). Schofield, accompanied by Stoneman's cavalry and followed by Hooker, crossed the Conasauga at Fite's Ferry three miles east of Resaca. From there they marched east ten miles to Edward's Ferry, crossed the Coosawattee River, then turned south to get behind Johnston at Adairsville. Hooker crossed at McClure's Ferry, three miles west of Edwards', then continued south to Adairsville along with McCook's cavalry.

Sweeny's 2d Division marched toward Calhoun, after moving out of the Lay's Ferry bridgehead in the lead of Dodge's XVI Corps, followed by Veatch's 4th Division and Logan's XV Corps. Sweeny moved slowly and cautiously along the Sugar Valley/Adairsville Road toward the Rome-Calhoun Crossroads about a mile and a half west of Calhoun. In the woods southeast of the crossroads, they encountered Hardee's Corps and his divisions, Walker, Bate, and Cleburne. Hardee's position extended from (right to left) Oothkaloogha Creek near the Oothkalooga Mill southwestward paralleling the Rome-Calhoun Road almost a mile. Hardee deployed with Walker on the right, extending from the mill across the intersection, and Cleburne on the left with Bate in support astride the Sugar Valley/Adairsville Road with artillery anchoring the flanks. BG John M. Corse, temporarily in command for Sweeny, deployed the 1st Brigade on the left; 2d Brigade in the center, astride the road; and 3d Brigade on the right with batteries I, 1st Missouri and B, 1st Michigan in overwatch on a hill to the right of the road. As the Federals approached the crossroads, the Confederates aggressively attacked and after a
brief skirmish Corse pulled back. In the meantime, Veatch came forward, joined Sweeney and the two formed a defensive line northwest of the crossroads. Later that night, XV Corps extended the line to the west. After ensuring that the trains were safely past, on their way to Adairsville, Hardee withdrew. Johnston's delaying tactics and systematic withdrawals proved very effective time after time.

The 17th, Sherman's force moved toward Adairsville along converging routes. However, Sherman did not anticipate Johnston making a stand there. Sherman thought Johnston would continue to fall back southward, withdrawing south of the Etowah and into the more defensible terrain of the Allatoona Mountains. Sherman urged his pursuing forces forward, wanting to bring on a general engagement in the open, level country north of the Etowah. But the pursuit was slowed by difficulties and confusion at the crossing sites along the Coosawattee. Disagreements developed between units over right of way, priority of movement on routes into and out of the crossing sites, and on the primary routes of movement. In addition to self-induced problems, the effective delaying tactics of the Confederate rear guard further impeded Sherman's pursuit. For example, Baird and Johnson's divisions of XIV Corps got strung out, delayed by Howard's (IV Corps) trains, which slowed XX Corps and, in turn, put XXIII Corps further behind schedule. The Federal crossing of the Coosawattee was slow and marked with confusion.

IV Corps' pursuit passed through Calhoun where they made contact with Wheeler's cavalry south of town. To delay the pursuing bluecoats the cavalrymen erected temporary log barricades forcing the Federal advance guard to deploy into line of battle and maneuver against those positions, effectively buying time for the retreating Johnston. That evening dug-in Confederate infantry supported by artillery and cavalry greeted the Federal advance as it reached Adairsville. Cheatham's Division conducted the rearguard action at Adairsville. Cheatham deployed Maney, Carter, and Vaughn's brigade in the vicinity of Robert C. Saxon's, or the Octagon House (where US 41 crosses Gordon-Bartow County line). Howard deployed his force and reported the strong Confederate positions to Thomas, who approved postponing an attack until the next morning.

Sherman ordered Thomas to bring up XX Corps, along with Baird's and Johnson's divisions as quickly as possible. Sherman sent orders to McPherson and Schofield to step up the pace and close on Adairsville by morning. Sherman also directed Stoneman to break the railroad below Adairsville between Cartersville and Cassville. Federal forces occupied Adairsville on the 18th.

Johnston, having abandoned the idea of fighting at Adairsville, developed what he thought was the perfect setting for delivering a counterstroke against Sherman. He planned to decoy Sherman to Kingston, while setting an ambush to hit the Federal left flank from hide positions in front of Cassville. The road net diverged south of Adairsville, one road led directly to Cassville, while the other paralleled the railroad to Kingston, about seven miles west of Cassville. Johnston's planned to send Hardee and cavalry, along with the trains via the main road to Kingston--as a decoy, hoping Sherman would follow with the bulk of his force. Polk would cover the main road to Cassville, and Hood would position himself on Polk's right. Johnston figured that Sherman would split his forces to cover the main routes south and when he did
Johnston would seize the opportunity to attack the column enroute to Cassville, with Hood and Polk. Hardee would delay Sherman's main effort at Kingston, then move to Cassville.

Sherman took the bait; believing that Johnston's main body retreated along the railroad to Kingston, he decided to concentrate his army on Kingston. Sherman sent Thomas in direct pursuit of Hardee, ordered McPherson on a flanking march to the west through Barnsley Gardens, and directed Schofield and Hooker to advance via Cassville.

Cassville (18 - 19 May).

On the 18th, Johnston, Polk, and Hood arrived at Cassville. Polk deployed across the Adairsville road north of town on ridgeline overlooking Two Run Creek about a mile northwest of Cassville. Hood deployed on the right flank guarding the western approaches. Hardee, left one of Cleburne's brigades and support from Jackson's cavalry at Kingston, while withdrawing the bulk of his corps to Cassville. With the addition of French's Division and the other troops from Rome, the Army of Tennessee swelled to over 70,000. The Federals, apparently having fallen for Johnston's deception, advanced into the jaws of Johnston's trap.

As Polk prepared to block the advancing bluecoats, Hood set out on his march to get in position on the Federal left flank. Hood moved out with Hindman's Division in the lead, followed by Stewart and Stevenson. Enroute Hood received reports of a Union force (McCook and Stoneman's cavalry divisions) advancing along the Canton Road, out to the east, on his rear. About 1030, Hood redirected his column to face this new threat. Hindman skirmished with the Union cavalry's advance elements. Hood alerted Johnston, but Johnston did not believe the report because earlier Armstrong's brigade (Jackson) reported the Canton Road clear.

The Federals on the Canton Road turned out to be McCook's cavalry division (Colonel Joseph Dorr's and LTC James W. Stewart's brigades along with Lt. William B. Rippetoe's 18th Indiana Battery) and Stoneman's cavalry division ordered to cut the railroad in the vicinity of Cass Station. McCook accompanied by the 2d Indiana stumbled into Stevenson's Division. Stevenson, responding to the threat, quickly formed into line of battle, attacked and drove the Union horse soldiers back. Hood ordered a general change of front and sent Stewart eastward. Stoneman ordered McCook to attack again. McCook maneuvered to the north encountering Stewart. The 2d Indiana led a saber charge against the 18th Alabama, skirmishers from Clayton's Brigade (Stewart). The unexpected encounter proved fortuitous for Schofield and Hooker's columns because it disrupted Confederate plans. By the time things got sorted out the opportunity for an attack was lost and Hood fell back to his former position on Polk's right. Hood deployed Hindman across the Canton Road. Also by this time, Hardee reported Federals advancing from the west along the Kingston Road. Johnston ordered everyone back through Cassville to the ridgeline running south and east of town and once in position to go over to the defensive. Johnston would once again make Sherman attack him.
At Kingston, Sherman remained convinced that Johnston was trying to withdraw south of the Etowah. Therefore, he ordered Thomas to send IV Corps, reinforced by Baird's 3d Division (XIV Corps), eastward along the railroad to Cass Station. He directed McPherson reinforced by Johnson's 1st Division (XIV Corps) south of Kingston to seize the Etowah crossings. As for
Schofield and Hooker, they were to link up with Thomas at Cassville. At this point, Sherman was still thinking pursuit, not battle.

By noon, Stanley's 1st Division in the van of IV Corps made contact with Hardee's battle lines east of Two Run Creek and anticipating an attack deployed accordingly. As if on cue the Confederates attacked across Two Run Creek, then for some unknown reason fell back. In response, IV Corps deployed and cautiously continued on toward Cassville. Thomas reported the incident to Sherman, recommending that Schofield and Hooker assist in capturing the retreating Confederate division (actually a full corps), probably the Confederate rear guard. With help from Schofield and Hooker, they could possibly encircle the unit.

Johnston, forced to give up his ambush, fell back south of Cassville occupying a ridgeline running northeast-southwest. Along this ridge, Johnston drew up into a new defensive position, three miles long. The position was naturally strong, heavily wooded, overlooking a broad valley with good fields of fire. Johnston put Hood on the right wing with his right refused and Wheeler out on the flank, Polk in the center, Hardee on the left wing with his left refused, and Jackson east of the railroad screening the southern flank. Johnston felt he had a strong position from which to inflict significant damage on Sherman.

The approaching Federals took up positions opposite the Confederates on a parallel ridge north and west of Cassville. Schofield deployed to the left of the Adairsville Road with Cox on left, extending beyond Hood's right, and Williams on the right. Hooker deployed XX Corps on Schofield's right with Butterfield on the left astride the Adairsville road, opposite Hood's left, and Geary on the right opposite Polk. Howard formed IV Corps on Hooker's right, extending across the railroad from Kingston, with Newton on the right, opposite Polk's left, Stanley in the center, and Wood on the left south of the town opposite Cass Station facing Hardee. Federal redlegs upon taking up firing positions began shelling Johnston's position.

That night at his commanders call Johnston conferred with Hood and Polk at Polk's headquarters. Accounts differ as to what occurred at the meeting, but Hood and Polk supposedly expressed concern that the Federal artillery, positioned on higher terrain, dominated the Confederate positions, especially, Polk's center (French). Initially, Johnston dismissed the danger, but Polk and Hood, agreeing that the position was untenable, persisted, persuading Johnston to withdraw once again. What happened that night has been embroiled ever since in controversy, embellished more so with the deterioration of the relationship between Hood and Johnston, and Polk died without leaving an official report or personal account of the incident. Evidently, Hardee favored making a stand and fighting. However, Johnston also received a report of Federals crossings the Etowah below of Kingston, making his flanks vulnerable to being overlapped by Sherman's numerically superior force. All things considered, Johnston reluctantly ordered another withdrawal. Once again Johnston successfully disengaged and covered his evacuation during the night of the 19th without being detected.
Cassville to Dallas (20 - 25 May).

Johnston withdrew his Army of Tennessee by crossing the Etowah at Cartersville using four bridges—the railroad bridge, the wagon bridge and two pontoon bridges. After crossing they destroyed the railroad and wagon bridges, then retreated into the Allatoona Mountains astride the Western and Atlantic Railroad at Allatoona Pass.

Sherman remained at Kingston, as did McPherson. Sherman ordered Thomas and Schofield, being at Cassville, to once again take up pursuit of Johnston's retreating army. Schofield reached the Etowah that night and reported to Sherman on the status of the bridges.

Sherman rested his army for three days. While the army rested [Operational pause], Sherman planned the next phase of the campaign. He knew that the Allatoona stronghold was too formidable to throw his armies against. The cost of an attack into the mountains was too high for Sherman's taste, so he devised a much bolder by-pass solution than he had used previously at Resaca. He decided to execute a more daring flanking movement by leaving the railroad loaded with twenty days' supplies in their wagons and head westward to Dallas, Georgia. From Dallas, Sherman knew Johnston would have to abandon his Allatoona stronghold in order to protect Atlanta. By threatening Marietta and Atlanta from the west, he would force Johnston back to the Chattahoochee where he expected Johnston to make his next determined stand. The general movement would begin on the 23d, allowing three days for the movement and concentration; he expected to be at Dallas on the 25th.

During this operational pause, Sherman focused on the security of the railroad. As he descended deeper into the bowels of the Confederacy his LOCs lengthened and became more vulnerable, so to secure the railroad he detached greater numbers of troops. He ordered BG John E. Smith's 3d Division XV Corps from Huntsville to join the Army. Sherman also requested that Washington use 100-day volunteer regiments for LOC duty to relieve him of that burden so his veteran troops would be available for the march to Atlanta and the decisive battle to come. Lincoln concurred with Sherman's request and wired the governors of Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin asking them to levy the necessary troops. Sherman did not get the response he had hoped for but did get some relief. Besides receiving fresh replacements, he received returnees from furlough and hospitals as well. Sherman ordered his armies to strip for action, to send the sick, lame and lazy to rear.

Soldiers used the time to catch-up on their sleep, reading their mail, writing home, eating, general reading, drawing, and or repairing equipment and clothing (especially shoes), and generally cleaning up and getting rid of lice. Some attended church services on Sunday, 22 May. The engineer units worked on repairing the railroad, while medical units evacuated wounded, and details buried the dead.

Cavalry, on both sides of the Etowah, remained active during the lull. The Confederates prepared earthworks south of the river and kept watch for signs of Federal movements.
On the 23d, as he had done previously, Sherman advanced in three columns with Schofield on the left, Thomas in the center with McCook's cavalry leading, and McPherson on the right. Schofield's route of march was via Richland Creek and Burnt Hickory (seven miles north of Dallas). Thomas' route was via Euharlee and Stilesboro to Burnt Hickory (Huntsville). His order of march was Hooker, Howard, Palmer. McPherson's route carried him through Stilesboro, Taylorsville, Aragon, and Van Wert (Rockmart) to a position near the head of Pumkinvine Creek. Federal cavalry provided flank security, Garrard covered McPherson's flank and Stoneman screened east of Stilesboro.

Federal movements began about 0400 on the 23d. McPherson crossed the Etowah with XV and XVI corps west of Kingston at Wooley's Bridge. Thomas crossed with IV Corps and Baird's and Johnson's divisions of XIV Corps at Gillem's Bridge and at a ford southeast of Kingston. XX Corps (Hooker) followed by XXIII (Schofield) crossed on a pontoon bridge near Milam's bridge. Hooker camped the first night on Euharlee Creek, while IV and XIV Corps pulled up on and extended the Army of the Cumberland to the right. The Army of the Tennessee bivouacked on the west branch of Euharlee Creek.

The march was difficult because of the weather and rugged nature of the terrain. Their advance carried them through a rugged, desolate wilderness, covered in large, dense forest and thick underbrush interrupted by only a few clearings in the vicinity of small farms that were scattered across the sparsely populated area. Generally, the terrain was broken by hills and steep rocky ridges and cut by deep ravines and numerous streams. The trek along the few roads was hot and dusty until the heavy rains turned the already poor roads into muddy quagmires, water was at a premium and forage was scarce. Colds, flu, and pneumonia were epidemic.

On the 24th, a captured Confederate courier revealed that Johnston knew of Sherman's movement and the Army of the Cumberland skirmished with Confederate cavalry along Raccoon Creek and camped at Burnt Hickory. XXIII Corps, to the northeast, screened by McCook and Stoneman, extended out toward Allatoona. The Army of the Tennessee, east of Van Wert about seven miles from Dallas, crossed Dugtown Mountain at York, and camped at Pumkinvine Church. Davis' 2d Division XIV Corps rejoined the Army coming in from their excursion to Rome.

On the 25th, Hooker advanced XX Corps on three routes. His order of march was Geary in the center, Williams, on the right, followed by Butterfield to the north. IV Corps followed XXth, while XIV escorted the trains. XXIII followed Butterfield. McPherson, on the road to Dallas, drove off Confederate cavalry in the town, then occupied Dallas. However, as they headed east toward Marietta they bumped into Hardee (Bate's Division) just to the east of Dallas.

Johnston's cavalry (Wheeler) detected the Federal move right from the start. Johnston in turn moved to block the Union threat. He ordered Hardee and Polk to Dallas. The distance from Allatoona to Dallas was about 16 miles. Hardee arrived outside Dallas late on the 23d. Polk followed and stopped at Lost Mountain about midway between Allatoona and Dallas. Johnston along with Hood remained at Allatoona, then on the 24th moved to the vicinity of Elsberry Mountain. By the afternoon of the 24th, the Confederates concentrated east of Dallas, taking
advantage of their shorter more direct route. Hardee was on the left blocking the Marietta road, Polk took the center, while Hood extended the right east of New Hope Church crossroads. This became known as the Dallas-New Hope Line extending from southeast of Dallas to northeast of New Hope Church. Wheeler conducted a raid on the Federal rear at Cass Station capturing 70 wagons, while Jackson skirmished with Federal cavalry between Van Wert and Dallas.

The battles along the Dallas-New Hope Church line, overlooked or dismissed by many historians, were among the most costly and confused battles fought during the campaign for Atlanta. Sherman himself ignores them in his reports. However, the terrain, weather, and enemy combined to force Sherman into some of the most furious and desperate fighting of the campaign.

New Hope Church (25 May).

John Bell Hood deployed his corps northeast of Dallas in the vicinity of New Hope Church facing northwest. He placed Hindman on the left, Stewart, reinforced by a brigade from Stevenson in the center, and Stevenson on the right. Hood's troops spent the morning preparing their defensive positions digging in, clearing fields of fire, erecting breastworks, digging rifle pits and trenches.

Stewart held the key crossroads. He deployed his division with three brigades in the front line, two back in reserve, and supported his line with sixteen tubes of artillery (three batteries). Stovall's Brigade, of five regiments, held the left, Clayton's Brigade, of four regiments, occupied the center, and Baker's Brigade, of three regiments, covered the right. Gibson's and Brown's brigades were in reserve.

Hooker's axis of advance carried XX Corps along three separate routes to the New Hope Church crossroads four miles northeast of Dallas. Thomas and Hooker accompanied the center division, John Geary's 2d Division. Hooker riding up front, along with his escort, spotted from the ridge overlooking the approach to the bridge over Pumpkintine Creek at Owen's Mill Confederate cavalry attempting to burn the bridge. It was about 1000 when Hooker, Geary, their staffs and escorts all charged forward to secure the bridge and run off the Confederates.

Geary's advance guard quickly captured the Pumpkintine Creek bridge, and the division pushed across. About a mile and a half further along, Geary made contact with Hood's advance skirmishers, the 14th Louisiana Sharpshooters (Gibson's Brigade). Geary's lead brigade deployed in the thick undergrowth that blanketed the area, then proceeded forward, slowly. From prisoners they discovered that Hood's Corps was entrenched in their front. This intelligence came as a surprise, also Geary was out in front of the rest of the army by about five miles. Therefore, Geary deployed his three brigades (Cobham, Buschbeck, and Candy) in an extended line of battle in the thick woods, where they "could not see the length of a company," and drove Hood's skirmishers back to their main line. At that point, Geary directed his men to
prepare a hasty defense and throw up breastworks. He then sent word to Butterfield and Williams to come up quickly.

Thomas sent messengers to rear to bring IV Corps forward. Howard was about six miles behind Geary. Communicating in this rough terrain was extremely difficult and movement on the narrow trails was slow. Between 1600 and 1700, Williams and Butterfield arrived, Williams countermarched, then deploy from the march into line of battle "without time to catch his breath," and Thomas ordered the divisions to prepare to assault. As storm clouds rolled in and thunder reverberated across the sky, Hooker's attack surged through the dense woods toward New Hope Church.

When word reached Sherman of the events at Pumkinvine Creek he became irritated because he did not believe that a sizable Confederate force could be in front of Prostitute. Sherman wanted

![Battle of New Hope Church - 25 May 1864](image)

*Figure 8: Battle of New Hope Church, 25 May 1864.*

Geary to advance immediately, but Thomas and Hooker recommended waiting for the rest of XX Corps to arrive. Sherman reluctantly acquiesced.
Hooker formed for the assault in columns of brigades with Butterfield (3d Division) left, Geary (2d Division) center, and Williams (1st Division) right. This formation narrowed the front of each division to the width of a brigade. Hooker's compressed front meant that his corps frontage was only the width of Stewart's Confederate division. The attack focused on the crossroads. The Federals attacked without artillery support. Because of the dense woods and thick underbrush they could not bring their artillery forward where it could do any good.

Williams, accompanied by Hooker, stepped off first with James Robinson's 3d Brigade in the lead. Struggling through the densely wooded terrain and tangled understory, they drove in Stewart's skirmishers but then encountered the devastating fire from the southerners' breastworks. Confederates concentrated their fires on the densely packed Federal attack formations and decimated them blowing gapping holes in the ranks by musketry and cannon fire. A deadly cross fire disintegrated entire ranks halting the momentum of the attack. Three times the bluecoated foot soldiers surged forward, and each time they were driven back scurrying for cover. Adding to the misery of the scene, during the fight a tremendous thunderstorm erupted.

 Appropriately termed the "Hell Hole" by the survivors, Williams reported losing 800 men in about twenty minutes. Butterfield lost 418 and Geary reported 376 for a total of 1594 casualties. In Ruger's brigade, the 107 New York lost 168 or 36 percent. While Hooker reported suffering 1667 casualties, most of them coming in Williams division.

 Howard's IV Corps, ordered forward, arrived about dark in a driving rain storm. They described the scene they encountered after the battle as chaotic, confused, and disorganized. The screams and groaning of the wounded were accompanied by shouting and swearing of those trying to reorganize and clear the battlefield. Stewart reported only 300-400 casualties.

 The 16,000 Federals attacked on a narrow front against only 4,000 Confederates, but the Confederates fought from behind cover and the Federals did not stand a chance. Night and the rain brought an end to the chaos. Sherman blamed the debacle on the lengthy delay prior to the attack which gave the Confederates time to prepare. Sherman spent that night behind a log near New Hope Church.

 McPherson bivouacked the Army of the Tennessee near Pumpkintwine Church on the west side of the creek three and a half miles from Dallas. His orders were to move out the next morning at 0300, proceed through Dallas, and hit Hood's left flank. On the 26th, the Army of the Tennessee moved through Dallas without opposition until east of the town. XV Corps with Veatch's division and XVI Corps with Davis' division upon encountering stiff opposition established a line two miles east of Dallas. Also, IV Corps and XXIII Corps moved up on line with XX Corps. However, a gap existed between McPherson's left and Thomas' right that they covered by only a thin screen of pickets. Fortunately for the Federals, only sporadic skirmishing occurred along the line of contact in that area, and Johnston never exploited the gap. Both armies dug in on that hot and muggy day.

 Sherman ordered his line extended to the east in another attempt to outflank Johnston, this time planning to go to the left trying to get around the right flank. While demonstrating with
other units and concentrating his artillery, Sherman ordered Howard, supported by two divisions from Schofield, to attack north of New Hope Church. McPherson was to slide to the left to link up with Hooker's right. Sherman seemed to finally realize that he faced Johnston's entire force and not just Hood's Corps, not longer trying to envelop Hood's flanks, but now wanting to slip back to the east and the railroad. Johnston anticipated Sherman's move and shifted Polk to join with Hood's left, and Hardee to link in with Polk's left. Hindman's Division shifted from the left to the extreme right of Hood's Corps. Johnston detached Cleburne's Division from Hardee, sending it to reinforce Hood on Hindman's right, anchoring the Confederate extreme right.

Pickett's Mill (27 May).

At dawn on the 27th, Federal artillery commenced a barrage of Confederate positions along the front, and the Southerners dutifully returned fire. Howard ordered T.J. Wood (3d Division) to lead the move to the left; Stanley's division replaced Wood in line. Richard W. Johnson's 1st Division, XIV Corps, plus Nathaniel McLean's 3d Brigade from Schofield's XXIII Corps supported Wood (about 18,000 troops). Howard's march commenced about 1100, taking him over difficult terrain cut by deep ravines and rugged ridges covered by dense woods and thick tangled undergrowth. The march columns' movement was frustratingly slow. They stopped frequently for recons by lead elements unfamiliar with the area as they tried to maneuver through the difficult terrain over the few, if any, roads. Howard's column blindly groped its way eastward. The approach march took over five hours.

Their initial movement brought them to a point behind the Federal left, too shallow, and not on Johnston's flank. Since they had not found the Confederate flank they continued their movement further eastward. Wood had the commander of his lead regiment (41 OH) use a compass to keep the unit on course. Gibson controlled his brigade's movement by sounding bugle calls--so much for surprise. Besides, the Confederates doing their own recon, Daniel Govan's Arkansas Brigade, detected Howard's not-too-subtle movement earlier that morning. After moving about a mile or two in about two hours, Howard turned his columns southward again figuring he must be beyond the Confederate right flank. Howard and Wood rode forward for their leaders recon and surveyed their objective. They were on the west bank of a branch of Pumkinvine Creek known as Pickett's Mill Creek or Little Pumkinvine Creek. From the top of a ridge, Howard could see across to the opposite ridge the evidence of freshly dug trenches.

Cleburne's Division supported by Major T.R. Hotchkiss's artillery battalion of twelve guns, arrived early enough and dug in on commanding terrain in the vicinity of Pickett's Mill atop a low ridge overlooking the valley of Little Pumkinvine Creek. Cleburne deftly covered the avenues of approach with interlocking rifle and artillery fires, prepared excellent fields of fire down the steep slopes in front of the position. Cleburne deployed Lucius Polk's Brigade on the left, on Hindman's right, Govan's Brigade in the center, and Hiram Granbury's Texas Brigade on the right. Swett's Mississippi Battery and a section of Key's Arkansas Battery occupied a position between Polk and Granbury with Key's other gun section posted between Govan and Granbury. Cleburne held Mark P. Lowry's Brigade in reserve and John H. Kelly's cavalry
division screened the front and right flank. Quarles' Brigade (Hindman) and Walthall's Brigade (Stewart) reinforced Cleburne.

About 1500, with Wood in the center, Johnson moved up on the left, and McLean filled the interval between Howard and Hooker. Howard formed into an assault column with divisions in column of brigades, six lines deep. Wood deployed from front to rear, William B. Hazen's 2d Brigade, William H. Gibson's 1st Brigade, and Frederick Kneffler's 3d Brigade. Johnson deployed with Benjamin Scribner's 3d Brigade in front, followed by John H. King's 2d Brigade and William P. Carlin's 1st Brigade. Sometime around 1630 Howard ordered the attack to proceed. Howard's choice of assault formation was as ill-advised for this assault as it had been

or the attack at New Hope Church; column of brigades on a narrow front nullified any numerical advantage (14,000 vs 10,000) that might have been gained by an attack on an extended frontage. The supposed inherent advantages of command and control and a massed attack, delivered in a concentrated blow of a dense formation, were negated when the attacks were delivered piecemeal and unsupported.
Wood sent Hazen's 1500 veteran troops from Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana in first at about 1700. Hazen, considered one of the best commanders in the army, established a solid reputation after his gallant stand at Stones River. He arrayed his brigade in a column of regiments with a front of less than 200 yards. Hazen advanced through the dense woods, then down into a deep, tangled ravine (100 to 120 feet). Movement was difficult. His formation denigrated, so he stopped to reform in the ravine. After reforming, the attackers struggled to ascend the steep, rocky slope to the ridge line crowned with Cleburne's veterans. Hazen contacted Cleburne's flank security first and drove in Kelly's dismounted cavalry pickets strung out in a long thin skirmish line. The dismounted horse soldiers put up a significant enough fight to give Cleburne time to reposition troops (Granbury's Brigade) and extend his line along the ridge to prevent the envelopment of his flank.

Hazen, alone and unsupported, attacked into Granbury's arriving Arkansans. Ordered forward to extend Cleburne's right, Granbury had no time to prepare defensive works. The strength of the position and taking advantage of the natural cover of fallen timbers, boulders, and trees enabled Granbury to repel the Federal assault. A furious fight, in the face of withering Confederate fire ensued; the only protection for the assaulting Federals was in the bottom of the ravine. While Hazen's first line (1st Ohio, 41st Ohio, 93d Ohio, and 124th Ohio) struggled along the ravine in front of Granbury, his second line of regiments (6 Kentucky, 5 Kentucky, 6 Indiana, and 23 Kentucky), which had veered off to the left, continued to probe for the Confederate flank. Charging into a corn field the surging bluecoats found an opening and for a short time achieved success, getting around the Cleburne's flank and threatening the Confederate rear. Granbury's line and the cavalry on his flank pressed by the continued pressure called for help. Cleburne shifted more forces from his left. The timely arrival by two of Govan's regiments (8th and 19th Arkansas) commanded by Colonel G.F. Baucom made this Federal success short-lived. They met in the edge of the cornfield. Hazen's left recoiled briefly from the initial assault on their flank but managed to recover and surged forward again. Once again Hazen's troops gained the Confederate flank but were in turn hit on their flank, this time by the timely arrival of Lowery's Brigade as it joined the fray. Lowrey's attack forced Hazen's left regiments back across the cornfield, where the Federals regrouped, prepared hasty defensive positions, and held off a determined counterattack. Hazen sent messengers to the rear begging for assistance but none responded. The fighting lasted until late into the night, sometimes at close quarters and hand-to-hand. Finally, by 1800 Hazen had had enough and withdrew. The Federals repeated the scene on Cleburne's front in subsequent Union attacks by Gibson and Kneffler. As Hazen fell back, Gibson moved forward and came in on Hazen's right. Wood hoped Gibson would meet less resistance against a weakened Confederate line. However, like Hazen before, Gibson went in unsupported. Unlike Hazen though, Gibson struck Granbury, now reinforced by Walthal. Also, Lowery and Kelly on the left engaged the on-coming Federals by enfilade fires on one flank, while Govan, a rifled battery, and a section of howitzers from Key's Battery provided fires from the right. Gibson's assault proved more costly than Hazen's. Gibson, forced to withdraw after about an hour, left behind numerous dead and wounded as had Hazen previously.

Scribner's brigade of Johnson's division advanced on Wood's left, while moving along Pickett's Mill Creek and across a wheat field encountered Kelly's cavalry pickets, protecting the Confederate flank. A fierce skirmish delayed the Federal advance. Enfilade fire from Kelly's
dismounted troopers occupying a hill to their left rear forced Scribner to deploy three regiments (38 Indiana, 1 Wisconsin, and 21 Ohio) across the creek to the east side. The three regiments assaulted the hill occupied by Kelly’s dismounted troopers in the vicinity of the mill forcing Kelly to withdraw. This action took about two hours (5-7 PM) and by the time Scribner resumed his forward movement it was too late to assist Hazen. Scribner continued on alone facing repeated assaults by Lowrey and Quarles, but Scribner’s soldiers stood firm and were the last to withdraw from the battlefield that night.

On the Federal right, McLean’s brigade failed to support Hazen’s attack on the right. Also, McLean failed to carry out his mission to fix the enemy to their front and prevent the Confederates from shifting troops to counter Hazen’s attack. Instead, McLean remained in the woods. Later, without ever joining in the battle raging to his front, McLean retired to the rear.

At 6 PM, Howard received a message from Thomas that Sherman canceled the attack and to go over to the defense. Wood decided further assaults were futile, and ordered Kneffler sent forward to cover the withdrawal of the remnants of Hazen’s and Gibson’s shattered brigades that remained forward in the ravine. Those survivors who were able to withdraw reluctantly rallied and reorganized in the eventuality of a counterattack. As Kneffler entered the ravine his troops also met the intense enfilade fire that had greeted the previous two brigades, whereupon he also retreated to the cover of the woods and immediately set about erecting defensive works. Afterwards the gruesome task of removing the wounded began. At 10 PM Kneffler ordered a withdrawal to Howard’s new line.

At about the same time Kneffler prepared to fall back, Cleburne approved Granbury’s request to go forward to clear the remaining Federals from their front. Granbury’s troops actually charged down from their position into the ravine on the heels of the withdrawing Federals adding further to the confusion and chaos of the night. Granbury encountered Kneffler, who fired a volley then fell back. Granbury captured 250 Union soldiers, many wounded and unable to move.

Kneffler’s withdrawal left Scribner vulnerable, therefore, he withdrew from the cornfield to the east side of the creek to guard the Federal left flank. Howard established a defensive line to the rear with Carlin’s brigade on the left, then King with Scribner in reserve, with the reorganized remnants of Hazen, Gibson, and Kneffler’s brigades on the right. Everyone dug in and fortified their positions on the 28th.

Union losses were 1732, of that total 1453, or 75 percent were from Wood’s division. Hazen lost 467, Gibson 681, Kneffler 250, Scribner 125 (12 1/2 percent of the Federals engaged). Cleburne lost 448.

In the aftermath of the slaughter of Pickett’s Mill, Sherman decided to move back to the railroad. With only one wagon allocated per regiment, troops were running short of rations, depending on division and corps trains. Distribution was also becoming a problem because of the slow travel from Kingston.
Dallas (28 May).

Sherman set about concentrating his army for the move back to the railroad at Ackworth. His line stretching from Dallas to Pickett's Mill was not a coherent line but had two potentially dangerous gaps, one between McPherson and Thomas, the other between Howard and Schofield. Therefore, Sherman ordered McPherson to close up on Thomas, Davis' division to rejoin XIV Corps, and XIV Corps to replace XXIII Corps in line. XXIII Corps would move out on the main Ackworth road while Howard provided protection for the left flank of the army.

Johnston, received a report that Sherman appeared to be pulling back from Dallas. So, Johnston ordered Hardee to recon forward to Dallas and develop the situation. Hardee in turn assigned the mission to MG William B. Bate's Division with BG William H. "Red" Jackson's cavalry division in support.

Bate's plan called for Jackson's cavalry to envelop the federal right flank and if resistance was light Bate would launch his infantry brigades forward. However, if Federal resistance was significant they would withdraw. Jackson sent Ferguson's Brigade on a wide arc around to the rear of Dallas to observe the south and west approaches to the town. Ross' brigade moved around to the south and prepared to enter the town. Armstrong's Brigade moved directly toward the Federal position to their front and upon encountering opposition would signal with four cannon shots. The infantry, formed in three separate columns, would advance on line. They arrayed, from south to north, Thomas T. Smith's Brigade, Finley's or Bullock's Brigade, and Joseph H. Lewis' Orphan (Kentucky) Brigade.

Armstrong's Brigade of Mississippians and Alabamans attacked dismounted about 3:45 PM. Their assault quickly overran the Federal outpost line consisting of Charles Walcutt's brigade (William Harrow's division, Logan's XV Corps) and momentum carried them through the 1st Iowa Battery, capturing three 10 pounder Parrott rifles in the process. But then the rapidly advancing Confederates were counterattacked by 6th Iowa and driven back—discovering that the Federal position was in fact strongly held. Logan acted quickly to seal the limited penetration by personally leading a counterattack and ordering James A. Williamson's 2d Brigade of Peter Osterhaus' division to reinforce the right. Williamson's brigade along with Wilder's Mounted Infantry Brigade recaptured the guns belonging to the 1st Iowa and restored Harrow's line.

With Armstrong's withdrawal, Bate sent messages to his infantry brigades canceling the attack. Thomas T. Smith, the left of Bate's Division and nearest to Armstrong, got the word and did not advance but moved out of the trenches and formed for the attack in anticipation of the signal to advance. However, Lewis and Finley did not receive the cancellation order. Thinking they had missed the attack signal, upon hearing fighting and finding Smith's trenches vacant, immediately launched their assault against XV Corps and the right of Veatch's division, XVI Corps. Lewis' Kentucky Brigade attacked Wangelin's brigade and captured several pieces of...
artillery. Attacking on Lewis' left, Bullock's Florida Brigade struck Morgan L. Smith's 2d Division. The attacks, however, were uncoordinated and repulsed. Fully realizing what they were up against Bate called off the ill-timed attacks. For the Kentuckians the word to fall back

came too late and consequently they paid a tremendous price to get within 20 meters of the Federal works.
By 6 PM the fighting ended. Logan reported 379 casualties. Confederate casualties were estimated at 1,000-1,500. The Orphan Brigade lost 51 percent of 1,100. Bate reported 450 casualties. The attack caused Sherman to delay his movements eastward and Dodge and Logan remained alert throughout the night for another Confederate attack. Sherman, however sent his cavalry, Stoneman and Garrard, to Allatoona Pass to secure the railroad and seize the pass.

On 29 May, Johnston, acting on cavalry reports that the Federal left was in the air, pulled Hood out of the Dallas-New Hope Line, ordering him on a flanking march to strike the exposed and vulnerable flank. Johnston ordered Polk and Hardee to be prepared to follow up any success achieved by Hood. Hood's flanking movement proceeded extremely slowly in the dark, with frequent halts, so that by the time they were in position the Federals exposed flank was protected by entrenched Federals. Johnston canceled the attack and pulled Hood back. The incident further strained the Johnston-Hood relationship.

Johnston, anticipating Sherman's intent to slip eastward, decided to stay in close, negating Sherman's advantage in strength and firepower, by executing harassing attacks keeping the Federals fixed on their front and flanks. The Confederates launched local probing attacks at night to disrupt Federal attempts to withdraw while continuing to extend his trenches opposite Sherman's. Confederate observation posts atop Elsberry Mountain provided valuable information as to the goings on in the Union lines. The trench lines extended some ten miles from Dallas to Pickett's Mill. The nature of the war in the west was changing characterized by: slow movements, constant entrenching, and building elaborate earthworks.

Between 29 and 31 May, Sherman finally began the tedious task of withdrawing while in contact by entrenching subsequent positions to the rear of the army and leaving only a strong skirmish line forward in contact with the Confederates as his covering force. Leaving a rear guard to cover the pullout, Sherman quietly withdrew eastward (a lesson learned from Johnston at Dalton and Resaca) the bulk of his force to the new trenches by staggering, the movement division by division. Because of the danger that as soon as the Confederates discovered that the Federals were on the move they would surge forward and attack when they were most vulnerable, Sherman kept up a strong screen of skirmishers while continuing to fall back and then sliding left to new fortified positions. Despite almost constant skirmishing, that at times was quite heavy, and constant sniping by sharpshooters during the day and heavy artillery firing at night, McPherson successfully withdrew and linked up with Thomas.

The defenders on both sides discovered four-feet wide parapets were not sufficient to stop solid shot at close range and therefore, increased the standard parapet wall to twelve feet. Soldiers spent their days improving their defenses—throwing up breastworks, digging rifle pits, traverses, trenches, communication trenches, and sleeping pits, strengthening parapets, and emplacing headlogs, thus creating a landscape that would become all to familiar to the soldiers of World War I. Physical and psychological strain, sleeplessness, rain, mud, cold nights, hot, sultry, steamy days, filth, lice, the stench of dead and decaying bodies, both human and animal, became apart of the soldier's landscape. The soldiers fighting in the trenches were tired and jittery, many nearing exhaustion.
McPherson finally reached New Hope Church on 1 June. With the arrival of XV Corps (Logan), XX Corps pulled out and moved around to the rear of the Union left at Pickett's Mill, and Sherman began his flank movement back to the Western and Atlantic railroad at Ackworth. Stoneman reached Allatoona Pass on the sixth, occupied Ackworth on the Western and Atlantic Railroad and immediately set about rebuilding the Etowah railroad bridge. On the ninth, they drove Wheeler out of Big Shanty.

Aeworth -- Big Shanty.

Between 1-7 June, (Grant at Cold Harbor, 3 June) Sherman concentrated his force in the vicinity of Aeworth and Big Shanty (Kennesaw), south of Alatoona. The summer rains began, initially welcomed because it broke the suffocating heat and humidity. Sherman took the opportunity to rest his army and refit before continuing his offensive to Atlanta. On 4 June, Sherman ordered McPherson to march behind the rest of the army, repose for the right to the left, and then proceed to Aeworth. On 6 June, McPherson deployed along Proctor's Creek, south of the town. Thomas remained the center army and Schofield now occupied the right. Schofield moved via the Burnt Hickory-Dallas Road enroute to Allatoona Church and the Dallas-Ackworth Road. The Army of the Ohio remained in place while the rest of the army passed behind them. Sherman established his headquarters at Big Shanty and moved his forward supply depot to that location.

Also on 4 June, Johnston abandoned the Dallas-New Hope line having no choice but to shadow Sherman's move to prevent him from getting on his flank. Johnston fell back six miles to Lost Mountain, establishing the Lost Mountain line. The Lost Mountain line, anchored on the left flank by Lost Mountain, extended generally northeast to Gilgal Church, then ran east to Brushy Mountain, and turned back to the northeast to the Western and Atlantic Railroad. The new defensive line formed an apex at Pine Mountain. Hardee remained on the left between Gilgal Church, at the crossroads of Burnt Hickory and Sandtown roads, and Pine Mountain, while Jackson's cavalry covered the left flank from Gilgal Church to Lost Mountain and the Dallas Road. Hardee had Bate's Division on Pine Mountain, supported by Slocumb's Louisiana Battery and Beauregard's South Carolina Battery. Polk held the Confederate center, and Hood lay astride the Western and Atlantic Railroad extending across Brushy Mountain with Wheeler's cavalry on the extreme right flank. The Lost Mountain line ran about ten miles in length.

South of Aeworth the terrain consisted of heavily forested rolling hills and ridges, mixed with dense underbrush. The landscape was broken by deep ravines and meandering streams, swollen by recent sometimes heavy rains (Noonday, Mud, Nose's, and Olley's) and four low isolated mountains (Lost, Pine, Brush, and Kennesaw). The area was sparsely settled, consisting of small fields, few roads, rapidly becoming impassable. In a normal year the streams would not be significant obstacles, but in June 1864 the weather was not normal and in the steady rains streams overflowed and roads disappeared becoming quagmires. The railroad and roads in the
area determined the direction of movement, the key roads being Sandtown, Burnt Hickory, Dallas, Macland, Powder Springs, and Austell.

On 8 June, Federal replacements arrived, XVII Corps commanded by MG Frank Blair, added two infantry divisions, about 9,000 (2,000 remained at Rome and 1,500 at Allatoona); 1st Alabama Cavalry Brigade (Garrard), 2,500; and BG J.E. Smith's division, XV Corps, 4,000. Hovey resigned and his two brigades were reassigned, one to Hascall and one to Cox. On the other side, Cantey's 6,000 man third brigade from Mobile reinforced Johnston.

During the lull in the fighting, 6-11 June, Federal engineers (COL William W. Wright's Railroad Construction and Repair Corps of 600 civilians and 2000 detachments) rebuilt the Etowah railroad bridge, a 600-foot span, in five days. It took three days to rebuild the bridge over the Oostanaula. Their work was marked by skill and efficiency. This allowed Sherman to run trains forward to just behind the front line—for psychological impact.

Pine Mountain (10 - 14 June).

After refitting and resting, Sherman, not expecting serious opposition until reaching the Chattahoochee, planned to attack southward keeping to the railroad. He sent McPherson, on the left, southward along the railroad from Auckworth, through Big Shanty enroute to Marietta, Garrard's cavalry covered the left flank. Thomas, in the center, with his headquarters at Mars Hill Church, moved due south toward Pine Mountain, enroute to Kennesaw Mountain, and then on to Marietta. Schofield, on the right, would operate between Sandtown Road at Gilgal Church and Lost Mountain, with Stoneman covering the right flank. McCook would be responsible for rear area security. Movement would be slow due to the combination of the terrain, weather, and poor roads. Further, since Johnston held the high ground, Confederate observers monitored the movements by the large Federal forces.

On 10 June, Sherman began his general advance toward Marietta. At 0600; he sent Garrard (east) and Stoneman (west) on the flanks. A strong force of skirmishers supported by artillery preceded each infantry column. Sherman anticipated only token resistance until reaching the Chattahoochee, but realized the exception could be north of Marietta around Kennesaw Mountain. After seven straight days of rain the mud and rain slowed movements to a crawl. The lead elements moved cautiously, probing for weak spots in the Confederate defenses which consisted of successive lines of trenches. Sherman described the scene before him:

"Kenesaw, the bold and striking twin mountain, lay before us, with a high range of chestnut hills tending off to the northeast, terminating to our viewing another peak called Brush Mountain. To our right was a smaller hill, called Pine Mountain, and beyond it in the distance, Lost Mountain. All these, though linked in a continuous chain, present a sharp conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in the region. Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost form a triangle. Pine, the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountain the base, covering perfectly the town of Marietta and the railroad back to the
Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal stations, the summits were crowned with batteries, and the spurs were alive with men busy in felling trees, digging pits, and preparing for the grand struggle impending. The scene was enchanting, too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamor of war; but the Chattahoochee lay beyond, and I had to reach it."

By late morning, Thomas' IV (Howard) Corps, in the van, encountered Confederate outposts in front of Pine Mountain (actually a mile long ridge about 300 feet high) which dominated the two main routes to Marietta. Bate's Division of Hardee's Corps supported by two batteries, Slocomb's Washington Artillery of New Orleans and Beauregard's South Carolina Battery defended Pine Mountain's steep slopes. With orders not to assault fortified positions, Howard waited for Palmer's XIV Corps to come up on his left. Thomas ordered Palmer and Howard to deploy and entrench. The army's march only covered 2-3 miles. Schofield advanced from the vicinity of Allatoona Church on the Ackworth-Sandtown road only a short distance before encountering Confederates in front of Gilgal Church. Meanwhile, Hooker marched from near Mt. Olivet Church bringing XX Corps on line between IV Corps and XXIII Corps. McPherson moved into position in front of Brush Mountain. Sherman's intended to punch through the Confederate line between Pine Mountain and Kennesaw.

Johnston had not been idle, taking advantage of the lull and the defensive strength of the terrain in development of his defensive scheme. He occupied the high ground, established observation posts and signal stations, prepared earthworks, infantry fighting positions, and artillery firing positions covering the major avenues of approach across the entire front. In the defense, Johnston, generally had two brigades forward and one back. His soldiers constructed reinforced earthworks. Lacking sufficient manpower to defend a solid coherent front of ten miles, Johnston adhered to the offensive-defensive principle, to attack only if a favorable situation presented itself despite continued prodding by Richmond for offensive action.

Johnston deployed with Hardee on the left concentrated at Gilgal Church with a brigade on Pine Mountain (Bate); Hood on the right behind Noonday Creek covering the railroad; and Polk in the center. Johnston was concerned primarily about a thrust toward Atlanta directly south along the railroad around his right flank. Therefore, he sent his ordnance wagons south of the Chattahoochee (12 June, Brice's Crossroads, Forrest-3,500 vs Sturgis-8,000; most spectacular victory of Forrest's career). Johnston established his headquarters at the Cyrus York house, on Burnt Hickory Road near the 11th, 12th, forced Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland, by the 13th, into inching its way around the flanks of Pine Mountain. Upon discovering the position was a salient forward of the main Confederate defensive line, Thomas decided to outflank it and cut it off.

On 13 June, Thomas probed with IV (Howard) and XIV (Palmer) corps to the east and Geary's 2d Division (XX Corps) to the west of Pine Mountain. Hardee, alerted to the danger, became increasingly concerned about Bate's exposed position and the chance of his being isolated and cut off. Johnston along with Generals Hardee and Polk visited the position on the 14th. Disregarding warnings that the Federals had ranged the position with their artillery, the threesome of Johnston, Hardee and Polk ventured forward and mounted the breastworks to
survey the situation below them. At the same time, Sherman, after meeting with Thomas, rode
with Howard to survey the situation in front of Pine Mountain. Bate had prepared an extensive
set of entrenchments, reinforced with felled trees forward as obstructions and cleared fields of
fire covered by artillery on the ridge above. Sherman saw the group of Confederates on top of
Pine Mountain and ordered Howard to scatter the group. Howard, in turn, directed Captain Peter
Simonson's (killed at Pine Mountain, 16 June) 5th Indiana Battery (4 Napoleons and 2-3-inch
Rodmans) to fire on the group. The first round scattered the officers. The second 3-inch bolt
fired by Cpt Alfred Morrison's section of ordnance rifles struck General Polk in the left side and
exited his chest, killing him instantly. That night Johnston withdrew Bate from the Pine
Mountain salient. MG William Wing Loring temporarily replaced Polk. Later in the campaign
A.P. Stewart would be elevated to corps command.

On 15 June, Howard's people, continuing to probe forward, discovered Bate's trenches
abandoned and pushed forward beyond Pine Mountain in the center until making contact with the
Confederate main defensive line. While Schofield moved toward Gilgal Church and threatened
Lost Mountain, on the right, McPherson threatened to turn Kennesaw on the Federal left.

Federal tactics were to threaten an attack, push back the Confederate outposts, dig-in
close, cover the OPs with rifle and artillery fire. Cautious probing took place daily as did sniping
from behind rocks, gullies and trees, and harassing artillery fires. The potential for firefight was
everywhere: it proved very nerve wracking for the front-line troops.

Gilgal Church -- Lost Mountain.

Late in the afternoon, while IV and XIV Corps butted up against Johnston's main line
blocking the Sandtown Road, the division's of Geary and Butterfield (Hooker's XX Corps)
encountered Cleburne at Gilgal Church. Butterfield's 3d Division, conducting a reconnaissance
in force east of the Sandtown Road, deployed Ward's 1st Brigade forward; Coburn's 2d Brigade
and Wood's 3d Brigade followed in column of brigades. Geary's 2d Division advanced on
Butterfield's left with brigades abreast (Ireland on the right, Jones in the center, and Candy on the
left) and Williams' 1st Division in reserve behind Geary. Cleburne held that sector of the line
with four brigades, dug in and strongly entrenched, supported by artillery. He deployed
skirmishers forward and beyond that a thin screen of outposts. When Butterfield's advancing line
came under fire from Cleburne's pickets, Butterfield deployed into line of battle and Geary's
division, coming up, deployed on the left. However, Butterfield attacked piecemeal, sending
Ward's brigade in unsupported until forced to finally go to ground, then Butterfield sent Coburn
forward. Geary's attack, though better coordinated and with his entire division, was not any more
successful. The two divisions suffered 700 casualties. On the Federal right McPherson sent
William Harrow's 4th Division, XV Corps, on an end run around Hood's right on Brush
Mountain.
16 June.

While Thomas probed the Confederate center, Schofield worked against Johnston's left at Lost Mountain, defended by Jackson's cavalry. Stoneman and Jackson had what amounted to a standoff at Lost Mountain. McCook's cavalry also pushed toward Lost Mountain. Meanwhile, Schofield discovered that the Confederate left was in the air. To exploit the situation, he sent Hascall's 2d Division to the far right against Ross' Mississippi cavalry brigade threatening to pierce the line between Gilgal Church and Lost Mountain. This allowed Schofield to gain some high ground from which he could enfilade Hardee's left, Cleburne, thereby making Confederate positions from Lost Mountain to Gilgal Church untenable. Schofield was in position to turn the Confederate flank which forced Johnston to pull back his left behind Mud Creek.
Mud Creek Line.

17 June.

Hardee pulled back his four divisions, like a door to a line along the high ground overlooking the east bank of the rain-swollen Mud Creek. This new line, the Mud Creek Line, ran generally north-south to the vicinity of the Latimer House; then the line turned back to the northeast. Hardee held the Confederate left and arrayed from south to north with Cleburne on the left; Walker on his right; French (Loring’s Corps) on his right, centered on the Latimer House; then Walthall connecting with Hood and Loring in reserve; the was generally oriented to the northwest.

Johnston abandoned the Lost Mountain-Brush Mountain line, establishing the Mud Creek line only as a supplementary fallback position. Not intending to make a determined stand, Johnston only wanted to buy time in order to prepare better positions to the rear. Johnston dispatched his chief engineer, COL Stephen W. Presstman, to designate and layout fallback positions.

The Federals (XXIII, XX, and IV corps) continued inching forward against Johnston’s new Mud Creek line, encountering Confederate snipers perched in trees overlooking Mud Creek. Geary’s 2d Division, XX Corps on the left, Cox’s 3d Division, XXIII Corps in the center and Hascall’s 2d Division on the right attacked Cleburne’s portion of the line. The Federals used a massed battery of fourteen guns (Bundy’s 13th New York, McGill’s Pennsylvania Battery E, and Giles Cockerill’s Battery D 1st Ohio — six Napoleon’s and eight 3-inch ordnance rifles) to pound Cleburne’s positions. During the intense bombardment one of Cleburne’s brigade commanders, BG Lucius Polk was severely wounded in the leg. He was the nephew of LTG Leonidas Polk who was killed on the 14th at Pine Mountain. At this point, Sherman started to show increasing frustration with the slow pace of his advance.

18 June.

Thomas assaulted Hardee’s salient at the Latimer House, defended by Samuel G. French’s Division, Loring’s Corps. French deployed Francis M. Cockrell’s Missouri Brigade on the left, Mathew D. Ector’s Brigade in the center, and Claudius W. Spears’ Mississippi Brigade on the right. Thomas assaulted with Wood’s 3d Division on the right, Newton’s 2d Division, IV Corps in the center, and Baird’s 3d Division, XIV Corps on the left. Wood’s division drove in the pickets of Walker’s Division (Hardee’s Corps) on French’s left, then turned to the left getting behind Cockrell’s skirmishers, forcing them back and in turn unhinging Ector’s skirmishers. The Federals occupied the vacated Confederate works and brought up their artillery to enfilade French’s trenchline. The threat to his left compelled Johnston to pull back once again. Johnston withdrew to Kennesaw that night (18-19 June).
On the Federal left, McPherson pushed beyond Big Shanty to Noonday Creek, encountering Confederate outposts, drove them back from successive delay positions to Brush Mountain. Harrow's 4th Division, XV Corps, swept around their flank and captured 150 prisoners.

Kennesaw Mountain (19 June - 2 July).

Kennesaw Mountain, a camel-backed ridge over two miles long, consists of two distinct humps -- Big Kennesaw (700') and Little Kennesaw (400') and a smaller spur, Pigeon Hill (200'), on the south end. Kennesaw Mountain runs generally in a southwesterly direction, is heavily wooded with steep, rocky slopes on the west side (facing Sherman), while the eastern side has several long sloping spines making the top accessible. The Confederates built a line of rifle pits along the base of the mountain for their outposts and a main trench line just below the crest with artillery redoubts interspersed throughout its entire length. A signal station crowned the top. Confederate infantrymen hauled cannon to the top of Little Kennesaw using 100 men per gun, hand carrying the ammunition and powder also.

By morning on the 19th, Johnston's new defensive line covered the railroad and main approaches to Marietta extending some six miles in a crescent-shaped arc. Wheeler screened the right flank, Jackson the left. Hood, defended the right, west of the Western and Atlantic Railroad and along the north end of Big Kennesaw connecting with Loring. Loring occupied Big Kennesaw, Little Kennesaw, and Pigeon Hill. Hardee deployed along a series of low hills south of Pigeon Hill that overlooked Nose's (or Noyes') Creek to a hill that would become known as Cheatham Hill. Sherman initially concluded that Johnston had pulled back to the Chattahoochee. However, advance Federal elements encountered stiff resistance across their entire front, along the Dallas Road, Burnt Hickory, and in front of Kennesaw.

19-21 June.

The Federals continued to probe and skirmish as they inched forward, discovering the Confederate defenses to be particularly strong with artillery support from atop the mountain ridge that dominated the area below. The Confederates emplaced a battery on the north end, centered another on top of Big Kennesaw; dragged nine guns to the top of Little Kennesaw, and a battery occupied Pigeon Hill.

On 20 June, Sherman decided to shift forces to the south and west, keeping his cavalry busy patrolling all the available routes in the area. McCook, on the Powder Springs Road, scouted toward the Chattahoochee. On the left, Minty's brigade (Garrard), on Bell's Ferry Road, clashed along Noonday Creek with Wheeler at the crossroads near the McAfee's House. Initially Wheeler's three brigades drove the Federal horse soldiers back to the bridge as the fight developed into a classic old fashioned cavalry engagement with mounted troopers making saber
charges into one another. The fight itself was indecisive and both sides claimed victory afterwards.

Schofield's advance on the Federal right down Sandtown Road reached the intersection with Mackland Road. Schofield's advance guard drove Jackson's vedettes back across Noyes' Creek, which due to the recent heavy rains, had overflowed its banks. As the Confederate cavalry withdrew, they ripped up the bridge flooring. Schofield put sharpshooters and artillery in overwatch as the 103d Ohio, designated as the crossing party, worked their way across the bridge's structural framework to secure the bridge and establish a bridgehead. Schofield rebuilt the bridge before pushing out and crossing the remainder of the Army of the Ohio. Cox's division continued south on the Sandtown Road stopping at a ridge overlooking Olley's Creek, while Hascall's division moved to the east to link up with Hooker and XX Corps. Thomas continued to maneuver against Hardee's line, while Hooker moved into position near the Kolb Farm to link up with Schofield.

Johnston, realizing the threat to his left flank and rear but rather than stretching himself any further, shifted Hood's three divisions from the right to the left flank on the night of the 21st. During a driving rain storm, Hood slipped out of line and went into position on Hardee's left with MG Hindman's Division on the right, Stevenson's in the center, and A.P. Stewart's on the left in reserve. Wheeler and Loring extended their lines to cover the gap in the line created by Hood's departure.

Kolb's Farm (22 June).

On 22 June, Hooker and Schofield continued their advance toward Marietta. By early afternoon their skirmishers made contact with Hood's outposts. After discovering from captured Confederates that they faced Hood's Corps, the two Union generals decided the best course of action was to assume a hasty defense and await the attack that Hood would surely launch, given his reputation as an aggressive commander and fighter. The Union commanders deployed on good defensive terrain along a ridge overlooking open fields.

Hooker deployed north of the Powder Springs Road with William's 1st Division on the right, Geary's 2d Division in the center, and Butterfield's 3d Division on the left. South of the road, Hascall's 2d Division, XXIII Corps, deployed on Hooker's right with Strickland's 3d Brigade on line and the brigades of McQuiston and Hobson refused. Hooker's battle line consisted of three divisions (XX Corps) in the main engagement area with two others from XXIII Corps in support, about 14,000 men. Also, eight artillery batteries were integrated into the defensive scheme. Williams and Hascall threw out skirmishers, 123d New York and 14th Kentucky respectively. The advancing Federal skirmishers discovered the Confederates, about 11,000, massing for battle precipitating the Battle of Kolb's Farm.

Hood, upon discovering the Federals to his front, immediately ordered an attack. Without any type of prior recon or notification of the army commander, Hood ordered Stevenson
to attack along the Powder Springs Road, supported by Hindman on his right and Stewart in reserve. Without the advantage of a recon, Hood misinterpreted the tactical situation. Thinking that this was a meeting engagement and that he was encountering a moving force, he tried to maneuver to turn the Federal flank. He, in fact, faced a force deployed in a hasty defense on good defensive terrain. Stevenson advanced shortly after 1700 with two brigades up (Brown on the right and Cumming on the left) and two in the second line (Reynolds behind Brown and Pettus behind Cumming) in support. Hindman deployed on Stevenson’s right, also with two up (Manigault on the right and Sharp on the left) and two back (Benton behind Manigault and Coltart behind Sharp).

![Map of Battle of Kolk’s Farm](image)

**Figure 12: Battle of Kolb Farm, 22 June 1864.**
The Federal skirmishers aggressively engaged their Confederate counterparts in a running firefight, effectively delaying their advance, as they fell back to the protection of the Federal main defensive line. Brown and Reynolds' rapid advance through open fields drove back the 123d Ohio. While the 14th Kentucky, hidden in a dense thicket of the woods, putting up a more stubborn resistance, slowed Cumming and Pettus' advance, causing them to fall behind and separate from the advancing units on their right, thereby disrupting the cohesion of the assaulting lines.

Stevenson's portion of the assault hit Williams (Kniipe and Ruger brigades), while Hindman's left found the seam between Williams and Geary. His right faced the center of Geary's defense (Robinson's brigade). Hindman pulled his units back after being partially engaged (Tucker and Deas brigades) and Wathall and Maniquaunt being bogged down in the marshy areas adjacent to John Ward Creek. Belatedly, Hood ordered Stewart forward on the extreme left flank, which resulted in only some minor actions around the Kolb House in Schofield's front. Schofield called Cox up to solidify the Federal right and extend the line further to the southwest back toward the Cheney House.

The assaulting Confederates emerged from the woods and into range of the Federal batteries arrayed across the entire width of the Union front. As the Confederates advanced, they negotiated their way across the intervening broken terrain through a devastating artillery crossfire of 40 guns, firing solid shot, shell, case-shot and canister. At 200 yards from the Federal breastworks they faced an intense wall of fire that ripped gapping holes in the assaulting formations. Though the assault formations quickly deteriorated in the face of this devastating fire, the follow-on elements continued forward into the breach until also broken short of their objectives. Some units rallied and made subsequent attacks. Many of the attackers, however, fell back to the cover of the woods, out of which they had attacked, while others sought protection in the ravines between the opposing lines until nightfall. Sporadic exchanges of fire went on until late into the night.

Union losses were about 300, while Confederate casualties were over 1,000. Stevenson lost 870 (300/450 in the 54th Virginia), Hindman reported 200 casualties. Historically, this action has been controversial for both Hood and Hooker contributing further to the already poor relationship each had with their respective superiors. Hood attacked without orders or informing his commander of his actions. Hooker on the other hand exaggerated the size of the force he faced and failed to adequately inform his superiors of the situation.

In the aftermath of the intense fight, both sides spent the time improving their respective positions. Sherman ordered Schofield to continue to test the flank. In response, Schofield sent Reilly's brigade, Cox's division, down the Sandtown Road to scout the crossing site at Olley's Creek. Reilly found the crossing guarded by Ross's Cavalry supported by artillery. The Confederate flank actually extended further southward than expected and beyond that of the Federals.

As a result of the fight at Kolb's Farm, Sherman reviewed his options. Option 1: To get around Johnston's left would require a further shifting of forces south to enable Schofield to get
Figure 13: Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, 27 June 1864.
beyond the Confederate flank. However, Thomas reported Howard and Palmer stretched to the point of being ineffective and unable to mass sufficient strength if threatened. Option 2: To have McPherson initiate the turning movement against Johnston’s right to take advantage of Hood’s evacuation of that flank. Option 3: To continue what amounted to siege operations by continuing to entrench and inch forward under the cover of massive artillery fires. Option 4: To assault Johnston’s obviously overextended line and punch through to Marietta.

Sherman eliminated the first two options because of his concern for security along his LOCs, which were harassed by roaming bands in his rear. Neither did he want to give Johnston an opportunity of an opening for a large scale raid against his vital lifeline. Further, the time and logistic requirements involved in mounting a major turning movement that would take him away from the rail line, again were too excessive. Sherman rejected option three because it went against his nature, and time worked to Johnston’s advantage. Further, Johnston might reinforce Lee, which Sherman would not allow to happen. Also, Sherman, tired of sparring with his opponent, was looking for an opportunity to strike. Despite having said he would not directly assault Confederate defensive works because of the higher cost involved, especially in terms of casualties, the payoff was potentially a decisive defeat of Johnston’s field forces and the end of the campaign. If Sherman was right about the gray line in front of him being thin and vulnerable to penetration, maybe he could deliver the knockout punch.

Johnston’s Kennesaw Mountain line stretched about eight miles. His flanks secured only by a thin line of cavalry. Wheeler still held the right flank and Ross’ Cavalry Brigade of Jackson’s Cavalry Division, on the southern flank, stood between Schofield’s XXIII Corps and Marietta. Johnston could expect no reinforcements, partly because of his continuing feud with Davis and the fact that Davis was still trying to defend everywhere. Specifically, in Mississippi where Stephen D. Lee and Forrest were operating. Johnston repeatedly asked Davis to release Forrest to operate against Sherman LOCs, but Davis refused.

Johnston deployed Polk’s Corps, now under the command of William Wing Loring, on the right; with Featherston’s Division extending from the Western and Atlantic Railroad up the north slope of Big Kennesaw connecting with Walthall’s Division on Big Kennesaw, in turn, connecting with French’s Division on the slopes of Little Kennesaw. French occupied Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill extending to Burnt Hickory Road. Hardee’s Corps occupied the Confederate center, with Walker on the right south of Burnt Hickory Road; Bate’s Division extended the line to the Dallas road; Cleburne’s Division, south of the Dallas Road, joined Cheatham’s Division, on the corps left. On the left of the army, Hood arrayed his corps, with Hindman on the right, Stevenson in the center, and Stewart on the left. Johnston’s defensive line took advantage of the natural strength of the terrain reinforced by extensive earthworks, artillery redoubts, forward rifle pits, and obstacles.

Sherman’s plan (Special Field Order, No. 28) issued on 24 June, called for an assault of the Kennesaw Mountain line on the 27th by only 20 percent of his force with dual penetrations of the middle of Johnston’s line and diversions on the flanks. Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland was to make the main attack in the center south of the Dallas Road at a point chosen by Thomas after a reconnaissance of his sector. McPherson would conduct a demonstration in the northern
sector to fix those forces in place and conduct a supporting attack on Thomas' left in the vicinity of the south end of Kennesaw Mountain. Schofield's Army of the Ohio would continue to demonstrate along Olley's Creek and feint up the Powder Springs Road.

McPherson, for his part, selected Blair's XVII Corps and Sweeney's 2d Division of Dodge's XV Corps for the diversionary demonstration against the right flank of the Confederate position on Big Kennesaw. Logan's XV Corps would make the main effort eastward along Burnt Hickory Road, focusing on the seam between Loring's Corps and Hardee's Corps, defended by French's Division (Loring) on Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill and Walker's Division (Hardee) south of Burnt Hickory Road.

On the morning of the 27th a fifteen minute artillery preparation commenced at 0800. Out on the extreme Federal left, Leggett's 3d Division of XVII Corps advanced only a short distance along the Bell Ferry Road before encountering resistance from Confederate skirmishers supported by artillery fire. The fire came from four batteries supporting Johnston's extreme right (Featherston's Infantry Division and Wheeler's Cavalry). Leggett's troops did not press on further toward the main defensive line. This was only a demonstration to fix the Confederates in place on this end, so they could not release reinforcements to the area of the main attack.

Intense fire from Confederate skirmishers of Walthall's Division, occupying dug-in firing positions, forced back Union skirmishers attacking along the north shoulder of Big Kennesaw. Along the face of Big Kennesaw the Federal effort was more vigorous as the lead elements fought their way through the Confederate skirmish line and proceeded to scale the steep slopes until stopped in front of the formidable works along the crest of the mountain. There the attackers sought cover and exchanged fire with the defenders for the remainder of the operation.

Pigeon Hill.

Opposite Pigeon Hill, Logan moved his assault forces into position during the pre-dawn hours under the cover of darkness. After repositioning his force by sliding them southward, Logan (XV Corps) deployed Harrow's 4th Division on the left, M. L. Smith's 2d Division in the center, north of the Burnt Hickory Road, and Osterhaus's 1st Division on the right, south of the road. Smith's division, reinforced by the attachment of Walcutt's brigade from Harrow, was designated the main effort along with Harrow (minus Walcutt), with Osterhaus' 1st Division in reserve. Smith employed his 5,500-man attack force with three brigades on line formed in double line of battle. Walcutt's 2d Brigade, the attached unit, on the left flank of the assault force got the thankless task of assaulting into the gorge formed by the southern shoulder of Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill. Giles Smith's 1st Brigade in the center, the brother of the division commander, advanced north of the road, directly towards Pigeon Hill, while A. J. Lightburn's 2d Brigade crossed over to the southside of the road and advanced on Smith's right.

BG "Black Jack" Logan's attack stepped off at 0800. The artillery prep (0800-0815) merely alerted the defenders to the Federals' approach. Burnt Hickory Road provided a natural
axis to guide on during their approach march, however, the terrain adjacent to Burnt Hickory proved difficult to negotiate. Because of the difficult nature of the terrain and the lack of sufficient time for a thorough commanders’ reconnaissance the Federal attack developed slowly.

Figure 14: Battle of Pigeon Hill, 27 June 1864.

The intervening terrain of Noyes’ (or Noses) Creek, which had overflowed its banks; swampy, low areas; along with dense thickets and tangled underbrush presented a natural obstacle to movement, combined with the harassing fire from the alerted Confederate snipers and artillery quickly disrupted the integrity of the assault formations. Additionally, Smith and Walcutt, after overcoming the difficulties of the approach, faced the formidable task of ascending the steep slopes of Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill strewn with natural and man-made obstacles covered by effective fire from the trenches above. The attacking forces lost all remaining cohesion and any momentum that it retained among the debris, entanglements, and boulders on the slopes of Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill. The three assaulting Union brigades faced not only the difficulty of the terrain but also four veteran Confederate brigades occupying the high ground blocking the way to their objectives. Sears’ and Cockrell’s brigades (French), reinforced by Ector covered Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill, while Mercer’s Brigade (Walker) defended south of Burnt Hickory Road.
South of the road Lightburn's brigade drove off the skirmishers from the 63d Georgia, but their advance sputtered to a stop short of the main defensive line. The enfilading fires from the troops deployed on Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill turned the open ground into a killing field as the blue-clad attackers went to ground, then fell back. The desperate fight lasted approximately two hours and cost Logan about 850 casualties. Confederate casualties were about a third of that.

**Cheatham Hill.**

South of Pigeon Hill in the area of the Union main attack, the Army of the Cumberland had difficulties getting organized for the assault. Like McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee, Thomas chose to move his assault forces from their bivouac sites to their designated assembly areas immediately prior to the attack under the cover of darkness. Forming into assault formations in their new assembly areas proved a slower process than anticipated. The opportunity for Thomas' attack and McPherson's to be executed simultaneously was lost.

After conducting a reconnaissance of his front, Thomas selected, the point for the main attack. The sector chosen offered primarily two advantages: the close proximity of the opposing lines and a salient formed in the Confederate defensive line (considered a weak point). The assaulting divisions still faced the prospect of maneuvering through the small valley of Ward Creek and then ascending the relatively steep slope to the ridge line where the defenders were dug-in.

Defending the ridge line south of the Dallas Road, Hardee deployed two of the Army of Tennessee's best divisions -- the divisions commanded by Pat Cleburne and Benjamin Franklin Cheatham. Each of these divisions contained four brigades deployed behind extensive and well prepared defensive works. The troops spent much of their time improving their trenches, clearing fields of fire and preparing obstacles in front of their positions with the only apparent weakness being the salient in Cheatham's sector.

Thomas selected Jefferson C. Davis' 2d Division, XIV Corps (Palmer) and Howard selected John Newton's 2d Division (IV Corps) to deliver the main attack. Thomas' plan called for Davis' division to assault the salient angle with Newton attacking on Davis' left. The assault divisions would be supported by fire from the divisions on their respective flanks -- Geary, 2d Division, XX Corps and Wood, 3d Division, IV Corps.

Newton's division, about 5,000 men, assembled for the attack behind Stanley's 1st Division, IV Corps with three brigades generally on line. The brigades were arrayed from left to right, Kimball, Wagner, and Harker each with it's regiments tightly stacked in massed columns. Davis arrayed his formation, about 3,000 strong, with Morgan's brigade in reserve dug-in on the front line. McCook's brigade on the left and Mitchell's brigade on the right assembled to the rear of Morgan's dug-in position and arranged their brigades in successive lines of regiments.
Thomas' attack, missed the appointed LD (line of departure) time, not kicking off until about 0900 when the attack signal was finally given. Davis decided to have Mitchell wheel his brigade to the north against the southern flank of the salient (defended by Maney's Brigade) while McCook assaulted the apex of the salient. Next, on McCook's left, came Harker's brigade, Newton's right, with Wagner in the center and Kimball on the left.

**Figure 15: Battle of Cheatham Hill, 27 May 1864.**

Davis' two-brigade attack started by passing through the front line trenches occupied by Morgan's brigade. Mitchell's brigade, initially echeloned to the right, faced a formidable array of obstacles emplaced on the south slope of its objective, then received devastating enfilade fire on their right flank. When they pivoted to the left the regiments presented their right flanks to the combined fires of Phelan's Florida and Perry's Alabama batteries along with Confederate infantry (Carter's and Strahl's brigades) posted in the trenches south of the "dead angle." McCook's assault was across 600 yards of open ground. They quickly overran the Confederate outposts in the forward rifle pits but stopped to regroup at the base of the slope before edging their way up the hill to the main Confederate line. One regiment at a time managed to reach the parapets of Maney's entrenched line, like a series of waves crashing on a beach. Because of the lack of effective obstacles and the nature of the terrain, the attacking regiments moved through dead
space until within 30-40 yards of the main defensive line. The Federal attacks, delivered piecemeal, allowed only small numbers of the attackers to reach the Confederate breastworks. Even fewer managed to mount the parapets where they engaged in a desperate struggle, sometimes hand-to-hand, before being thrown back. McCook lost 35 percent, 824 at the "dead angle." Colonel Dan McCook was seriously wounded on the parapet.

On Thomas' left Harker's and Wagner's brigades faced an equally dangerous situation. Their battering ram tactics faired poorly against the combined rifle and artillery fires from Vaughn's (Cheatham), Polk's, Lowrey's, and Govan's brigades (Cleburne). Harker, attempting to rally his shaken troops, was killed in front of his objective by a canister ball. He had chosen to ride into battle on horseback instead of advancing on foot. Harker's unit suffered 650 casualties in less than two hours. Wagner's troops were also thrown back. By the time Kimball moved forward, the battlefield presented a grim landscape for his troops to advance through and their reception was as rude as that encountered by those who had advanced previously. Kimball withdrew after about 10 minutes under fire. A general withdrawal back to the Federal main line ended the assault, but not the shooting.

To the south, Schofield managed to establish a bridgehead across Olley's Creek and occupy a position overlooking Nickjack Creek. Sherman, realizing that Johnston's flank could be turned, immediately set about preparing plans for the next phase of the campaign. He issued preparatory orders to McPherson and began the build-up of supplies, while ordering the southward shift of troops to effect a link-up with Schofield.

The cost of the battle of Kennesaw was: Logan-586, Newton 654, and Davis 824—killed and wounded; 17 missing (Logan), 300 PWs from Newton's and Davis' divisions. Casualties from XVI Corps--57, XVII Corps--200, XX and XXIII corps--300. The total was roughly 3000, while Confederate casualties stood at less than 1000.

For two days Union and Confederate soldiers faced each other not more than 30 yards apart amidst the dead and dying. A 29 June truce was agreed upon to recover dead and wounded from the "dead angle" of Cheatham Hill. After the truce period ended each side remained alert and on guard against any move the other might make.

**Approach to the Chattahoochee (2 - 20 July).**

With improved weather and Schofield beyond Johnston's southern flank, Sherman decided to renew his flanking movements by taking advantage of Schofield's success on the right. Sherman decided to force Johnston to choose between his mountain stronghold and Atlanta. By 1 July McPherson was ready to move and with ten days rations pulled out of line marching behind Thomas. McPherson moved to link up with Schofield out on the Sandtown Road and to prepare to strike eastward toward the Chattahoochee. Thomas maintained contact with Johnston covering McPherson's move.
2 July.

By 2 July, Johnston, realized the threat to his rear, withdrew from Kennesaw Mountain and evacuated Marietta. Again using the cover of night to withdraw, he slipped away southward to prepared positions around Smyrna astride the Western and Atlantic Railroad. Johnston's Smyrna line lay between Rottenwood and Nickjack creeks at Smyrna Station, 4 miles south of Marietta. Loring held the right, east of the railroad, with Wheeler responsible for covering his flank. Hardee commanded the center, astride the railroad and to the west, while Hood covered the left using a refused flank defense with Jackson protecting his flank.

After Johnston slipped away from Kennesaw Mountain, Thomas moved forward reestablishing contact with Johnston's force. Garrard's cavalry assumed responsibility for Sherman's left flank and LOC (railroad) security when McPherson made his lateral shift. Stoneman scouted Sweetwater Creek to the river. Anticipating a big fight at the river, Sherman ordered the hospitals at Acworth and Big Shanty made ready.

4-7 July.

Upon learning of Johnston's withdrawal, Sherman ordered an immediate pursuit. He hoped to catch Johnston's retreating force on the move or in the act of crossing the river before they reached new defensive positions across the Chattahoochee. On 4 July, Sherman, eager to get at Johnston, sent McPherson around the Confederate left on Nickjack Creek near Ruff's Mill. In his zeal, Sherman, ordered Thomas to attack Johnston's line. Initially, Sherman refused to believe that Johnston occupied entrenched positions across his front with any strength north of the Chattahoochee. Howard and his subordinates tried to convince Sherman, but to no avail, about the situation to their front. However, he was shocked when the Federal skirmishers in the van of the attack, he ordered, revealed the true strength of the Confederates.

The attack, conducted by William Grose's 3d Brigade, Stanley's 1st Division, Howard's IV Corps, ran up against Cleburne, in the center of the Confederate line. The Confederates quickly turned back the Federal attackers in the short Battle of Smyrna. John W. Fuller's (1st Brigade, Veatch's 4th Division, XVI Corps (Dodge)) attack on the left of Johnston's line against Stevenson (Hood's Corps) at Ruff's Mill also failed. Sherman quickly called off the attacks as the Federals went to ground and dug-in.

Meanwhile, Frank Blair's XVII Corps managed to maneuver around the Confederate left flank. To counter this move, Johnston sent Cheatham's Division to the left to support Jackson and the Georgia Militia guarding the crossing sites along Nickjack Creek. However, it was too little too late. Johnston, outflanked, again, pulled out of the Smyrna line after dark.

Johnston fell back to his fortified river line. Stewart's Corps occupied the right from the river westward across the Western and Atlantic Railroad to the Atlanta Road. Hardee, positioned in the center, bent back to the southwest until connecting with Hood on the left, who, in turn,
extended to the junction of Nickjack Creek and the Chattahoochee. Wheeler pulled back across the river to cover the right. Jackson and the Georgia Militia covered the left. Johnston's latest line was an arc that covered about six miles of frontage on the north bank of the Chattahoochee. The right rested near Howell's Ferry and Rottenwood Creek, the left covered Mason and Turner's Ferry and the mouth of Nickjack Creek.

Sherman continued his drive toward Atlanta, anticipating the long awaited stand by Johnston along the Chattahoochee, but still hoped to catch Johnston in the midst of a river crossing operation. However, he was again taken aback when he found Johnston occupying yet another heavily fortified line of works in front of the river. Johnston occupied the high bluffs on the north bank of the Chattahoochee where he had constructed an extensive series of mutually supporting redoubts and strong points on a six mile front. Artillery redoubts overlooking possible crossing sites dotted the high ground along the south bank.

Thomas moved directly forward, generally along the main road to Atlanta, with Howard on the left, between Rottenwood Creek and the Western and Atlantic Railroad; Palmer in the center, east of the Atlanta Road, facing Stewart; and Hooker on the right, west of the road facing Hardee. McPherson was on Thomas's right. Gresham's 4th Division, of Blair's XVII Corps proceeded along the Mason-Turner Road driving Ross' cavalry and the 1st Division of Georgia Militia before them. Leggett's 3d Division, XVII Corps advanced on the Lickskillet Road to Green's and Howell's Ferry. Dodge's XVI Corps deployed between Green's and Howell's Ferry, south of Blair (McPherson's right). Logan's XV Corps deployed between Nickjack Creek and the Mason-Turner Ferry Road, tying in with Hooker. Schofield reverted to the Army's reserve and remained near Smyrna.

Sherman, anxious for action, prodded Thomas to attack. Upon inspecting Johnston's latest defensive line, Sherman determined that these works were the most formidable yet encountered and a direct assault would be foolhardy and too costly. So, Sherman directed his cavalry to locate crossing sites both north and south of Johnston's line.

Stoneman's cavalry searched downstream to Sweetwater Creek scouting the lower fords and crossing points. McCook, on Thomas' left, guard the trains and supported either flank as necessary. Garrard moved upstream to Roswell, but discovered the bridge destroyed. After a couple of days of probing and scouting, Sherman decided to cross north of the Confederate line. So on 6-7 July, Sherman sent Schofield northward to locate a crossing site between Pace's Ferry and Roswell.

8 July.

Schofield selected a point near the mouth of Soap Creek, Isom's (Isham's) or Cavalry Ford. Stressing the need for security and surprise and with his crossing forces masked by the terrain, Schofield set about assembling his assault force and his pontoons. On 8 July, Cameron's 2d Brigade, Cox's 3d Division spearheaded the crossing of the Chattahoochee by crossing a fifty-
man assault team upstream at an old sunken rock fish dam. Once across they moved downstream along the opposite bank outflanking the Confederate outposts above the main crossing point. Hascall's 2d Division secured the pontoon trains. With the bridgehead quickly established, Byrd's Brigade provided covering fire for the 12th Kentucky as they conducted an assault crossing of the Chattahoochee. The 12th then rushed forward from their landing site securing the ridge above the site. The security force entrenched while the twenty-five pontoons were floated out of Soap Creek and emplaced.

9 July.

On 9 July, Wilder's brigade (commanded by Colonel Abram Miller), Garrard's division crossed at Shallow Ford below the Roswell bridge covered by the Chicago Board of Trade Battery. As the assault team waded across, they popped up from beneath the water and fired on the astonished Confederate skirmishers on the far shore. Wilder's troops, armed with seven-shot Spencer rifles, rose up, emptied the water from their barrels, worked the lever action, fired, and ducked back down in the water, then repeated the sequence over again while negotiating the crossing. Also on the ninth, a unit from Ed McCook's cavalry division crossed at Cochran's Ford. Because of the high water level, they negotiated the crossing, "stripped down," with only their rifles, cartridge boxes, and hats. Once across the river the nude assault team chased off the "surprised" Confederate outpost guarding that site.

Caught by surprise, when Federal cavalry and three infantry divisions crossed the Chattahoochee and established a lodgment on 8 and 9 July, Johnston ordered the evacuation of the Chattahoochee River line back to the outer defensive works of Atlanta south of Peachtree Creek. During their evacuation, the Confederates destroyed all remaining bridges. Johnston also promoted A.P. Stewart to lieutenant general and gave him command of Polk's Corps (Army of Mississippi) replacing Loring, the temporary commander. Johnston continued to look to his left as the most likely sector for Sherman's major effort. After all, that was where they knew McPherson to be and Sherman tended to favor him as his maneuver element. Also, he ordered Wheeler to keep an eye on Federal movements around Roswell.

10-16 July.

Sherman secured his long anticipated goal at a relatively low cost. Sherman could not have anticipated the ease with which he forced Johnston from his formidable defensive line. Securing his lodgment on the south bank of the Chattahoochee put the last river barrier behind him and opened the way to his next objective--Atlanta.

Atlanta was a strategic hub. The four railroads: Western & Atlantic, Georgia, Macon & Western, and Atlanta & West Point converged there. It was a major supply and manufacturing center. Atlanta had a population of about 22,000. Confederate engineers had begun planning and developing the defensive system for the city after the fall of Vicksburg.
Sherman continued to build strength in the bridgehead area on the southside of the Chattahoochee. They entrenched, stockpiled supplies, rested, and refitted. His engineers built additional bridging. Reconstruction of the Chattahoochee railroad bridge, a 900-foot long, 90-foot high bridge, was a significant feat—completing it in four and a half days. An unofficial truce prevailed between soldiers on picket duty.

On 13 July, Stoneman captured a bridge southeast of Carrollton, his mission was to cut the railroad from Montgomery, AL but when confronted by Jackson’s Confederate cavalry he retired to Villa Rica without disrupting the railroad.

On the sixteenth, Sherman moved to reinforce the success achieved on his northern flank by shifting the main effort to his right. Sherman knew he did not have the forces to invest Atlanta in a siege, so he elected to isolate the city in a phased process by cutting the rail lines serving the city. Sherman pulled McPherson out of line on the right and sent him behind Thomas and Schofield around to the extreme left. Sherman decided to cut Johnston off from the East as the first step eliminating any chance of reinforcements from Virginia. McPherson crossed the Chattahoochee in the vicinity of Roswell and struck southward to Decatur and the Georgia Railroad, running between Atlanta and Augusta. Schofield advanced eastward out of the lodgment area from the vicinity of the confluence of Soap Creek and the Chattahoochee, through Cross Keys to Decatur in the center. McPherson, on Schofield’s left, had Garrard maintaining flank security. Garrard and McPherson reached the Georgia Railroad at Stone Mountain depot cutting the line to the east. McPherson then turned westward toward Atlanta to link up with Schofield.

17 July.

As Johnston prepared plans to attack the Union force as it crossed Peachtree Creek, President Davis relieved Johnston and replaced him with John Bell Hood effective 18 July. Hood’s reported strength was 48,750, while Sherman’s reported strength as of 30 June was 106,070 (Army of the Cumberland-59,000; Army of the Tennessee-32,000; Army of the Ohio-15,000).

Peachtree Creek (20 July).

Hood’s three infantry corps deployed across the high ground roughly a mile south of Peachtree Creek overlooking the valley of Peachtree Creek. Stewart held the left astride Howell Mill Road, with French on the left, Walthall in the center, and Loring occupied the right toward Early Creek (Tanyard Branch). Hardee held the center, with his left, Maney, on Loring’s right, then came Walker and Bate, on the right, near Clear Creek. Hood’s old corps, now commanded by Cheatham, deployed on the Army’s right, while the cavalry continued to work on the flanks.
On 19 July, Thomas advanced on Peachtree Creek from the north, pushing Wheeler's cavalry corps and Reynolds' infantry brigade back, south of the creek. Thomas arrayed his forces with Palmer on the right, Hooker in the center, and Howard on the left. Palmer's XIV Corps advanced with Davis on the right, Baird in the center, and Johnson on the left. Opposing Palmer were Adams, Sears, and Reynolds. Hooker moved down Pace's Ferry Road. Geary's 2d Division forced a crossing. Once across, Hooker deployed Williams' 1st Division on the right, Geary in the center, and Ward on the left. Ward linked up with Howard's (IV Corps) right, Newton. Howard deployed on the high ground astride Peachtree Road, and sent Stanley's and Wood's divisions to the east to close the gap between Thomas and Schofield.

The bold and impetuous Hood decided on a course of action to rest the initiative from Sherman. He decided to attack Thomas on the 20th. The plan called for a two-corps (Hardee and Stewart) echeloned attack by divisions. The attack would start on Hardee's right with Bate's division, followed in order by Walker and Maney, with Cleburne in reserve, then Stewart's Corps, starting with Loring, Walthall, and French. The concept of attack was to cut Thomas off from McPherson and Schofield by having the main attack forces conduct a giant wheeling maneuver to the left driving Thomas back against the Chattahoochee River and Peachtree Creek, while Cheatham and Wheeler held McPherson and Schofield at bay so they could not come to assist Thomas.

**Figure 16: The Battle of Peachtree Creek, 20 July 1864.**
The attack, scheduled to commence at 1 PM, did not start until after 3 PM. The operation was beset with problems from the outset. McPherson's appearance east of Atlanta forced Hood to move units to deal with this threat. Hood also shifted Cleburne from the main effort to reinforce Cheatham. The adjustments of units and his battle lines conspired to throw off the timing of the attack. Once the attack was underway a combination of factors continued to plague the operation: the assaulting units advanced through rugged terrain, covered in dense woods and thick underbrush, cut by steep ravines and streams; a bulge in the Union line; poor coordination and control delayed and disrupted the timing and cohesion of the attack.

The terrain hindered Bate's Division's forward progress, the first unit to step off, causing them to fall behind Walker's Division. Walker's Division, the next unit to go in the attack sequence, made contact with Newton's 2d Division, IV Corps (Howard) before Bate, because of Bate's slower movement, and the Federals occupying the bulge in the Federal line extended outward toward Walker. Therefore, Walker had a shorter distance to travel to make contact. The Federals drove Walker back, while out on the extreme right flank, Newton's 3d Brigade (Bradley) checked Bate's forward progress. This caused Maney to halt his advance, but Loring, on Maney's left, moved out on his own ahead of Maney. By the time Maney finally advanced, Newton's right (Kimball), Geary's division, and Ward's division repulsed Loring's attack. In turn, Geary and Ward repulsed Maney's assault. Geary's and Williams' Divisions also checked Walthall's attack. The attack quickly became a series of fragmented frontal assaults. Some of the Confederate units on the left, unable to get into position to effectively support their fellow units, did not attack at all.

While the terrain hindered the assaults of the Confederates, it worked to the advantage of the Federals in some instances. Some units took up hasty defensive positions on the high ground behind earthworks, breastworks, and artillery redoubts, previously prepared by the Army of Tennessee. These positions overlooked the routes of approach and the attackers often found themselves in murderous fire sacs. In addition, Thomas enjoyed an overall numerical advantage in infantry and artillery. Federal losses were less than 2,000 or about 10 percent, while Confederate losses were estimated at between 2,500 and 5,000. Hood remained in Atlanta throughout the course of the battle.

Atlanta (22 July).

About the time Hood was to launch his attack on Thomas, McPherson's (XV, XVI, and XVII corps) advance westward from Decatur along the Georgia Railroad reached the outskirts of Atlanta, threatening to disrupt Hood's planned operation. McPherson advanced with Logan's XV Corps and Dodge's XVI Corps (behind in reserve) north of the railroad with Blair's XVII Corps to the south. Wheeler's cavalry, fighting dismounted and dug in on a "bald hill," initially blocked McPherson's approach. Hardee sent Cleburne's Division, withdrawn from the reserve, to reinforce Wheeler and Cheatham. The next morning Blair attacked Wheeler and Cleburne's Division on Bald Hill with Leggett's 3d Division and Smith's 4th Division. Leggett achieved early success against Wheeler, stormed the Confederate defensive works and secured Bald Hill
Figure 17: The Battle of Atlanta, 22 July 1864.

(later called Leggett's Hill) and in the process exposed Cleburne's flank. Cleburne repulsed Smith's attack on Leggett's right. In turn, the Federals threw back Cleburne's counterattack to retake the hill. The Federals, content with their newly won hill, did not attempt to push forward any further.
Despite his defeat at Peachtree Creek, Hood turned east to face the threat on his right. As McPherson established his position east of Atlanta, Hood learned from Wheeler that McPherson's southern flank, unprotected by Union cavalry, was exposed and vulnerable to attack. Hood decided to seize the initiative and in a daring move divided his force for a thrust out of the city's defenses to envelop McPherson's southern (left) flank. Hardee, along with Wheeler's cavalry, was to depart the city to the south, turn east then north and attack McPherson on the left and rear at dawn on the 22d. Wheeler would continue further to the east and conduct a deeper envelopment striking McPherson's LOCs and trains areas. Cheatham's Corps was to hold McPherson in front, then conduct a supporting attack eastward in conjunction with Hardee's attack in the rear. Stewart and the Georgia Militia would fall back into the city's defenses to hold against Thomas and Schofield.

Hardee began withdrawing early that evening from positions north of Atlanta and set off on a forced march of some fifteen miles. Cleburne disengaged from contact, pulled out of line, and rejoined Hardee for the night march south. Cleburne recalled that the operation "was a heavy tax upon their powers of endurance." The troops were exhausted having fought and marched on 20-21 July; fought most of the day on the 21st; then lost another night's sleep marching for another 12 hours and fighting for another 8 on the 22nd.

After marching through the night, Hardee turned his corps northward in order to get into position for a dawn attack, but the Confederates miscalculated the distance to be moved and the time it would take. As a result, they turned to soon, failing to turn the corner and ending up on McPherson's flank instead, still six miles from the objective. Hardee's divisions would not be deployed for battle until noon. While deploying for battle Walker rode forward on a commanders' reconnaissance and was shot and killed by a Union picket. Hardee deployed from left to right, Maney, Cleburne, Walker, and Bate.

As Thomas and Schofield advanced southward they discovered the Confederate defenders' abandoned lines. McPherson entrenched on a north-south axis, connecting with Schofield on the north; Logan on the right from the railroad south to Blair along Bald Hill with his flank "in the air." However, the error was detected and corrected as McPherson shifted Dodge's XVI Corps to left flank directly across the path of the advancing Confederates.

When Hardee's attack kicked off Maney faced Leggett's and Giles Smith's divisions (Blair) south of Bald Hill. Cleburne struck Smith's (left) and Fuller's (right) divisions (Dodge). Walker's division hit Fuller, and Gist's Brigade found an opening on Fuller's right with a direct shot at Giles Smith's rear, but Fuller personally directed the effort to pinch off the penetration. The combination of enfilading rifled artillery fire and the rapid firing, 16-shot, Henry rifles of the 64th Illinois proved to much for Gist's troops. Bate's Division, attacking the center of Sweeney's division (Dodge), also met a withering combined arms crossfire and broke off their attack. Neither Maney nor Bate, attacking out on the wings, made any progress.

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Cleburne, however, hit the seam between Blair and Dodge, drove Giles Smith back toward Bald Hill, and threatened to penetrate the gap (Govan and Smith), until McPherson directed Federal reinforcements into the breach. Wangelin's 3d Brigade, Woods' 1st Division, Logan's XV Corps, in reserve on the far right marched south to backstop the Federal line and throw Cleburne back. McPherson, riding to Bald Hill just behind the front, crossed the area where Cleburne had penetrated, encountered Confederate skirmishers, and was shot and killed. Meanwhile, Cleburne attacked again, this time with Maney's Division, but the attacks were uncoordinated and Leggett and Smith, assisted by Walcutt's brigade, Harrow's division (XV Corps) withstood the fierce struggle in and around their positions.

Hood, observing the fighting from the second floor of a house near the present day Oakland Cemetery, for some unknown reason waited several hours before committing Cheatham. By midafternoon, as the Federals regained the upper hand in their struggle with Hardee, Hood finally sent Cheatham's Corps forward. Cheatham arrayed, from north to south, with Clayton's Division on the left, north of the Georgia Railroad, Brown's Division in the center, astride the railroad, and Stevenson's Division extended toward Bald Hill. Stevenson struck Leggett's division and Walcutt's brigade (Harrow) and was easily repulsed. To the north, Cheatham achieved greater success, as Clayton assaulted Woods 1st Division, XV Corps, north of the railroad and Brown advanced against M.L. Smith's 2d Division (XV Corps) astride the Georgia Railroad.

Maniquault's Brigade, spearheading Brown's attack north of the railroad, stalled initially in front of the Union works discovered the railroad cut running through the center of the Federal line unobstructed and dashed into the rear. The onrushing Confederates overran an artillery battery (DeGress) and forced Lightburn's 2d Division back, caused Harrow to withdraw and C. R. Woods to change front and refuse the left flank of the 1st Division. Sherman found himself in the thick of the action at a critical moment in the battle. Therefore, Sherman ordered Logan to counterattack and Schofield to support with artillery fires, then personally directed the enfilading artillery fire and Woods attack on the Confederate flank. Meanwhile, Logan directed the return of XV Corps assets Martin, detached earlier, and the attachment of Mersy's brigade (Sweeny) to M.L. Smith, then launched the attack. Logan retook his lost position, as directed, and recovered DeGress' guns as well. There would be no pursuit.

To the south, the fighting in the vicinity of Bald Hill still raged. After Vaughn and Govan drove Giles Smith's division from their works, they turned on Scott's brigade (Leggett). Hard pressed, Leggett changed front, bending back to the east and facing south. Smith's Troops rallied and reformed on the left. Wangelin's brigade linked in on the flank reaching out to connect with XVI Corps. XVII Corps managed to fend off the latest and last attempt to take Bald Hill. Cleburne personally led the charge. That night the Confederates fell back into the inner defenses of Atlanta, while the Federals restored their lines. The Army of the Tennessee closed the gaps in their line and generally worked through the night restoring their positions in anticipation of a renewed assault the following day. Confederate losses were between 5,000-8,000 out of 36,934. Federal losses stood at 3,722 out of 30,477. Giles Smith's division had 1,801 casualties. Hardee's Corps sustained 3,299, of these Cleburne's Division accounted for
1,388, about 40 percent including 30 of 60 officers; Maney 619. In Cheatham's Corps: Manigault claimed 400 in his brigade and in Brown's Division over 1,000.

Ezra Church (28 July).

The Army of the Tennessee awoke 23 July to the carnage of the previous day and found their antagonists gone from their front. Later that morning a truce was arranged in order to bury the dead and evacuate the wounded. The Federals evacuated their wounded to the rear to field hospitals, while the Johnnies took theirs into the city and put those who could survive the trip on trains and shipped them south.

While Sherman contemplated his next move, he had to find a replacement for McPherson. Based largely on Thomas' advice, Sherman selected Howard, the commander of IV Corps over Logan and Hooker. Logan, disappointed, believed he was not selected because he was not a West Pointer. Hooker, incensed because he was passed over, requested to be relieved. Sherman selected MG Henry D. Slocum, who was at Vicksburg, to replace Hooker and command XX Corps. Alpheus Williams served as the interim commander. Stanley replaced Howard as the commander of IV Corps.

In the Army of Tennessee, Hood could not find an experienced replacement division commander and thus broke up Walker's Division. Hood assigned Mercer's, Gist's, and Stevens' brigades to Cleburne, Maney (Cheatham), and Bate, respectively. Paton Anderson recalled from Florida replaced Brown as the commander of Hindman's Division (T.C. Hindman was ill). Hood requested LTG Stephen D. Lee to replace Cheatham as commander of Hood's old corps. Lee, only thirty-one arrived on 27 July. Hood replaced his chief of staff, BG William W. Mackall, who resigned, with BG Francis A. Shoup, the architect of the Chattahoochee defenses. Hood and Hardee's relationship worsened. Hood blamed Hardee for his two defeats and Hardee requested to be reassigned.

After taking a few days to rest, refit and reorganize, Sherman announced his next move. With two of the four railroads serving Atlanta in his control, the Western and Atlantic and the Georgia, and not having the manpower or inclination to encircle the city, Sherman decided to continue his quest for control of Hood's LOCs. Sherman decided to swing back to the west, conduct a flanking move to attack the Macon and Western Railroad (to Macon and Savannah, where it joined the Atlanta and West Point Railroad, to Montgomery, Alabama and Mississippi) near East Point. MG Lovell Rousseau during his raid through northern Alabama had interdicted the Atlanta and West Point Railroad at Opelika, Alabama. Sherman intended to pull the Army of the Tennessee out of line on the extreme left and to send them out to the west then south to East Point. The cavalry (Stoneman, Garrard and McCook) would sweep around the city on both flanks on a raid against Lovejoy's Station. Stoneman proposed continuing south on a deeper raid to Macon and Andersonville. Thomas and Schofield would probe forward to keep the defenders of Atlanta occupied.
On 27 July, Sherman put his Army in motion again. Howard, rather than taking the Army of the Tennessee on a wide sweep to the southwest, conducted a very deliberate sidestep slowly and cautiously extending out to the Federal right from behind Thomas. Howard, based on
available intelligence and understanding of Hood's penchant for offensive action, stopped after extending the Federal line only about two miles and took up a hasty defense near Ezra Church. Howard deployed Logan (XV Corps) on the right facing south and Blair (XVII) on the left. Logan refused his right flank, by bending M.L. Smith's and Harrow's divisions back to the northwest. In addition, Howard massed 26 guns on his right flank. While Howard dug in and positioned his artillery, Hood planned his counterpunch.

Hood, reacting to Howard's movement by sending S.D. Lee and A.P. Stewart, each with two divisions apiece, west to intercept and block the Federals flanking move. Lee was to be the blocking force, while Stewart was to find Howard's flank and attack the Federal rear on the twenty-ninth. Hardee would remain responsible for Atlanta's main inner defensive line. Hood also sent Wheeler off to deal the Federal cavalry threat to his southern LOCs.

S. D. Lee attacked the Federal position with Brown's Division on the left and Clayton's Division on the right. Shortly after noon, Brown's Division attacked Morgan L. Smith's 2d Division, XV Corps, and after several tries managed to threaten Smith's flank. However, Walcutt's brigade (Harrow's Division) came up from its reserve position blocking the threatened penetration and helped repulse Brown by outflanking him in a counterattack. During the fight, Brown was slightly wounded. Clayton's attack, followed Brown's, encountered elements from Woods' 1st Division and Harrow's 4th Division. Through a mix-up Clayton's attack was delivered piecemeal and Gibson's Brigade attacked unsupported. A staff officer had ordered the brigade forward prematurely. Lee failed to inform Hood that he attacked on his own initiative, so the battle was several hours old by the time the army commander became aware of the situation.

A.P. Stewart, followed up Lee's ill-fated assaults with several equally ill-advised assaults of his own. Stewart sent Wathall across the same ground Brown attacked over earlier rather than moving against the flank and rear, as planned. Wathall attacked three times before retiring from the field. Loring was wounded while deploying his division for an assault. Stewart was also wounded, and Wathall took command. Federal casualties amounted to 650 out of 13,226, while Confederate casualties were (out of 9 brigades, 2 1/2 divisions): Brown 870, Clayton about 1,000; Wathall also around 1,000; the total was between 3,000-5,000 out of 18,450. In the eleven days since Hood took command, his losses totaled 14,800. These heavy losses were becoming a morale factor.

The Confederate's one major success came against the Federal cavalry raids. Sherman's cavalry raids were a disaster, failing to cut the LOCs supporting Atlanta from the south. Wheeler's cavalrymen ran down each of the Federal cavalry columns. Stoneman's division, surrounded at Sunshine Church near Macon, was forced to conduct a breakout with two brigades (Adams and Capron) while his third (Biddle's brigade) and Stoneman remained as the rear guard. Stoneman, Biddle, and 600 troopers were captured. Adams reached Union lines on 4 August. Capron's brigade was scattered at King's Tanyard near Winder; on 3 August, most were captured, but Colonel Capron managed to escape and return to Federal lines. McCook was defeated at Brown's Mill near Newnan; the remnants made their way back. Of the 4,700 Union horsemen who set out on the raid only 1,600 managed to make their way back to Federal lines.
BATTLE OF UTOY CREEK
6 Aug 1864

Figure 19: The Battle of Utoy Creek, 6 August 1864.
After learning of the failure of his cavalry raids, Sherman opted to resume extending his right to reach East Point and the railroad. This time it was Schofield who would make the flanking maneuver. Garrard's cavalry replaced Schofield's Army of the Ohio in their trenches, while Schofield took up the march to get on Howard's right. The Army of the Ohio reached a point along Utoy Creek. Hood, in turn, strengthened his line by sending Bate's Division (Hardee's Corps) to reinforce Lee's left. Sherman ordered Schofield forward and reinforced him with Palmer's XIV Corps (Thomas). However, the operation was stopped cold because of a controversy over who had date of rank. Palmer, citing that he was senior, refused to take orders from Schofield. Palmer finally offered to resign. After initially refusing the offer of resignation, Sherman accepted it and replaced Palmer with Richard Johnson (6 August). The delay gave the Confederates time to build up and improve their positions.

On 6 August, Schofield was finally ready to resume operations. He deployed XXIII Corps on the right, XIV Corps on the left, and XV Corps in support on Palmer's left. Schofield attacked with Cox's 3d Division, on the right, against Bate, the Confederate left, while Hascull's 2d Division hit the Confederate left flank. Cox made several attempts to bulldoze over the Confederate position but in the end was repulsed. While Cox battled Bate, Hascull attacked Ross's Cavalry Brigade, just back from their defeat of the Federal cavalry, but the attack faltered after being broken by a combination of the South Utoy Creek and Confederate rifle and artillery fire.

During the night Bate withdrew to the Confederate main lines covering the railroad. The following morning when the Federals probed forward they found the defenders strongly entrenched behind even stronger works, protected by obstacles covered by fire. On the seventh, Johnson's XIV Corps participated in the probing actions, but the results were unsatisfactory and costly to the Federal attackers. Hood's troops were far from being broken and demoralized, despite their recent setbacks. When fighting from built-up positions against equal numbers and against piecemeal efforts they could deal out effective punishment on their attackers. The setback at Utoy Creek caused Sherman to suspend his flanking operations. During the impasse, he called for his siege artillery from Chattanooga and proceeded to bombard Atlanta.

On 10 August, Hood sent Wheeler on a raid to destroy the railroad north of Marietta and disrupt Sherman's LOC. The raid was ineffective and Wheeler continued northward into Tennessee. Wheeler's failure to return to Atlanta deprived the army of its eyes and ears. Sherman in turn sent out another cavalry operation, this time under Judson Kilpatrick. The objective was the railroad south of the city. Between 18 and 20 August, the Federal raiders did some damage to the tracks, before being driven off, but nothing permanent.

**Jonesboro (31 Aug - 1 Sep).**

Sherman, not content to continue a siege and unwilling to sacrifice his troops in direct assaults on prepared works, returned to what had brought him success thus far. He decided to move his infantry around the left flank to finally complete breaking Hood's LOCs. On 25
August, Sherman withdrew the bulk of his force out of their trenches and started them on his latest flanking maneuver, leaving only Slocum’s XX Corps in position north of the city to protect the Chattahoochee railroad bridge and river crossing sites. On the night of the 25th, Thomas withdrew his three corps. On the 26th, the Army of the Tennessee withdrew and marched to Fairburn. As Thomas and Howard moved southward, Schofield maintained his position in the rear. On the 28th, Thomas reached Red Oak, Howard occupied Fairburn, and proceeded to destroy the Atlanta and West Point Railroad tracks there.

Because the bombardment that had been going on for the last couple of weeks ceased on the 26th and the Federal trenches were discovered evacuated, some Southerners gained false hope that Sherman had given up and had gone. Sherman had effectively stolen a day march on Hood because of the lack of effective intelligence gathering on the part of the Confederates and wishful thinking. The senior leaders of the Army of Tennessee were in the dark about Sherman's intentions. Hood was shocked back into reality on the 28th when Howard reappeared near Jonesboro and destroyed the railroad at West Point. Even at this point, Hood felt it was only a raid and dispatched Jackson along with two brigades of infantry by rail to deal with the problem and determine Sherman’s whereabouts.

By the 29th, Hood realized the railroad was the objective of this move by Sherman—but in what strength? On the 30th, as Schofield (XXIII Corps) and Stanley (IV Corps) headed for the railroad line south of Rough and Ready, Howard marched for Jonesboro along with Davis (XIV Corps). Hood moved Hardee and Lee southward to Rough and Ready and East Point, still unaware that Jonesboro was the objective of the Federal move. By that evening, Hood had enough information to summon Hardee and Lee to a conference in order to outline his plan to attack. Logan’s Corps reached Jonesboro on the 31st. That night the Confederates were on the march to Jonesboro. Late on the afternoon of the 31st, Howard’s advance elements crossed the Flint River and entrenched along a ridgeline west of Jonesboro. Howard deployed with Logan (XV Corps) astride the Fairburn Road, Ransom (XVI Corps) to the right with his right refused back to the river, and Blair (XVII Corps) in reserve to the rear west of the river.

Hardee’s and Lee’s corps were not in position to attack until midafternoon on the 31st, giving the Federals additional time to prepare their reception. Hardee’s plan of attack called for Cleburne to deploy on the left and assault the Federal right flank (Ransom), turning it into another wheeling maneuver. Lee was to take position on the right and attack the Federal left (Logan). The Confederate attack went wrong from the outset as their timing was off and the attacks were uncoordinated. Lee was quickly thrown back as he attacked prematurely and unsupported into the teeth of Logan’s defense. When Hardee sent word for Lee to renew the attack he replied that he could not and Hardee called an end to the debacle. Hardee suffered 1725 casualties, while Federals casualties were 179.

Hood ordered Lee back to Atlanta, anticipating an attack by Sherman on the city, leaving Hardee to contend with the Federals around Jonesboro. Hardee took up the defense north and west of the town. Hardee stretched his forces to try to cover the ground vacated by Lee’s force. He deployed with Cheatham’s Division on the left, under John C. Carter; Bate’s Division in the
center, under John C. Brown; and Cleburne's Division on the right, refused its flank back to the east stretching for the railroad, facing north.

**Battle of Jonesboro - 31 Aug 1864**

First Day

![Map of Battle of Jonesboro - 31 Aug 1864](image)

*Figure 20: The Battle of Jonesboro, Day 1, 31 August 1864.*

Meanwhile as the fighting raged at Jonesboro, Schofield (XXIII Corps) and Stanley's IV Corps broke the railroad between Rough and Ready and Jonesboro. Next, Sherman ordered
Battle of Jonesboro - 1 Sep 1864
Second Day

Figure 21: The Battle of Jonesboro, Day 2, 1 September 1864.
Thomas and Schofield to turn on Jonesboro. Concentrating his force at Jonesboro, Sherman in effect isolated Hardee's Corps. Sherman's plan of attack called for Logan to attack Hardee's position from the west, Davis' XIV Corps to attack Cleburne's position from the northwest, and Stanley's IV Corps to attack straight south down the railroad into Hardee's rear.

Sherman's attack was delayed until late in the afternoon because the Federal units were slow in their approach marches. Davis' XIV Corps attacked the apex of Hardee's salient defended by Govan's Brigade, Cleburne's Division. The initial assault force, although staggered by defiant defenders and slowed by the terrain, reformed. Reinforced, they surged forward again this time penetrating the Confederate line in several places and threatening to break through at various other points up and down the line. Cleburne, forced to pull back, ordered limited counterattacks to contain the Federal penetrations and threats to his rear area, while reestablishing a second line of defense. Cleburne's second line held, and Sherman, with visions of enveloping Hardee, held Davis up awaiting the arrival of Stanley and Blair's XVII Corps to get into position. But with the onset of nightfall the enveloping forces failed to get in position, and Hardee withdrew to Lovejoy Station—escaping envelopment. Hardee sent word to Hood that Jonesboro had fallen. Hood ordered the evacuation of Atlanta on 2 September.

THE ARMIES

As the Atlanta Campaign began the Federal armies under the command of Major General William T. Sherman numbered approximately 110,000 men and 254 guns. Sherman commanded, what could be called today, an Army Group organized into three armies -- the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio.

The Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Major General George H. Thomas, was the largest of the armies under Sherman's command numbering about 73,000. The Army of the Cumberland was organized into three infantry corps: IV Corps under the command of Major General Oliver O. Howard (20,538), XIV Corps under Major General John M. Palmer (22,696), and XX Corps commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker (20,721). Each corps consisted of three infantry divisions. The Army also had a cavalry corps commanded by Brigadier General Washington L. Elliott (8,983) organized into three mounted divisions. Thomas' artillery consisted of 42 batteries with four to six guns per battery for a total of 130 tubes.

The Army of the Tennessee was commanded by a Sherman and Grant protégé, Major General James B. McPherson. The 24,500-man army was also organized into three infantry corps XV Corps under Major General John A. Logan with four infantry divisions (11,500), XVI Corps commanded by Major General Grenville M. Dodge with two infantry divisions, and XVII Corps under the command of Major General Frank P. Blair with two infantry divisions. Each corps had 2-3 artillery batteries per division, a total of 23 batteries and 96 guns. There was no organic cavalry assigned.
Lastly, the Army of the Ohio (13,559) commanded by John M. Schofield consisted of only one corps, XIII Corps. The Army of the Ohio was organized into three infantry divisions and a division of cavalry with 7 artillery batteries totaling 28 guns.

Opposing Sherman at Dalton, Georgia was General Joseph E. Johnston commanding a revitalized Army of Tennessee numbering 54,500 men and 144 guns. The Army of Tennessee was organized into two infantry corps and one cavalry corps. The first corps, commanded by Lieutenant General William J. Hardee consisted of four divisions, 12 artillery batteries of 48 guns. The second corps was commanded by Lt. General John B. Hood, consisting of three infantry divisions and 9 artillery batteries of 36 guns. The cavalry corps, under Major General Joseph Wheeler, consisted of three cavalry divisions and 4 artillery batteries of 18 guns. The Army also had a Reserve Artillery of 9 batteries of 36 guns. Polk's Army of Mississippi, consisted of Polk' Corps with three infantry divisions, with nine artillery batteries of 36 guns and a cavalry division with three artillery batteries of 14 guns for a total of 12 artillery batteries and 50 guns.

**UNION ORDER OF BATTLE**

![Figure 22: Federal Order of Battle](image-url)

**Figure 22:** Federal Order of Battle
Figure 23: Confederate Order of Battle

The typical Federal units numbered: 300-500 men per regiment; a 1,000-1,500 per brigade; and 4,000-6,000 per division. Many long-service units had less than 300 in the regiment, like the 73d Illinois which had only 183 men left. By way of comparison a Confederate regiment averaged less than 300 per, a brigade averaged 1,500 and a division 4,000-6,000.

The Civil War Staff

During the Civil War, as today, the success of large military organizations often depended on the effectiveness of the commanders’ staffs. Modern staff procedures have evolved only gradually with the increasing complexity of military operations. This evolution was far from complete in 1861, and throughout the war, commanders personally handled many vital staff functions, most notably operations and intelligence. The nature of American warfare up to the mid-nineteenth century had not yet clearly overwhelmed the capabilities of single commanders.

Civil War staffs were divided into a "general staff" and a "staff corps." This terminology, defined by Winfield Scott in 1855, differs from modern definitions of the terms. Listed below are the typical staff positions at any army level, although key functions are represented down to regimental level. Except for the chief of staff and aides-de-camp, who were considered personal
staff and would often depart when a commander was reassigned, staffs mainly contained representatives of the various bureaus, with logistical areas being best represented. Later in the war, some truly effective staffs began to emerge, but this was the result of the increased experience of the officers serving in those positions rather than a comprehensive development of standing staff procedures or guidelines.

### Typical Staffs

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George B. McClellan, when he appointed his father-in-law as his chief of staff, was the first to officially use this title. Even though many senior commanders had a chief of staff, this position was not used in any uniform way and seldom did the man in this role achieve the central coordinating authority of the chief of staff in a modern headquarters. This position, along with most other staff positions, was used as an individual commander saw fit, making staff responsibilities somewhat different under each commander. This inadequate use of the chief of staff was among the most important shortcomings of staffs during the Civil War. An equally important weakness was the lack of any formal operations or intelligence staff. Liaison procedures were also ill-defined, and various staff officers or soldiers performed this function with little formal guidance. Miscommunication or lack of knowledge of friendly units proved disastrous time after time.

### Logistics

"The great question of the campaign was one of supplies."


In both armies logistical support was the responsibility of the four supply departments: (1) *Quartermaster*—clothing and equipment, forage, animals, transportation, and housing; (2) *Commissary*—rations; (3) *Ordnance*—weapons, ammunition, and related equipment; (4) *Medical*—medical supplies, evacuation, treatment, and hospitalization.
The military department was the basic organizational unit for administrative and logistical purposes, and the commander of each department controlled the support in that area with no intervening level between the department headquarters and the bureau chiefs in Washington. Typically, material flowed from the factory to base depots as directed by the responsible bureaus. Supplies were then shipped to advanced depots, generally a city located on a major transportation route in the department rear area.

Army depots were located in major cities: Boston, New York, Baltimore, Washington, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, New Orleans, and San Francisco. Philadelphia was the chief depot and manufacturing center for clothing. During campaigns, armies established advanced and temporary bases served by rail or river transportation as needed to support operations. From these points, wagons moved the supplies forward to units in the field -- the principle is somewhat similar to the modern theater sustainment organization.

The Confederates used a similar system with depots at Richmond, Staunton, Raleigh, Atlanta, Columbus (GA), Huntsville, Montgomery, Jackson (MS), Little Rock, Alexandria (LA), and San Antonio. However, the Confederates were continually plagued by a shortage of funds which collapsed domestic and overseas procurement, a shortage of animals and wagons for field transportation, and the failure of railroads to run on schedule.

Procurement was decentralized. Purchases were made on the open market by low-bid contract in the major cities and producing areas by depot officers. Flour and other commodities were procured closer to the troops when possible. Cattle were contracted and major beef depots were maintained at Washington, Alexandria, VA, and Louisville. The Commissary Department developed a highly effective system of moving cattle on the hoof to the immediate rear of armies in the field, to be slaughtered by brigade butchers and issued to the troops the day before consumption.

The adequacy of logistics at the strategic and operational levels shape plans and often the outcome of campaigns. Strategic concentration, operational maneuver, and the exploitation of operational and tactical success often depend on the adequacy of logistics and the ability of the force to protect its lines of communication. As true as the above are in 1994 these same truths were applicable in 1864, and General Sherman immersed himself in the logistic preparations for his upcoming campaign. Sherman, in effect, was his own chief quartermaster and commissary officers. The chief quartermaster officers for each of the three armies were Major Langdon C. Easton (Army of the Cumberland), LTC J. Condit Smith (Army of the Tennessee), and LTC G.W. Schofield (Army of the Ohio).

Supplies for Sherman's Atlanta Campaign flowed from Louisville (Chief Quartermaster, BG Robert Allen's HQ), the primary base depot for the campaign, and St. Louis (base depot) to Nashville (LTC James L. Donaldson), the main supply depot, to Chattanooga, Knoxville, Johnsonville (TN), Decatur and Bridgeport (AL) (advanced depots). Later, temporary and field depots were established at Ringgold, Resaca, Allatoona, Acworth, Big Shanty and Atlanta. Atlanta was Johnston's primary depot.
The depot system allowed Sherman to amass a huge stockpile of supplies. For example, at Jeffersonville, IN, just across the Ohio from Louisville, 10,000,000 rations were stored. At Nashville, “five months’ supplies of all kinds” including ration for 150,000 men and 60,000 animals were maintained as well as facilities for packing hogs and pickles, and bakeries which used 550 barrels of flour per day. At Chattanooga 100,000 rations for 30 days and clothing to last six months were on hand. With such quantities of provisions available, Sherman carried a 20 day supply of rations in his wagons.

The key component of the transportation system connecting the entire supply network was the military railroad. The backbone of the railroad network, the three principal railroads, the Louisville and Nashville (185 miles), the Nashville to Chattanooga (150 miles), and the Western and Atlantic (150 miles of single track from Chattanooga to Atlanta) needed repair and required reorganizing before the necessary build-up of supplies began.

In late November and early December, BG Daniel C. McCallum, the military director and superintendent of railroads and W.W. Wright, chief engineer of military railroads in the Military Division of Mississippi, along with a division of the U.S. Military Railroad Construction Corps arrived in Tennessee. The U.S. Military Railroad consisted of two departments: the Construction Corps and the Transportation Corps. Originally, soldiers detailed to work on the railroads made up the bulk of these two corps, by 1864 the majority were contract civilians. The Construction Corps, later, reorganized and expanded to six divisions and 5,000 men with each division organized into subdivisions. The two most important subdivisions being the bridge builders and the track layers. McCallum immediately set about surveying the 500 plus miles of track in the operational area and the available assets. As the Federal army moved deeper into Confederate territory to sustain the uninterrupted flow of supplies to the front Wright’s Construction Corps rebuilt 22 1/2 miles of track and 4,081 linear feet of bridges. From December 1863 to August 1864, Wright’s men used 6,000,000 broad feet of bridge timber and 500,000 cross-ties.

The Transportation Corps, under the direction of Colonel Adna Anderson, managed and maintained the locomotives, cars, and rolling stock at a maximum strength of 12,000 divided into three divisions. The largest facilities were at Nashville and Louisville, with smaller ones at Stevenson and Huntsville, Alabama, and Knoxville. Additionally, at Nashville were extensive warehouses for spare parts and repair shops for servicing 1,000 cars and 100 locomotives. McCallum estimated that 200 locomotives and 3,000 railroad cars were needed for the spring campaign, only 70 locomotives and 600 cars were on hand. Between February and May 1864, 30 locomotives and 675 cars were delivered to Nashville.

By Sherman’s (assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi on 18 March) estimates, he needed 130 railroad cars carrying 10 tons each to arrive daily in Chattanooga. To accomplish this feat Sherman set about acquiring the 100 locomotives and 1000 railroad cars he required -- at the outset only 40 locomotives and 400 cars were operational. During the Atlanta Campaign Sherman received a daily total of 1,600 tons. Four trains of ten cars each were group together and four of these groups arrived in Chattanooga daily, 160 cars each with a capacity of 10 tons. This was the equivalent of 36,800 six-mule team wagons with a
carrying capacity of 2 tons each. From 1 November 1863 to 14 September 1864, a total of 298,528 tons and 140,000 troops were delivered to the Military Division of Mississippi.

Three men had responsibility for ensuring uninterrupted logistical flow and sustaining the momentum of the campaign: (1) the director and general manager of military railroads (COL. Daniel C. McCallum), (2) the head of the Department of Transportation (COL Adna Anderson), who operated the supply trains, and (3) the commander of the Department of Construction (COL William W. Wright), who kept the roadbed, track, and bridges operating. COL Wright’s troops were trained and drilled as a rear area rapid reaction force to Confederate raids against the vital rail lines. Sherman also mobilized thousands of militiamen from the Midwest for three month tours of duty to guard the bridges, tracks, and tunnels. During the four months of the campaign, there were no serious disruption in the sustainment effort.

Sherman also depended heavily on steamboats to transport supplies in bulk. The average load carried by an Ohio River steamboat was 500 tons. Though hampered by seasonal hazards of low water and ice, between February and May 1864, 158,016 tons arrived in Nashville on 614 steamers and barges. A boatyard was established at Bridgeport, AL and by mid-July 4 gunboats, to patrol the upper Tennessee to Knoxville, and 13 steamers, to ferry supplies between Knoxville and Chattanooga, were constructed.

The standard army wagon was (ten feet long, 43 inches wide, 22 inches deep) pulled by a team of either 6 horses or mules, on a good road in good weather, could pull 4,000 pounds of cargo, but the average was only 2,500 pounds. The payload could include forage, baggage, rations, hospital stores, and ammunition. For example, a typical load might consist of 1,400 marching rations, eight days forage/grain for the mules, or 25 boxes of smallarms ammunition. Early in the war 6 wagons were allocated per regiment, by 1864, that numbered had been reduced to 2. For the Atlanta Campaign, each regiment was limited to 1 baggage wagon and 1 ambulance. Additionally, officers of an infantry company were allotted 1 packmule to transport personal items. Between 1 November 1863 and 1 September 1864 a total of 41,122 horses, used primarily by the cavalry and artillery, 38,724 mules, and 3,795 wagons were issued. From 1 November 1863 to 14 April 1864, a total of 2.1 million bushels of corn, 3.4 bushels of oats, and 20,000 tons of hay was issued.

The supply and ordnance trains (both field and combat) of Sherman’s combined armies consisted of 5,180 wagons and 860 ambulances (28,300 horses and 32,600 mules) which equates to roughly 50/1000 soldiers compared to the Army of the Potomac in the east, which had over 4000 wagons or an average of 40/1000 (the Army of the Cumberland had over 4700 wagons during the Chickamauga Campaign). Sherman tried to make his force as mobile as possible and cut his transportation requirements to the bear minimum by issuing orders restricting loads. Generally, wagons were allocated as follows: 3 per division headquarters, 2 per brigade headquarters, 1 per regimental headquarters, 1 per regiment for baggage, 1-2 ambulances per regiment. During forays away from the railroad, Sherman limited allocations to 1 wagon per regiment. Johnston allowed Confederate units 3 wagons per regiment.
Typical Trains

Corps and division trains organized into *ordnance* and *supply* trains
Corps *ordnance* train carried 100 rds of small arms per piece and artillery rounds
equal to that carried in the ammunition chests of all the batteries.
Division *ordnance* train carried 60 rds of small arms per piece and each soldier
carried 40 rds.

Sample of Federal Logistical Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Packing</th>
<th>Weight (lbs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulk ammunition .58 Caliber, expanding ball 500-grain bullet</td>
<td>1,000 rounds per case</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-pound Napoleon canister (14.8 lbs.)</td>
<td>8 rounds per box</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Marching&quot; ration (per man per day) 1 lb. hard bread (hardtack) 3/4 lb. salt pork or 1/4 lb. fresh meat, 1 oz. coffee, 3 oz. sugar and salt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forage (per horse per day): 14 lbs. hay and 12 lbs. grain</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal equipment: Includes rifle, bayonet, 60 rounds of ammunition, haversack, 3 days’ rations, blanket, shelter half, canteen, and personal items</td>
<td></td>
<td>40-60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LOGISTIC ALLOWANCES

**The Soldier’s Load:** About 46 lbs. (Union) - Musket and bayonet (14 lbs.), 60 rounds, 3-8 days rations, canteen, blanket or overcoat, shelter half, ground sheet, mess gear (cup, knife, fork, spoon, skillet), personal items (sewing kit, razor, letters, Bible, etc.). Confederate less, about 30 lbs.
Official US Ration: 20 oz. of fresh or salt beef or 12 oz. of pork or bacon, 18 oz. of flour or 20 of corn meal (bread in lieu if possible), 1.6 oz. of rice or .64 oz. of beans or 1.5 oz. of dried potatoes, 1.6 oz. of coffee or .24 oz. of tea, 2.4 oz. of sugar, .54 oz. of salt, .32 gal of vinegar.

Union Marching Ration: 16 oz. of "hardtack," 12 oz. salt pork or 4 oz. fresh meat, 1 oz. coffee, 3 oz. sugar and salt.

Confederate Ration: Basically the same, but with slightly more sugar and less meat, coffee, vinegar and salt, and seldom issued in full. For the Army of Northern Virginia usually half of meat issued and coffee available only when captured or exchanged through the lines for sugar and tobacco.

Forage: Each horse required 14 lbs. of hay and 12 of grain per day; mules needed the same amount of hay and 9 lbs. of grain. No other item was so bulky and difficult to transport.

Union Annual Clothing Issue: 2 caps, 1 hat, 2 dress coats, 3 pr. trousers, 3 flannel shirts, 3 flannel drawer, 4 pr. stockings and 4 pr. booties (high top shoes). Artillerymen and cavalrymen were issued jackets and boots instead of booties. Allowance = $42.

Confederate: On paper the Confederate soldier was almost equally well clothed, but the QM was seldom able to supply the required items and soldiers wore whatever came to hand, the home-dyed butternut jackets and trousers being characteristic items. Shortages of shoes were a constant problem.

Tents: Sibley (teepee) held 20 men, feet to center pole, and was commonly used for permanent camps. "A" or "wedge" tent was stretched over a horizontal bar on two 6' upright posts, held 4-6 men. Also used mainly for permanent camps. For field use each soldier was issued a "Tente d'Abril" (shelter half), two soldiers buttoning their halves together to form a tent. Called "dog" tent by witty soldiers, now known as a pup tent.

Baggage: Enlisted men of both armies were required to carry their own. Union order of Sep 1862 limited officers to blankets, one small valise or carpetbag and an ordinary mess kit. Confederate standards allowed generals 80 lbs., field officers 65 lbs., and captains and subalterns 50 lbs.

Wagons: Union's standard 6-mule Army wagon could haul 4,000 lbs. on good roads in the best of conditions, but seldom exceeded 2,000 or with 4 mules, 1,800 lbs. at rate of 12-24 miles a day. Confederates used 4-mule wagon with smaller capacity.
Engineers

Engineers performed essential tasks in every campaign. Trained engineers were at a premium so many civil engineers were commissioned as volunteers. The Confederates, in particular, relied heavily on civilian expertise. State and local civil engineers planned and supervised much of the work done on local fortifications.

Engineer missions included construction of fortifications; repair and construction of roads, bridges, and railroads; demolition; limited construction of obstacles; and construction or reduction of siege works. Topographic engineers performed reconnaissance and produced maps. In March 1863 the Federals merged the Corps of Engineers and the Corps of Topographical Engineers into the Corps of Engineers. The Confederates never separated these functions.

Bridging assets included wagon-mounted pontoon trains of either wooden or canvas-covered pontoon boats. Trained engineers could bridge even large rivers in a matter of hours. The typical pontoon train consisted of thirty-four pontoon wagons, twenty-two chess wagons that carried the chains, cables, and wooden planks, four tool wagons and two traveling forges. Sherman had two pontoon trains - aggregate length was 1400’. Johnston had four pontoon trains to support the Army of Tennessee.

Sherman’s engineers included: the 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, the 1st Missouri Engineers, the Pioneer Brigade, and Pontoon Battalion of the Army of the Cumberland; an Engineer Battalion in the Army of the Ohio and a Pioneer Corps in the Army of the Tennessee. The importance of the railroad was further emphasized by the Construction Corps of 2000 railroad workers, under a civilian supervisor, E.C. Smeed. Sherman used his engineer assets to conduct reconnaissance and mapping, construct roads and blockhouses, build and repair bridges, and repair the railroad.

Johnston’s engineers consisted of four companies with an effective strength of just over 400 men. These companies were supervised by Johnston’s chief engineer, Lt. Colonel Stephen W. Prestman. They maintained the pontoons, laid out and supervised the construction of fortifications and trenchworks. Bragg’s engineers relied heavily on conscripted labor to dig the hundreds of miles of trenches during this campaign.

Some significant feats performed by Sherman’s engineers were: rebuilt the Etowah River bridge, 625’ long, 75’ high, with 600 men in 6 days; rebuilt the Chattahoochee River bridge, 780’ long, 92’ high, in 4.5 days; Dodge’s Pioneers threw-up the Roswell bridge, 1,400-foot long in 4 days. When Hood went on his raid northward after the fall of Atlanta he managed to tear up over thirty-five miles of track and 455 linear feet of bridges, but it was completely repaired in thirteen days, and thirty-five miles of track and 230 feet of bridges between Tunnel Hill and Resaca were repaired in seven and a half days.
Weapons

Most Federal infantrymen were equipped with either Springfield or Enfield rifles, there were some repeating rifles like the Spencer and the Henry.

Confederate infantrymen were about fifty percent Enfield and Springfield rifles, most of the others carried—.54 caliber Mississippi Rifle, some .69-caliber muskets converted into rifles; while other regiments were still carrying smoothbores, some had .45-caliber British Wentworth sniper rifles.

CIVIL WAR SMALL ARMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPON</th>
<th>MAX RANGE</th>
<th>EFF RANGE</th>
<th>RATE OF FIRE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INFANTRY:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Rifled Musket</td>
<td>1000 yds</td>
<td>200-500 yds</td>
<td>3 rds/min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>muzzle-loaded,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>cal .58.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Rifled Musket (Enfield)</td>
<td>1100 yds</td>
<td>200-500 yds</td>
<td>3 rds/min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>muzzle-loaded,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cal .577.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spencer Repeating Rifle</td>
<td>800 yds</td>
<td>125-400 yds</td>
<td>8 rds/20 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seven-shot magazine, breech-loaded, cal .52.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Repeating Rifle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 rds/ 11 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-shot magazine, breech-loaded, cal .44.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smooth-bore Musket</td>
<td>200 yds</td>
<td>50-100 yds</td>
<td>3 rds/ min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>muzzle-loaded,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cal .69.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CAVALRY:

Spencer Carbine—seven shot magazine, breech-loaded, cal .52.

Sharps Carbine
single-shot, breech-loaded, cal. .52

Burnside Carbine
single-shot, breech-loaded, cal. .54.

Colt Revolver,
six-shot, cal. .36 and .44.

Remington Revolver
six-shot, cal. .36 and .44.

800 yds 150-200 yds 8 rds /20 sec
800 yds 150-200 yds 9 rds/ min
800 yds 150-200 yds 9 rds/ min
100 yds 20-50 yds
100 yds 20-50 yds

Basic ammunition load for infantry: 40 rounds in cartridge box. In addition, 100 rounds per man were held in the brigade or division trains and 100 rounds in the corps trains. When a large action was expected 20 additional rounds were issued to each soldier, who placed them in his uniform pockets or knapsack.

The total consumption of smallarms ammunition was 22.1 million rounds, e.g., 21.3 million rifled musket rounds and 796,910 rounds for all others.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPON</th>
<th>MAX RANGE</th>
<th>EFF. RANGE</th>
<th>RATE OF FIRE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-Pdr Gun</td>
<td>2000 yds</td>
<td>1500 yds</td>
<td>2 rds per min (4 with canister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smooth-bore 3.67 in. bore.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Pdr How</td>
<td>1000 yds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smooth-bore 4.62 in. bore.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Pdr Gun-How</td>
<td>2000 yds</td>
<td>1619 yds</td>
<td>2 rds per min (4 with canister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Napoleon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Smooth-bore 4.62 in. bore.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24-Pdr How</td>
<td></td>
<td>1300 yds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smooth-bore 5.82 in. bore.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-Pdr Gun (James)</td>
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<td>1700 yds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rifled, 3.8 in. bore.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-Pdr Parrott</td>
<td>6200 yds</td>
<td>1850 yds</td>
<td>2 rds per min (4 with canister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rifled)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00 in. bore.</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-inch Rifle</td>
<td>4000 yds</td>
<td>1830 yds</td>
<td>2 rds per min (3 with canister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ordnance/Rodman)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00 in. bore.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Pdr Blakely</td>
<td></td>
<td>1850 yds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rifled)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4 in. bore.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12-Pdr Wiard</td>
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<td>1850 yds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rifled)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6-in. bore.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Pdr Parrott</td>
<td>6200 yds</td>
<td>1900 yds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rifled)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.67 in. bore.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Union:

254 guns (50 batteries)
130 guns (24 batteries, Army of the Cumberland)
96 guns (19 batteries, Army of the Tennessee)
28 guns (7 batteries, Army of the Ohio)

Confederate

187 guns (46 batteries)
137 guns (34 batteries, Army of Tennessee)
50 guns (12 batteries, Army of Mississippi)

ARTILLERY AMMUNITION:

SHOT - Solid projectile.

SHELL - Fused, hollow projectile, with powder-filled cavity. Exploded into 3 to 5 large pieces. Commonly used at 500-1500 yards.

SPHERICAL CASE - Fused, hollow projectile, with powder and a number of small iron round-balls, that exploded in all directions. Commonly used at 500-1500 yards.

CANISTER - Tin, cylindrical can filled with 27 1 1/2 inch iron balls packed in sawdust. Can opened immediately upon exiting muzzle, showering enemy like large shotgun. Commonly used at 50-400 yards.

BASIC AMMUNITION LOAD (half with guns, half in trains):

Napoleon 256 rds
Ordnance Rifle 400 rds

In all, 149,670 rounds were expended; 97,464 rifled rounds and 52,206 smoothbore rounds.
Tactics

The Napoleonic Wars and the Mexican War were the major influences on American military thinking at the beginning of the Civil War. In the battles of 1861 and 1862, both sides employed the tactics proven in Mexico and discovered that the tactical offensive could still be successful, but at a great cost in casualties. Official tactical doctrine did not recognize the potential lethality of rifled weapons. Commanders believed that the decisive form of battle was the offense and thus choosing the tactical offensive retained the initiative over a defender. Infantry tactical formations stressed close order, linear formations. On the offense, troops deployed into line of battle to gain advantage of mass and concentrated firepower forward attacking in successive lines with bayonets fixed.

While on the defensive the defender gained additional firepower, more accurately delivered at greater ranges and generally tore the initial assault lines to shreds. In turn, often causing the following lines to bunch-up and intermingle, thereby, causing the attack to lose momentum. Bayonet assaults into the face of concentrated rifle fire quickly became suicidal.

Long after the strength of the defensive had been established, Civil War commanders continued to employ the tactical offensive in order to retain the initiative over defenders. The offensive was still considered the decisive form of battle, but it was becoming more difficult to coordinate and even harder to control. The better commanders often tried to attack the enemy's flanks and rear but seldom were successful because of the difficulty involved. The commander not only had to identify the enemy's flank or rear correctly, but he also had to move his force into position to attack and then do so in conjunction with attacks made by other friendly units. Command and control required to conduct these attacks was beyond the ability of most Civil War commanders. Therefore, Civil War armies continued to repeatedly attack each other frontally, with resulting high casualties, because it was the easiest way to conduct offensive operations.

When attacking frontally, a commander had to choose between attacking on a broad front or a narrow front. Attacking on a broad front rarely succeeded except against weak and scattered defenders. Attacking on a narrow front promised greater success but required immediate reinforcement and continued attacks to achieve decisive results. As the war dragged on, attacking on a narrow front against specific objectives became a standard tactic and fed the ever-growing casualty lists.

Continued high casualty rates resulted because tactical developments failed to adapt to the new weapons technology. Few commanders understood how the rifle-musket strengthened the tactical defensive. However, some commanders made offensive innovations that met with varying success. When an increase in the pace of advance did not overcome the defenders' firepower advantage, some units tried advancing in open order. But open order formations lacked the appropriate mass to assault and carry prepared positions and created command and control problems beyond the ability of Civil War leaders to resolve. Later in the war, when the difficulty of attacking entrenched defenders under heavy fire became apparent, other tactical
expedients were employed. Attacking solidly entrenched defenders often required whole
brigades and divisions moving in dense masses to rapidly cover intervening ground, seize the
objective, and prepare for the inevitable counterattack. Seldom successful against alert and
prepared defenses, these attacks were generally accompanied by tremendous casualities and
foreshadowed the massed infantry assaults of World War I. Sometimes, large formations
attempted mass charges over short distances without halting to fire and without artillery
preparation.

As the war dragged on, tactical maneuver focused more on larger formations: brigade,
division, and corps. In most of the major battles fought after 1861, brigades were employed as
the primary maneuver formations. Brigades might retain coherent formations if the terrain were
suitably open, but often brigade attacks degenerated into a series of poorly coordinated
regimental attacks through broken and wooded terrain.

Typically, defending brigades stood in line of battle and blazed away at attackers as
rapidly as possible. Volley fire usually did not continue beyond the first round. Frequently,
soldiers fired as soon as they were ready, and it was common for two or three soldiers to work
together, one or two loading for the other to fire. Brigades were generally invulnerable to attacks
on their front and flanks if the units to the left and right held their ground or if reinforcements
came up to defeat the threat.

When a division attacked, its brigades often advanced in sequence, from flank to flank,
depending on the terrain, suspected enemy location, and number of brigades available. At times,
divisions attacked with two or more leading, followed by one or more brigades ready to reinforce
the lead brigades or maneuver to the flanks. Two or more divisions might conduct a corps attack
controlled by the army commander. More often, groups of divisions attacked under the control of
a corps commander. Division and corps commanders generally positioned themselves to the rear
of the main line in order to control the flow of reinforcements into the battle, but they often rode
forward into the battle lines to influence the action personally.

Of the three basic branches, cavalry made the greatest adaptation during the war. It
learned to use its horses for mobility, then dismount, and on foot like infantry. Cavalry regained
a useful battlefield role by employing this tactic, especially after repeating and breechloading
rifles gave it the firepower to contend with enemy infantry. In contrast, artillery found that it
could add its firepower to the rifle-musket and tip the balance even more in favor of the tactical
defensive, but artillery never regained the importance to the offensive that it held in Mexico.

The most significant tactical innovation in the Civil War was the widespread use of field
fortifications after armies realized the tactical offensive's heavy cost. It did not take long for the
deadly firepower of the rifle-musket to convince soldiers to entrench every time they halted.
Eventually, armies dug complete trenches within hours of halting in a position. Within twenty-
four hours, armies could create defensive works that were nearly impregnable to frontal assaults.
In this respect, this development during the American Civil War was a clear forerunner of the
kind of warfare that would dominate World War I.
Communications

Communications systems used in the Civil War consisted of line-of-sight visual signaling by flag, lantern, or torch, wire telegraphic systems, and courier methods. The telegraph served mainly as strategic and operational communications, visual line-of-sight provided both operational and limited tactical communications, and couriers were the primary means of tactical communications.

Both armies used Myer's wigwag system, but inclement weather could shut this means down. Both sides used simple codes. The Federals used sets of two concentric rotating disks, one containing numbers, the other letters. By prearranging the set of the wheels, the Federals could encode messages. This system proved secure. The Confederates used a sheet with rows of letters, not dissimilar to a page from a modern code book, and used prearranged code words to modify the encoding sequence. Confederate encoding procedures were often haphazard, and entries in Federal records show that this code was often broken.

As the war continued greater use was made of wire. The Federal field telegraph service used the Beardslee magneto-electric device. Field telegraph units carried the equipment on wagons necessary to lay wire between field headquarters. Thus field commanders could communicate with Washington. Confederate field telegraph operations remained too limited to be of operational significance. Existing Confederate telegraph lines provided a strategic capability but the lack of resources and factories in the South to produce wire precluded their expanding their telegraphic networks.

The courier or messenger system, using mounted staff officers or detailed soldiers to deliver orders and messages, was the most viable tactical communications option short of the commanders meeting face to face. Although often effective, this system had its shortcomings, as couriers were captured, killed, or delayed en route; commanders misinterpreted or ignored messages; and situations changed by the time a message was delivered.

Medical

Medical systems were basically similar. Surgeons general and medical directors for both sides had served many years in the prewar Medical Department but were hindered by lack of administrative experience in handling large numbers of casualties, as well as the state of medical science in the midnineteenth century. Administrative procedures improved with experience, but throughout the war, the lack of knowledge about the causes of disease and infection led to many more deaths than direct combat action.

Modern procedures for collection, evacuation, and care owes its inception to the efforts of men like surgeon Jonathan Letterman and his counterparts in the Federal and Confederate Medical Departments. The Letterman system was based on three precepts: consolidation of field hospitals at division level, decentralization of medical supplies down to regimental level, and
centralization of medical control of ambulances at all levels. A battlefield casualty evacuated from the front line received initial treatment at the regimental depot/holding area (aid station) immediately to the rear of the unit. An ambulance or wagon moved the wounded to the division field hospital (brigade clearing station), usually located within a mile of the battle lines (out of artillery range) where emergency surgery could be performed and wounded could be cared for until well enough to be returned to duty or transported to general hospitals located in the armies' rear area.

**Flow of Wounded -- Union**

Point of Injury (walk/assisted-unassisted, carried, or litter) → Regimental Depot (ambulance, litter, walk) → Division Hospital (ambulance, rail, or boat) → General Hospital

The Confederates system was generally the same as the Federals, except that Confederate field hospitals were usually consolidated at brigade level. Medical procedures, techniques, and problems were virtually identical for both sides. Commanders discouraged the common practice of soldiers leaving the battlefield to escort wounded to the rear. The established procedure for casualty evacuation was to detail men for litter and ambulance duty. Both armies detailed musicians and others as stretcher bearers. A common complaint was that commanders tended to detail those they felt they could most afford to give up--shirkers, skulkers, or "weak, sickly, and trifling men ... least suited for detail in the corps." Casualties would move or be assisted to the rear, where litter bearers evacuated them to the field hospital using ambulances or supply wagons. Ambulances were specially designed two- or four-wheel carts usually manned by a driver and two stretcher bearers.

Brigade and division surgeons staffed consolidated field hospitals. The average Federal division hospital train consisted of fourteen army wagons and four medical wagons, carrying twenty-two hospital tents, medical and surgical supplies and equipment to care for seven to eight thousand men. Sherman had three connecting hospital trains running between Atlanta and Louisville, 470 miles. In the Official Records, Federal medical records indicated that they received and treated 58,500 casualties. Of those 15,500 were combat casualties/wounded-31,300 were returned to duty, 26,000 evacuated, 1,200 died.

During the campaign, Confederate wounded were evacuated to Atlanta (outside the railroad station at Five Points); if they could be moved they were transferred to Macon, otherwise they were taken to local hospitals.

**THE LEADERS**

Because the organization, equipment, tactics, and training of the Confederate and Federal Armies were similar, the performance of units in battle often depended on the quality and
performance of their individual leaders. General officers were appointed by their respective central governments. At the start of the war, most, but certainly not all, of the more senior officers had West Point or other military school experience. In 1861, Lincoln appointed 126 general officers, of which 82 were, or had been, professional officers. Jefferson Davis appointed 89, of which 44 had received professional training. The remainder were political appointees, but of these, only 16 Federal and 7 Confederate generals had had no military experience.

Of the volunteer officers who comprised the bulk of the leadership for both armies, colonels (regimental commanders) were normally appointed by state governors. Other field grade officers were appointed by their states, although many were initially elected by their men. This long-established militia tradition, which seldom made military leadership and capability a primary consideration, was largely an extension of the states' rights philosophy and sustained political patronage in both the Union and the Confederacy.

Much has been made of the West Point backgrounds of the men who ultimately dominated the senior leadership positions of both armies, but the graduates of military colleges were not prepared by such institutions to command divisions, corps, or armies. Moreover, though many leaders had some combat experience from the Mexican War era, very few had experience above the company or battery level in the peacetime years prior to 1861. As a result, the war was not initially conducted at any level by "professional officers" in today's terminology. Leaders became more professional through experience and at the cost of thousands of lives. General William T. Sherman would later note that the war did not enter its "professional stage" until 1863.

MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENTS

CAPTAIN THOMAS J. BOX, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Captain Thomas J. Box, United States Army, Company D, 27th Indiana Infantry, for action at Resaca, Georgia, 14 May 1864.

CITATION: Capture of flag of the 38th Alabama Infantry (C.S.A.).

PRIVATE DENIS BUCKLEY, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private Denis Buckley, United States Army, Company G., 136th New York Infantry, for action at Peach Tree Creek, Georgia, 20 July 1864.

CITATION: Capture of flag of 31st Mississippi (C.S.A.).
SERGEANT THOMAS D. COLLINS, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Thomas D. Collins, United States Army, Company H, 143d New York Infantry, for action at Resaca, Georgia, 15 May 1864.

CITATION: Captured a regimental flag of the enemy.

PRIVATE HARRY DAVIS, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private Harry Davis, United States Army, Company G, 46th Ohio Infantry, for action at Atlanta, Georgia, 28 July 1864.

CITATION: Capture of flag of 30th Louisiana Infantry (C.S.A.).

BRIGADIER GENERAL MANNING F. FORCE, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Brigadier General Manning F. Force, United States Army, U.S. Volunteers, for action at Atlanta, Georgia, 22 July 1864.

CITATION: Charged upon the enemy's works, and after their capture defended his position against assaults of the enemy until he was severely wounded.

CAPTAIN M. R. WILLIAM GREBE, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Captain M. R. William Grebe, United States Army, Company F, 4th Missouri Cavalry, for action at Jonesboro, Georgia, 31 August 1864.

CITATION: While acting as aide and carrying orders across a most dangerous part of the battlefield, being hindered by a Confederate advance, seized a rifle, took a place in the ranks and was conspicuous in repulsing the enemy.

PRIVATE SAMUEL GRIMSHAW, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private Samuel Grimshaw, United States Army, Company B, 52d Ohio Infantry, for action at Atlanta, Georgia, 6 August 1864.

CITATION: Saved the lives of some of his comrades, and greatly imperiled his own by picking up and throwing away a lighted shell which had failed in the midst of the company.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOUGLAS HAPEMAN, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Hapeman, United States Army, 104th Illinois Infantry, for action at Peach Tree Creek, Georgia, 20 July 1864.

CITATION: With conspicuous coolness and bravery rallied his men under a severe attack, re-formed the broken ranks, and repulsed the attack.

PRIVATE PITT B. HERINGTON, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private Pitt B. Herington, United States Army, Company E, 11th Iowa Infantry, for action near Kenesaw Mountain, Georgia, 15 June 1864.

CITATION: With one companion and under a fierce fire of the enemy at close range. Went to the rescue of a wounded comrade who had fallen between the lines and carried him to a place of safety.

FIRST SERGEANT PATRICK IRWIN, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to First Sergeant Patrick Irwin, United States Army, Company H, 14th Michigan Infantry, for action at Jonesboro, Georgia, 1 September 1864.

CITATION: In a charge by the 14th Michigan Infantry against the entrenched enemy was the first man over the line of works of the enemy, and demanded and received the surrender of Confederate General Daniel Govan and his command.

SERGEANT JOSEPH S. KEEN, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Joseph S. Keen, United States Army, Company D, 13th Michigan Infantry, for action near Chattahoochee River, Georgia, 1 October 1864.

CITATION: While an escaped prisoner of war within the enemy's lines witnessed an important movement of the enemy, and at great personal risk made his way through the enemy's lines and brought news of the movement to Sherman's Army.

LIEUTENANT JEREMIAH KUDER, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Lieutenant Jeremiah Kuder, United States Army, Company A, 74th Indiana Infantry, for action at Jonesboro, Georgia, 1 September 1864.

CITATION: Capture of flag of 8th and 19th Arkansas (C.S.A.).
CAPTAIN HENRY W. LAWTON, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Captain Henry W. Lawton, United States Army, Company A, 30th Indiana Infantry, for action at Atlanta, Georgia, 3 August 1864.

CITATION: Led a charge of skirmishers against the enemy's rifle pits and stubbornly and successfully resisted 2 determined attacks of the enemy to retake the works.

SERGEANT CHARLES W. McKAY, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Charles W. McKay, United States Army, Company C, 154th New York Infantry, for action at Dug Gap, Georgia, 8 May 1864.

CITATION: Voluntarily risked his life in rescuing under fire of the enemy a wounded comrade who was lying between the lines.

PRIVATE HENRY B. MATTINGLY, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private Henry B. Mattingly, United States Army, Company B., 10th Kentucky Infantry, for action at Jonesboro, Georgia, 1 September 1864.

CITATION: Capture of flag of 6th and 7th Arkansas Infantry (C.S.A.).

PRIVATE WILLIAM B. MAYES, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private William B. Mayes, United States Army, Company K, 11th Iowa Infantry, for action near Kenesaw Mountain, Georgia, 15 June 1864.

CITATION: With one companion and under a fierce fire from the enemy at short range went to the rescue of a wounded comrade who had fallen between the lines and carried him to a place of safety.

MUSICIAN ROBINSON B. MURPHY, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Musician Robinson B. Murphy, United States Army, Company A, 127th Illinois Infantry, for action at Atlanta, Georgia, 28 July 1864.

CITATION: Being orderly to the brigade commander, he voluntarily led two regiments as reinforcements into line of battle, where he had his horse shot under him.
PRIVATE MARCELLUS J. NEWMAN, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private Marcellus J. Newman, United States Army, Company B, 111th Illinois Infantry, for action at Resaca, Georgia, 14 May 1864.

CITATION: Voluntarily returned, in the face of a severe fire from the enemy, and rescued a wounded comrade who had been left behind as the regiment fell back.

CAPTAIN PAUL A. OLIVER, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Captain Paul a. Oliver, United States Army, Company D, 12th New York Infantry, for action at Resaca, Georgia, 15 May 1864.

CITATION: While acting as aide assisted in preventing a disaster caused by Union troops firing into each other.

CORPORAL WESLEY J. POWERS, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Corporal Wesley J. Powers, United States Army, Company F, 147th Illinois Infantry, for action at Oostanaula, Georgia, 3 April 1865.

CITATION: Voluntarily swam the river under heavy fire and secured a ferryboat, by means of which the command crossed.

ASSISTANT SURGEON GEORGE E. RANNEY, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Assistant Surgeon George E. Ranney, United States Army, 2d Michigan Cavalry, for action at Resaca, Georgia, 14 May 1864.

CITATION: At great personal risk, went to the aid of a wounded soldier, Private Charles W. Baker, lying under heavy fire between the lines, and with the aid of an orderly carried him to a place of safety.

PRIVATE CHARLES F. SANCRAINTE, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private Charles F. Sancrainte, United States Army, Company B, 15th Michigan Infantry, for action at Atlanta, Georgia, 22 July 1864.

CITATION: Voluntarily scaled the enemy's breastworks and signaled to his commanding officer in charge; also in single combat captured the colors of the 5th Texas Regiment (C.S.A.).
PRIVATE JOSEPH A. SLADEN, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private Joseph A. Sladen, United States Army, Company A, 33d Massachusetts Infantry for action at Resaca, Georgia, 14 May 1864.

CITATION: While detailed as clerk at Headquarters, voluntarily engaged in action at a critical moment and personal example inspired the troops to repel the enemy.

SERGEANT JOHN H. R. STOREY, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Sergeant John H. R. Storey, United States Army, Company F, 109th Pennsylvania Infantry, for action at Dallas, Georgia, 28 May 1864.

in the right leg, which was amputated on the same day.

CITATION: While bringing in a wounded comrade, under a destructive fire, he was himself wounded

PRIVATE JAMES K. STURGEON, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private James K. Sturgeon, United States Army, Company F, 46th Ohio Infantry, for action at Kennesaw Mountain, Georgia, 15 June 1864.

CITATION: Advanced beyond the lines, and in an encounter with 3 Confederates shot 2 and took the other prisoner.

SERGEANT ERNST TORGLER, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Ernst Torgler, United States Army, Company G, 37th Ohio Infantry, for action at Ezra Chapel, Georgia, 28 July 1864.

CITATION: At great hazard of his life he saved his commanding officer, then badly wounded, from capture.

MAJOR and AIDE-de-CAMP HENRY E. TREMAIN, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Major and Aide-de-Camp Henry E. Tremain, United States Army, U.S. Volunteers, for action at Resaca, Georgia, 15 May 1864.

CITATION: Voluntarily rode between the lines while 2 brigades of Union troops were firing into each other and stopped the fire.
PRIVATE EDWIN M. TRUELL, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private Edwin M. Truell, United States Army, Company E, 12th Wisconsin Infantry, for action near Atlanta, Georgia, 21 July 1864.

CITATION: Although severely wounded in a charge, he remained with the regiment until again severely wounded, losing his leg.

CORPORAL GEORGE WILLIAM TYRRELL, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Corporal George William Tyrrell, United States Army, Company H, 5th Ohio Infantry, for action at Resaca, Georgia, 14 May 1864.

CITATION: Capture of flag.

MUSICIAN ALASON P. WEBBER, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Musician Alason P. Webber, United States Army, 86th Illinois Infantry, for action at Kenesaw Mountain, Georgia, 27 June 1864.

CITATION: Voluntarily joined in a charge against the enemy, which was repulsed, and by his rapid firing in the fact of the enemy enabled many of the wounded to return to the Federal lines; with others, held the advance of the enemy while temporary works were being constructed.

SERGEANT STEPHEN WELCH, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Stephen Welch, United States Army, Company C, 154th New York Infantry, for action at Dug Gap, Georgia, 8 May 1864.

CITATION: Risked his life in rescuing a wounded comrade under fire of the enemy.

PRIVATE WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS, UNITED STATES ARMY

By direction of Congress, the President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Medal of Honor to Private William H. Williams, United States Army, Company C, 82d Ohio Infantry, for action at Peach Tree Creek, Georgia, 20 July 1864.

CITATION: Voluntarily went beyond the lines to observe the enemy; also aided a wounded comrade.

(Information provided by Cas Michael Criscillis)
FOR FURTHER READING


Horn, Stanley F. *The Army of Tennessee*. Norman, Oklahoma, 1953.


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